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Abstract
The main objective of this research is the development and initial
testing (through secondary analysis) of a conceptual framework for
analysis which is intended to assist both the policy analyst and the
policy researcher in their empirical investigations into policy phenome-
na. This framework is meant to facilitate understanding of the policy
formation process by focusing attention on the basic forces shaping the
main features of policy formation as a dynamic social-political-organi-
zational process.
The primary contribution of the framework lies in its capability
to suggest useful ways of looking at policy formation reality. It pro-
vides the analyst and the researcher with a group of indicators which
suggest where to look and what to look for when attempting to analyze
and understand the mix of forces which energize, maintain, and direct
the operation of strategic level policy systems. Furthermore, it repre-
sents more than a checklist of important variables because it extends
well beyond the mere identification of such variables. That is, the
framework also highlights inter-connections, linkages, and relational
patterns between and among important variables. The framework offers
an integrated set of conceptual tools which facilitate understanding of
and research on the complex and dynamic set of variables which interact
-2-
in any major strategic level policy formation process.
The framework developed herein is grounded in a set of basic, policy-
relevant concepts, including the concepts of: policy, policy strategies,
search, policy feasibility, the scope and intensity of change, crisis,
and policy analysis. The main components of the framework include:
alternative policy strategies, strategic decision issues, policy analy-
sis, and policy feasibility. Within these components, specific emphasis
is given to a diverse set of strategic, analytical, and extra-rational
variables. In addition, political variables such as consensus build-
ing and maintenance, coalition formation, and the intentions, perceptions,
leverage, and capacities of policy actors are integrated into the frame-
work.
Once developed, the framework is initially tested through applica-
tion to a recently recorded case study of a broad, complex, strategic
level policy formation process. The case study chosen for this purpose
represents a rich mix of strategic, analytical, and political variables.
It traces the operation of the policy formation process which ultimately
resulted in a major reorganization of the United States postal system.
Through application of the framework, the Postal Reform Case is analyzed,
with particular emphasis on the strategic aspects of the policy formation
process.
The utility of the framework as an heuristic aid to policy analysis
and policy research is clearly demonstrated even in this preliminary
testing through secondary analysis. Use of the framework provided con-
ceptual tools for focusing and ordering a wealth of complex behavioral
data, and it facilitated analysis and understanding of this unstructured
and variable-rich policy formation process.
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Part I: Introduction and Overview
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Policy Research: The Need, The Ends, and The Means
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Chapter One
Policy Research: The Need, The Ends, and The Means
1A. Introduction and Overview
This first chapter of what promises to be a rather lengthy study of
the policy formation process will deal with the need for research on the
policy formation process, the ends to be achieved by this study (i.e.,
the research objectives and intended outputs) and the means for moving
towards that goal (i.e., the study design and methodology).
This study, and a complimentary effort being carried out nearly
simultaneously by a fellow doctoral candidate at Northwestern University,
is the result of a long-standing interest in gaining theoretical insights
into the complexity of the operation of the policy formation process,
as a means of enhancing the now rather primitive capability to improve
that process and the policy outcomes it produces. Early attempts at
policy analysis and policy research made obvious the need for some type
of at least semi-structured framework to bring order to the complexity
and dynamic nature of the numerous variables which affect policy forma-
tion. Furthermore, prior organizational experience and a general
familiarity with the policy literature created an awareness of the need
for a framework which would facilitate behaviorally oriented studies of
the policy formation process. This study is an attempt to meet that need.
1B.. The Need for Research on the Policy Formation Process-
The basic need for research on the policy formation process arises
.
My colleague, Harold E. Dolenga, is preparing a comprehensive, analytical
case study of the policy formation process as manifested in recent postal
reform and reorganization policy decisions taken by the U.S. Government.
2
3out of an historical neglect of this type and level of phenomenon, and
the resultant low level of knowledge about policy processes. This un-
acceptable state of affairs, and the challenge it presents, are both
encapsulated in this brief observation by Joseph Bower:(1 )
"In short, the theory of organizations is still in
an infant stage as far as the policymaker is con-
cerned. To some extent, we know what is needed,
however, and it is thus possible that efforts can
be usefully invested in accelerating and guiding the
maturation process." (p. 143)
Thus, the basic rationale for this study is the pressing need to provide
concrete input into an emerging, seminal effort which is aimed at
"accelerating and guiding the maturation process" of organization theory
from a policy perspective.
The terms policy and policy formation, as defined in this study, are
intended to connote a concern with strategic, macro-level decision pro-
cesses. The primary focus of this work will be on the main features of
policy formation as a social-political-organizational process, with a
particular emphasis on the strategic aspects of the dynamic interactions
manifest in policy systems.
lB1. Necessary Prerequisites. Before significant progress can be made
insofar as the study of the policy formation process, it appears to be
fairly obvious that two pre-requisites need to be met. The first of these
concerns the nearly complete absence in the literature of analytical-
ly oriented descriptions of actual policy system behavior vis-a-vis complex,
This neglect arose partly out of a less than adequate research methodology,
and partly out of a distortion of the so-called "scientific method," which
was erroneously interpreted to mean that phenomena not susceptible to
"rigorous" empirical testing should not or could not be studied "scientifi-
cally". These false barriers to policy research are examined and countered
in this chapter.
4dynamic, real policy formation processes. For a variety of reasons,
these real processes are rarely recorded by the participants or even by
knowledgable observers. Such documentation as has been done by "out-
siders" tends to be one or more of the following: inaccurate, superficial,
narrow in focus, incomplete, untimely, or lacking in theoretical content.
In short, policy research is severely hampered by the lack of a reliable
data base. Sophisticated behavioral studies of actual policy formation
processes are long overdue.
The second pre-requisite to meaningful policy process research is
related to the need for a theoretical framework to guide and focus
research efforts. At present, it is nearly impossible to locate an
operational research paradigm adequate for policy research. The necessary
tools, concepts, and theoretical foundations (to the extent they exist
at all) are intermingled in a vast and diffuse literature which encompasses
diverse disciplines and methodologies.
1B2. The Need for a Framework. Even if a reliable data base were now
available, that data would likely be so rich and complex as to defy
treatment by typical research methodologies. What appears to be lacking
is the development of a conceptual framework for analysis. Such a frame-
work would necessarily require an ecclectic theoretical grounding and a
flexible structure capable of accommodating rich, complex empirical data.
The development of such a framework is the primary purpose of this study.
The framework to be developed herein is intended to have a strong theore-
tical and empirical foundation. (See Section iD2 for an overview of the
The recent work of Dolenga (1972) on postal reform and reorganization
is a heartening step in the direction of remedying many of these data base
problems.
5contemplated conceptual framework for analysis.)
The need for conceptual frameworks for studying policy formation
phenomena has been clearly recognized and intensively urged by students
of policy. Indeed the absence of any comprehensive framework has been
noted as an important reason for the failure of most contemporary
writing on policy formation to penetrate beyond technicalities into
basic features.(2)
To serious students of public policy processes, it seems to be
patently obvious that most of the problems which plague the U.S. govern-
ment today cannot be usefully encompassed within any conceptual frame-
work which is not broad enough and flexible enough to deal with intra-
organizational, and environmental variables. Increasingly, viable
policy formation necessitates transcending the narrow confines of in-
dividual organizations and individual disciplines. Indeed, the very
historical persistence of many long-standing problems seems to be rooted
in past attempts to "solve" them within closed, narrow formulations.
1B3. The Empirical Justification. Very little empirical work has been
done at the level of strategic decision-making within the context of
policy formulation processes. Most of the sparse contributions to date
have been limited to partial, self-serving, descriptive narratives
written by involved "insiders", and to the somewhat sterile written public
record (e.g., transcripts of Congressional Hearings). Neither of these
sources has added much scholarly insight into the relationships among the
complex and dynamic forces which mold these critical processes. A higher
level of understanding of these forces is a pre-requisite to viable attempts
to improve the process.
3
6lB4. The Theoretical Justification. From a theoretical perspective,
and considering policy formation relevance, two main weaknesses of or-
ganization theory literature and research are of concern here. These
are; first, the tendency toward micro-level research and reductionism;
and, secondly, the lack of attention to political variables. Katz and
Kahn(3) and Mouzelis( 4 ) have independently noted two competing histori-
cal approaches to research and theory building. The first is a 'bottom-
up" approach which predominately focuses on the individual (or small
group) as the unit of analysis. The second is the "top-down" approach
which attempts to deal with broad societal level variables. What both
of these approaches have not dealt with adequately is that immensely im-
portant intermediate level of human activity, the formal organization
(and its interaction with the environment and the individual and group
levels of analysis). Katz and Kahn and Mouzelis have noted some encou-
raging signs of a potential convergence of these two previously distinct
streams of activity, and they suggest that the area of intersection may
rather fortuitously turn out to be the formal organization. All such
efforts aimed at convergence are commendable. However, perhaps the
optimism of Katz and Kahn and Mouzelis will prove to be misplaced if the
matter is left to chance or to the slow process of evolution.
This pessimism springs, in part, from a recognition of the urgent
need to move to even a higher unit of analysis than the formal organiza-
tion; i.e., to the inter-organizational or system level. Success in
escalating from the individual and small group level to the level of the
organization has not been encouraging. Although there have been a num-
ber of works that purport to make such a great leap forward, on closer
7examination, these largely turn out to be treatises on the social-psy-
chology of the individual actor (decisionmaker) albeit in an organiza-
tional setting.
As Zald(6) has noted:
"Most of the organizational theory literature is
primarily focused on the socially microscopic
phenomena individual, small groups, inter-personal
relations, etc., the larger phenomena have been
taken as aggregates of microscopic or as environ-
mental factors that interact with the microscopic.
What is neglected albeit not entirely abandoned are
more macroscopic things within which the individual
behavior take place."
Similar criticisms of the discipline of political science may be found
in the recent work of Morton Kaplan( 7) and Heinz Eulau(8). Likewise,
Etzioni has convincingly argued that the empirical study of macro
systems remains neglected in sociology, in organization theory, and is
badly handled in political science.(9)
A major barrier which seems to account for the extremely slow ex-
pansion in the level of analysis in these disciplines is the notion of
the building block approach to research and theory-building. This
extremely conservative orientation suggests that, as Mouzelis(l ) has
noted:
. . . one should not venture to study such larger
social systems as whole societies or organizations
before enough building blocks, enough solid knaw-
ledge has been accumulated about less inclusive and
complex systems. Of course, when one takes into
consideration the multiplicity of levels of analy-
sis and the irreducibility of the higher to the
lower, one sees the absurdity of such a strategy
and the unnecessary restrictions that it imposes
on social research." (p. 173)
This research is an attempt to loosen the rigid constraints of the micro-
reductionist, deductive model. It argues for the need to expand the unit
8of analysis, not only to the intermediate level of the formal organiza-
tion, but even beyond that to the inter-organizational and systems level.
Thus, while fully recognizing the limitations of many existing
conceptual tools, this type of study attempts to broaden the horizons of
organization theory. In particular, work such as the new volvme by
Tuite, Chisholm, and Radnor seems to be a first step in the right
direction. Tuite, et al., have clearly recognized that:
"Regardless of discipline, the authors, as they
attempt to grapple with significant policy issues,
find that the problems with which they must deal
transcend the domain of any one organization. Many
of our problems are now inter-system problems. This
does not mean that all intra-system issues have been
solved, but it does represent a shift of focus." (p. 217)
This shift in focus is critically needed. Despite the recent prolifera-
tion of research and writing with an environmental and ecological orien-
tation,(1
2 ) much of this environmental literature is still limited in
the sense that it deals with the interaction of a specific organizational
sub-unit, or with a specific organization, and its proximate environment.
The critical dimension of inter-organizational decision-making variables
remains virtually ignored in the literature.(l3)
lB4-1. Policy Studies. In addition to this general lack of treatment
of inter-organizational variables, there are practically no behaviorally
oriented empirical studies of macro level policy formation processes in
the public sector. Such work as has been done to date has generally been
limited to business organizations, with some recent extensions to the
health and education institutional settings. Generally, the approach
used in these studies has been limited to non-strategic managerial sub-
decisions, ignoring the more encompassing, and at least potentially more
9significant, policy level decisions. Even the much hearlded, A Behavior-
al Theory of the Firm,(l4) could not legitimately be classified as a
study of policy formation within the business firm, because it focuses
largely on a very selective sub-set of intra-firm decisions. Further-
more, as of this date, this Cyert and March model lacks any comprehen-
sive empirical testing.
1B4-2. Political Variables. The sparse organization theory literature
relating to organizations as decision systems is virtually devoid of any
systematic treatment of political variables. (For an extensive treatment
of the concept of the potential influence of such political variables,
see Chapter Five which deals with political feasibility and consensus
building.) To the extent that this important dimension is recognized by
major organization theorists, it is treated as a micro-level phenomenon
operative at the level of the individual member or at the level of the
small group. Such is the case with the March and Simon treatment of the
individual member's decision to join or leave the organization,(15)
and with the Cyert and March narrow treatment of organizational coali-
tions.(16) Despite the fact that some few theorists in both the manage-
ment and public administration fields have given lip service to the
(17)existence and importance of political variables, it is very diffi-
cult to find any systematic theoretical or empirical treatment of this
dimension in a policy formation context.
1B5. Other Factors Supporting the Need for Policy Research. In addition
to the basic rationale discussed above concerning too strong a tendency
to focus on micro research through reductionism, and the lack of attention
10
to political variables, two subsidiary factors, taken together, constitute
additional support of the need for empirically-based research on policy
formation processes. These two factors are discussed below:
1) Policy strategies as a focus of empirical investigation are
nearly ignored in organization theory research. The author was unable
to identify any empirical research focused explicitly on policy strate-
gies in the broad sense of the term, (i.e., analyzing policies in terms
of their implicit or explicit strategies). The need for such research
was recognized by Dror's observation that, "What is urgently needed is
intensive study and research which will permit elaboration of various
strategies in terms of applicability, effectiveness, and efficiency
under different conditions".( 18) This study is an initial step in the
direction partially fulfilling that need.
2) Harold Wilensky,(19 ) Miller, (2 0 ) and Evans,(2 1 ) have all stressed
the critical importance of the "boundary issue", arguing that this is the
point where most bridging assistance of scientific contribution is need-
ed. In governmental macro systems, the 'boundary personnel" are indivi-
dual high-level policymakers who may have a critical impact on policy
formation. The actual and potential role of these high-level policymakers
is very neglected in organization theory research. This is in part due
to difficulties of access, on the one hand, and to an over reliance on
research methods which are not useful in dealing with such phenomena on
the other hand. A failure to deal systematically with the potentially
crucial role of such top-level policymakers has precluded utilization of
valuable sources of knowledge such as the experience and intuition of
these important practitioners. Because of its intended focus on the
11
strategic level policy formation system, this study will, hopefully,
provide some additional insight into this relatively unexplored field.
1C. Research Objectives and Intended Outputs
Intellectually this research is based on theoretical work aimed at
developing a conceptual framework for the behavioral study of policy
formation processes in very complex policy systems. Empirically, this
study is based on extensive field work which provided the data for
preparation of a comprehensive case study (composed of several major
sub-decisions) of the policy formation process regarding postal reform
and reorganization. Through secondary analysis of the case study prepared
by Dolenga,( 2 ) the framework developed herein is subjected to initial
and preliminary testing.
1C1. General Objectives. The general objectives for this study rest,
of course, on the intellectual and empirical bases cited above. The main
objective of this research is the development and initial testing (through
secondary analysis) of a conceptual framework for analysis which is in-
tended to assist both the policy analyst and the policy researcher in their
empirical investigations into policy phenomena. This framework is meant
to facilitate understanding of the policy formation process by focusing
attention on the basic forces shaping the main features of policy forma-
tion as a dynamic social-political-organizational process. Once developed,
the framework is initially tested through application to a recently record-
ed analytical case study of a broad, complex, strategic level policy forma-
tion process. The case study chosen for this purpose represents a rich
mix of strategic, analytical, and political variables. It traces the
12
operation of the policy formation process which ultimately resulted in
a major reorganization of the United States postal system. Through appli-
cation of the framework, the Postal Reform Case is analyzed, with parti-
cular emphasis on the strategic aspects of the policy formation process.
1C2. Specific Intended Outputs. Stated more specifically, the intended
outputs of this research will include:
1) The development of a conceptual framework for the behavioral
study of policy formation processes in general. (See Section 1D2
below for an overview of the nature and purposes of the framework to be
developed.)
2) A selective analysis of major strategic issues in the case
study, made primarily through application of the conceptual framework for
analysis. This selective analysis will focus on an examination of the
policy formation process in terms of its implicit and explicit strategies.
The primary purpose of this analysis is to test the viability of the con-
ceptual framework as an heuristic aid to policy analysis and policy
research. A secondary objective will be an attempt to identify the essen-
tial conditions under which policymakers may tend to choose a strategy
of radical, vice incremental change.
LD. Methodology
This section will discuss the overall study design and will provide
an overview of the conceptual framework and its intended application.
lDl. Overall Study Design. As already noted, this study consists of
two main parts; the theoretical development of a conceptual framework
for policy analysis, and the initial testing of that framework through
13
application to a recently recorded analytical case study of a broad,
complex, strategic-level policy formation process.
Development of the conceptual framework represents a theoretical
contribution to both the literature and methodology of policy formation
studies. The empirical contribution has two components. First, the
author actively participated in an extensive schedule of field inter-
*
viewing conducted by Dolenga. These field interviews, most of which
were conducted in Washington, D.C., provided the basic data base from
which Dolenga prepared his analytical case study of the postal reform
and reorganization policy formation process. (23) The interview instru-
ments and most of the interviews themselves were a joint venture between
Fuchs and Dolenga, an arrangement approved by Dr. Michael Radnor who
served as the Dissertation Adviser for both individuals.
Secondly, through secondary analysis of Dolenga's case study, the
utility of the conceptual framework for analysis will be tested. That
is, its value in facilitating understanding of the policy processes
contained in the postal reform/reorganization case study will be deter-
mined through application to a data base which reflects empirical
reality. The objective of the secondary analysis will not be to provide
a complete analysis of the postal case as a discrete policy formation
situation. Rather, the objective will be to examine key strategic dimen-
sions (as suggested by the conceptual framework) as a means of gaining
Dolenga was a fellow doctoral candidate who shared the author's long-
term interest in policy formation processes. In many respects, Dolenga's
work stands as a valuable complement to this study. Therefore, the
serious reader is strongly urged to read both dissertations in order
to obtain a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical understanding
of policy formation reality.
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insight into the policy processes operative in the postal case. There-
fore, the degree of detail will be kept to the minimum necessary to
illuminate the main decisional issues involved in the case.
In summary, this study will have identifiable theoretical and empiri-
cal components which will be integrated in the development and prelimi-
nary testing of a behaviorally oriented conceptual framework for the
general analysis of policy formation processes. As previously noted,
some aspects of the empirical part of the study were jointly conducted
with Dolenga, who, in turn, made significant contributions to the
theoretical development of the framework.
1D2. An Overview of the Conceptual Framework for Analysis. The sec-
tions which follow will provide an overview of the main characteristics
of the conceptual framework for analysis. The following topics will be
addressed: 1) underlying assumptions; 2) conceptual frameworks as in-
struments for theory building and research; 3) delimitation of the frame-
work; 4) basic framework design; 5) potential uses; 6) methodological
considerations; 7) limitations; and 8) application of the framework.
1D2-1. Underlying Assumptions. It is extremely important that the
conceptual framework be viewed synoptically and that its heuristic nature
not be erroneously transformed into algorithms never intended. Both
prior organizational experience and this research experience have generated
a profound respect for the complexity of policy formation as a process.
Therefore, there is no intent to imply that this framework is capable of
explaining all aspects of that complexity. However, this conceptual
framework does offer to both the policy analyst and to the policy re-
searcher a very useful heuristic aid, insofar as it focuses attention on
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important aspects of the policy process and suggests useful avenues
along which to pursue policy research. Understood and applied as an
integrated package, the framework should yield insight and understand-
ing about some very vital aspects of policy formation--a process present-
ly shrouded in myth and misunderstanding.
In addition to the foregoing caveat, it should be explicitly recog-
nized that this work rests on the premise that the application and utili-
zation of a systematic, analytical approach, which accommodates important
extra-rational factors, may lead to improved understanding of policy
formation. Furthermore, careful extension of such an approach offers the
potential for making important, but deliberate and limited advances in
the quality of policy formation. This study is primarily concerned
with description and analysis as aids to understanding. However, impli-
cit in this quest for understanding is the (as yet untested) belief that
the generation of meaningful descriptive theories of policy formation is
a pre-requisite to serious advancement in prescriptive theories.
Thus, it should be made clear that despite an underlying concern
on the part of the author for the quality of policy formation, that
concern lies well beyond the scope and intent of the present work.
Therefore, an algorithmic acceptance of a simplistic notion about the
existence of any direct or strong casual relationships between the quality
of the process and the resultant policy outputs would be unwarranted.
Indeed, the task of identifying and testing such causal relationships
is in many respects beyond the present and forseeable potential capacity
of social science because of the fact that a policy outcome is usually
determined not merely by the quality of the policy decisions taken
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earlier (policy outputs(24)), but also by other factors and subsequent
events. Some of these could probably not have been anticipated, in
advance, by policy actors in reaching their decisions. On the other hand,
to the extent that major variables influencing a policy outcome could
have been anticipated during policy formation, they become the legiti-
mate concern of the relevant policy system and are properly included
in any viable investigative framework for analysis.
1D2-2. Conceptual Frameworks In Theory and Research. Conceptual frame-
works are, of course, not a new instrument for either theory building
or for research. Useful frameworks have been developed and applied
by Snyder, et al.,(25) Anthony, (26) yerson and Banfield,(27) Olsen,(28)
(29)
Holsti,( and others. However, it should be noted that most earlier
efforts have been in the context of either international relations or
business institutions. Even within these fields there has not been
any significant advance since the appearance of seminal works such as
those cited above. Furthermore, this author is unaware of any serious
efforts to develop a comprehensive framework within the context of
federal level public policy formation systems and certainly not one which
specifically includes inter-organizational dimensions.
In addition to the above considerations, this framework is distin-
guished from others by its unique focus on the methodology of policy
formation; namely, "policies on policies". Although the framework is in-
tended to be applied, tested, and refined through application to discrete
policy cases, its basic orientation is with policy systems themselves.
Thus, application of the framework is aimed at developing a perspective
for the analysis of policy-making processes in general, rather than at
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the substantive analysis of particular policies.
The framework presented here as a major output of this study
elaborates a network of conceptual tools which should assist the policy
analyst and researcher in their empirical investigations into policy
phenomena. The framework may be thought of as a focusing device which
attempts to bring into clearer relief at least some of the main con-
tours, characteristics, and dimensions of a complex policy terrain
which is as yet uncharted in any systematic way. The intent here is
to move in the direction of Banfield who characterizes a good conceptual
scheme as one which tends to be logically complete or systematic and
which will, therefore, direct attention to all relevant features of the
situation under study.( 3 )
The primary contribution of this framework lies in its ability
to suggest useful ways of looking at policy formation reality. It offers
to the analyst and researcher a group of indicators which suggest where
to look and what to look for when attempting to analyze and understand
the mix of forces which energize, maintain, and direct operation of
macro level policy systems. However, the framework is more than a
checklist of important variables, because it moves well beyond mere
identification of such variables. That is, the central value of the frame-
work lies in its potential to highlight inter-connections, linkages, and
relational patterns between and among important variables. The frame-
work offers an integrated set of conceptual tools which can provide
some counter-balance to the tendency of man to (as Simon has noted), at
worst, ignore, and, at best, ineffectively deal with "the interrelatedness
of all things."(31)
1D2-3. Delimitation of the Framework. The study of any social phenomena
requires a selection from some phenomenological totality of only those
of its concrete aspects which are most relevant to the problem under
investigation. This selection process involves choices which serve to
isolate a part of the social reality in order to reduce its overall
complexity and permit observation and analysis. These choices also serve
to determine the analytical or conceptual basis of the relevant theory.
That is, decisions as to what is to be studied and why, operate so as to
set theoretical boundaries, to discriminate between more relevant and less
relevant properties, and to indicate-what is going to be explained and
what is going to be considered as given.
In the instant case, such selection choices and decisions about
what would be studied and why, have inevitably impacted on the structure
and context of this conceptual framework. Basic decisions about which
of the myriad of variables affecting policy formation would be important
(useful) enough to include in the framework were influenced by: (1) a
very extensive review of the diverse literature which has contributed to
the very partial and fragmented existing body of knowledge about policy
processes; (2) broad personal experience in large operating organizations;
and (3) preliminary investigation into the nature of the phenomenon under
investigation. The results of such choices cannot be judged to be right
or wrong, only to be more or less useful. Through elaboration and appli-
cation of the framework, the degree of usefulness will become more evident.
1D2-4. Basic Design. The framework to be developed herein is grounded in
See Vita, p.
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a set of basic, policy-relevant concepts, including the concepts of;
policy, policy strategies, policy feasibility, the scope and intensity
of change, crisis, and search and evaluation processes. The main compo-
nents of the framework include: alternative policy strategies, strate-
gic decision issues, policy analysis, and policy feasibility. Within
these components, specific emphasis is given to a diverse set of strate-
gic, analytical, and extra-rational variables. In addition, political
variables such as consensus building and maintenance, coalition formation,
and the intentions, perceptions, leverage, and capacities of policy
actors are integrated into the framework.
The framework is in no way intended to represent a process model
and it would be erroneous to view it as such. Furthermore, the frame-
work is not intended to reflect any attempt to model actual behavior of
the policy actors or system. Instead, the objective, at this stage, is
to present a set of variables thought to be useful dimensions along
which to study and analyze the operation of a policy system, and to
attempt to demonstrate (through application to case data) the heuristic
value of focusing on this set of variables. The framework is a compo-
site collection of process and system variables, along with other behav-
ioral variables (such as ideologies, institutional awareness, etc.)
which are difficult to categorize rigorously, and which are frequently
ignored or only partially dealt with in the literature and in empirical
research on policy processes.
JD2-5. Potential Use. The conceptual framework can be used behaviorally
for selecting and ordering data and for describing, analyzing, and explain-
ing policy formation phenomena. The framework also offers a potential
C
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for normative or prescriptive use by suggesting possible avenues of
improvements in the policy formation process. These two main uses of
the framework are closely related in the sense that normative recommenda-
tions require a strong behavioral foundation. However, despite the
existence of a potential for translating this behavioral framework into
a normative one, that task is beyond the scope of this study which will
concentrate on the descriptive, behavioral, and analytical uses of the
framework, once it is developed.
1D2-6. Methodological Considerations. The heuristic nature of the
framework and its intended use for policy analysis and for research on
policy formation should be emphasized. The selection of variables and
their categorization and degree of elaboration are all aimed at the
central purpose of providing a conceptual framework which will be useful
for studying the policy formation process. The objective was not to
create elegant and aesthetically pleasant taxonomies nor to generate
categorially extensive morphological analyses. No claim is being made
that this framework contains categories of variables which are exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive. In this sense, it does not meet any rigid
"scientific" definition of what an ideal framework ought to be. Instead,
the objective here is to develop a framework which would be useful in
providing a mechanism capable of highlighting interdependencies and
linkages between and among clusters of variables.
Thus, the reader will not find here a completed and elegant
taxonomy. Instead, the reader will find a tentative and preliminary
framework which identifies and integrates in a logical and consistent
manner, groups of important variables, examination of which will raise
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the level of understanding of complex policy formation processes.
Formulation of the framework required an eclectic and dialectic
approach to the literature and research findings of a variety of disci-
plines. This seems to be particularly appropriate for this research
effort which is grounded in the discipline of organization theory. For,
as Pugh( 32 ) has noted, one major distinctive characteristic of organ-
ization theory is the fact that:
"Researchers are more aware of work in other
fields, cross boundary interaction is more
frequent, and therefore a wider range of
analytical concepts is being used."
Since the systematic study of macro-level policy formation systems
is essentially virgin territory, and because a framework such as that
proposed here is non-existent elsewhere, this work borrows and adapts
concepts and terminology from a variety of sources. In addition to the
adaptation and refinement of existing concepts from disciplines such as
organization behavior, political science, and economics, several new
concepts are developed and introduced, especially in cases where exist-
ing conceptual tools were inadequate for present purposes. The reader
who is acquainted with some seemingly familiar concepts from other
disciplines is, therefore, cautioned to obtain a clear understanding of
the intended meaning of such concepts and terminology as used in this
framework.
1D2-7. Limitations.. As is the case with most heuristic aids, there is
a great danger that too much will be expected from the framework. There-
fore, it is necessary to again emphasize its provisional and tentative
character. This work is a beginning and not an end. This framework must
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be subjected to continued alteration, elaboration, and refinement based
on empirical research findings. Thus, the conceptual framework developed
herein can provide no answers. It can only suggest potentially useful
questions and potentially useful ways of looking for answers which will
facilitate understanding of policy phenomena. The conceptual tools
embeded in this framework for analysis cannot generate any prefabrica-
ted solutions to policy formation problems. Instead, they merely assist
in preparing the ground for the adequate handling of such problems.
Thus, the essential nature of the framework is heuristic rather than
algorithmic.
The proposed conceptual framework suffers from the danger of all
analytical approaches which involve breaking down of an overall Gestalt
into component parts. It renders all too obvious the problems inherent
in any attempt to hold in an interactive network the sometimes opposing
forces of analysis and synthesis. Recognizing the critical necessity of
maintaining a dynamic balance between the overall Gestalt of a policy
system and the specific influence of individual variables, the framework
attempts to focus attention on systematic movements back and forth
between detailed analytical treatment and the recombination of different
system components into a few main patterns of interaction.
Given the rather primitive state-of-the-art of the relevant methodo-
logy, and recognizing the severly limited body of knowledge which exists
today about policy processes, valid questions might be raised as to
whether attempts at development of a framework in this field are not
premature. Given the earlier caution that this framework is but a first
step towards the ultimate development of a rigorous and comprehensive
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framework, this attempt is not considered to be premature, but somewhat
overdue. Relevant here is James B. Conant's observation that develop-
ment of a framework or conceptual scheme has often led to progress even
though the framework turns out to be wrong.(33) Of course, any frame-
work or paradigm of science can also stifle progress if it is -developed,
offered, and accepted with some dogmatic finality. Such an outcome of
this important, but modest, work is neither intended nor likely. None-
theless, despite the existence of a number of significant limitations and
the modest aspirations of this effort, the development and application
of the conceptual framework presented herein should facilitate progress,
for as Robert Anthony( 34 ) has noted:
"Isolated experience and discrete bits of knowledge
are not very useful. When organized into some kind of
pattern, however, the pieces often illuminate one
another; the whole becomes greater than the sum of
the parts. The very act of organization may show that
the framework will have served a useful purpose if it
prepares the way for a better one."
1D2-8. Application of the Framework. It cannot be said of the set of
concepts which comprise the framework presented here that it is right or
wrong. A more appropriate test would be whether or not it proves to
be useful to those who attempt to do analysis and research on policy
formation systems. Thus, the usefulness of this framework will be at
least partially tested through application of it to secondary analysis
of case data which describes the policy formation process which brought
about a major reorganization of the U. S. postal system. It is hoped
that even this preliminary testing will demonstrate both the theoretical
soundness and the applied value of the framework as a sensitizer, a
heuristic aid, and a set of guidelines to shape analysis and research
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on the policy formation process. During the application and analysis
stages, the emphasis will be on a search for some tentative main patterns
of potential interconnections and mutual influences among the major
variables and concepts comprising the framework.
1D2-9. Format. The conceptual framework for analysis is a comprehensive
package consisting of several theoretical developmental analysis papers
which constitute the next six chapters of this paper. These concept
papers address those basic concepts which form the essential theoretical
foundation underlying the policy formation process. The concepts
treated include: 1) policy; 2)policy strategies; 3) the scope and inten-
sity of change; 4) policy feasibility; 5) search an!d evaluation processes;
and 6) crisis. These six concepts are not intended to be either mutually
exclusive or exhaustive. Instead, taken together, they represent a
core of interdependent, suggestive concepts hypothesized as being vital
aspects of policy formation and thought to offer significant explanatory
power insofar as the objectives of the present study.
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Chapter Two
The Concept of Policy
2A. Chapter Overview
The main purpose of this chapter is to formulate a working defini-
tion of the concept of "policy". This will be done by first reviewing
existing attempts in the literature and then by synthesizing a composite
definition having potential utility for the present study. Afterfor-
mulation of an appropriate definition, the components of discrete policies
will be identified and three main dimensions for analyzing policy will
be examined.
2B. Definition of Policy
Definitions are always arbitrary and are usually designed to suit
the objective of the originator. At the same time, the value of a defi-
nition is largely determined by its isomorphism with the phenomena under
investigation and by its theoretical and empirical utility. Moreover,
definitions should be theoretically informed, since they acquire real
meaning only in a specific theoretical context. Consequently, the general
frame of reference for the study outlined here implies a certain defini-
tive conception of "policy" which deserves explication. Before attempt-
ing this, however, we will take a brief look at the conceptualizations
and definitions of "policy" contained in the existing literature.
A word of warning should be inserted here. An attempt to generate
a vaible definition of the term "policy" is an extremely difficult task
involving many not yet resolved methodological and conceptual problems.
Many distinguished scholars from a diversity of disciplines have tried
to come to grips with this challenge without great success. Therefore,
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any criticism herein of the work of others should be viewed as a con-
structive attempt to build on their earlier efforts.
The Dictionary of the Social Sciences( 1 ) defines the term "policy
as ". .. a course of action, or intended course of action,conceived
as deliberately adopted, after review of possible alternatives, and
pursued, or intended to be pursued." This definition fails to differen-
tiate between policy and decision, thereby implicitly suggesting that
the two concepts are synonomous. Therefore, this definition has very
limited validity for purposes of this study which (as we shall see) re-
quires a clear distinction between the concepts of decision and policy.
Perhaps the best evidence that the policy dimension is generally
-ignored in organization theory literature is the fact that it was
difficult to identify any scholars in this field, other than Katz and
Kahn, who found the need to explicitly define the term policy. Further-
more, even they, as we will soon recognize, have defined "policy" very
narrowly, for present purposes. Katz and Kahn(2) tell us that:
"Organizational policies are abstractions or generalizations
about organizational behavior at a level which involves the
structure of organization. Policymaking is therefore an
aspect of organizational change--the decision aspect." (p. 253)
This definition is problematic for several reasons. First, many policies
are neither aimed at, nor require organizational change. Secondly,
organizational change is in many (but not all) cases one effect of a
change in policy, but is not necessarily a useful starting point for
defining policy. Finally, an organizational decision to change the
rules of decision-making (which are usually associated with the change
in organizational processes) is an important aspect of policy-making
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which is not treated by the Katz and Kahn definition.
The work of Dye and Sharkansky provide an illustrative example
of the existing tendency in much of the policy literature and research
to avoid (fully or partly) coming to grips with this difficult defini-
tional problem. The utility of such work for purposes of this study
is minimal, at best. For example, Thomas Dye (3) has modeled the
policy-making process, but has failed to define or even to attempt to
define "policy", evidently assuming that there already exists a general
agreement as to its meaning. In one work, in just three short para-
graphs, Dye vses terminology such as "public policy", "policy choices",
"policy decisions", "public policy and output of political systems" and
"policy outputs". Each of these terms presumably refers to a different
aspect of "policy, but Dye offers no clear distinctions in this regard,
and makes no differentiation between "policy" and "policy outcomes".(4)
Other policy scholars such as Sharkansky,(5)for example, avoid
coming to grips with the definitional problem completely by focusing
almost exclusively on the analysis of governmental expenditures
(mainly on the State level) rather than dealing with policy in a broad
sense. Governmental expenditures are, of course, an important and
legitimate subject for study. However, the budgetary process and the
policy process are hardly synonomous. Beyond this, though, Sharkansky's
work is undermined by the fact that after a relatively extensive criti-
eism of the inadequacies of existing definitions, and after recognition
of the need for the study of broad policy phenomena, he moves to an
extended discussion of governmental expenditures without any attempt
to justify explicitly his apparent assumption of isomorphism and analogue
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between policy and expenditures. Such an approach, while useful for
some purposes, does not contribute much to the conceptualization of
broad level policy phenomena.
Rakoff and Schaefer,(6) for methodological convenience, define
policy as "action or non-action of the political system in response to
demand." It is difficult to see that such a convenient, but narrow,
definition does very much to illuminate the real complexity of the
phenomena under investigation. Of course, the decision on "non-action",
although often overlooked, is one among several important policy deci-
sions. However, to dichotomize policy as a single choice between action
and non-action will ensure, in advance, that the treatment of policy
phenomena will be narrow and superficial with little penetration into
the basic nature of the choices being made. Furthermore, such a defini-
tion would result in the classification of every convulsive reaction as
"policy".
A more elegant and sophisticated definition was introduced by
Lowi,( 7 ) who suggested a differentiation between "distributive" "redis-
tributive" and "regulatory" policy types. Salisbury has pointed out that
Lowi's distinctions are not only inapplicable in empirical research,
but also are weak because one must rely on the judgment of individual
actors as the final arbiters of the fine nuances that distinguish one
from other. Ironically, in view of the severity of this criticism, we
find that Salisbury himself utilizes the same distinction, in only
slightly refurbished form, adding the category of "self-regulatory"
policies.(8) Nonetheless, Lowi's approach provides an advanced insight
into this largely unexplored phenomena. However, the main problem with
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his and Salisbury's approaches is that, while they really offer an impor-
tant categorization of policy types, these are not really definitions
of the term policy.
A more useful distinction between the concepts policies and deci-
(9)
sions is provided by Forrester who advises:
"Policies and decisions are conceptually very distinct from
one another although they are intermingled and confused in
much of the management science literature. . ." Policies
are those rules that guide decisions. The policy treats
the general case and at least partly defines how specific
decisions are to be made. Conversely, a decision takes the
status and information of the system and processes it in
accordance with the guiding policy to determine current
action."(p. 430)
Dror,(lO) who is primarily concerned with public policy, suggests
the following definition:
"Public policy is a very complex, dynamic process, whose
various components make different contributions to it. It
decides major guidelines for action, directed at the future,
mainly by governmental organs. . . policy is direct output
of policymaking'
Bauer, et al., define policy as "strategic moves that direct
an organization's critical resources toward perceived opportunities
in a changing environment." ( ll)
Robinson, Ranney,and Van Dyke, all (with some minor variation)
define policy as a goal, or set of goals or objectives, including the
strategies to achieve them.(1 )
Ackoff defines policy as "a rule for selecting a course of action;
a decision rule." (l3)
Each of these attempts at defining the term/concept "policy" is
less than fully satisfactory, thus underscoring the inherent difficulties
mentioned at the outset. Therefore, it is apparent that any effort to
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define policy once and for all, and independently of a specific theo-
retical context, represents an exercise in futility. The only meaning-
ful alternative is to define policy within a clearly specified theore-
tical framework. When this is done, the theoretical schema employed
will indicate which parameters of the concept are likely to be most
useful for specific purposes.
By applying such criteria to the work of Forrester, Dror, Bauer,
et al., Robinson, Ranney, and Ackoff, we note the emergance of some
common characteristics of policy, viz., major guidelines or rules;
strategic moves; directed; future oriented; framework for discrete
decisions. By synthesizing these major characteristics, we can
create a composite definition which is richer and more useful for our
purposes. Thus, for this study, "policy" will be difined as a set of
major guidelines directed toward the future, pursued or intended to be
pursued, which provide a framework for discrete decisions.
This definition emphasizes policy as a directive, conscious
activity rather than a post-factum classification of system activity,
recognizing that such activity may be the aggregative result of undi-
rected side effects of systems transformation. Furthermore, this defi-
nition is flexible enough to accommodate what Eulau calls the "tension"
arising out of the simultaneity of causal and purposive properties of
policy.( 1 4 ) In addition, this approach highlights the strategic
dimension of policy in the sense of providing a framework of guidelines
and boundaries of the policy space within which discrete decisions are
to be made. The third characteristic emphasizes the future orientation
of policy in the sense of the planning mode.
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The definition of "policy" suggested above is broad enough to include
the main features of policy formation and yet, is operational enough
to provide meaningful guidelines for research. It is broad enough be-
cause it may be applied to policies at different system levels and in
different institutional contexts; and, because it deals with the major
basic features of policy, i.e., overall goals, strategies, boundaries,
time dimensions, etc. This definition is operational because it facili-
tates the analysis of policies by focusing scarce research resources on
critical, identifiable policy features and it provides guidelines for
building a more detailed conceptual framework as will be demonstrated
later.
2C. Policy Components
The following five components of policy suggested by Austin Ranney(1 5)
appear to have heuristic value for research and analysis. Each discrete
policy may be thought of as consisting of these five components:
(a) A particular object(s) which is (are) intended to be affected.
(b) A desired course of events which will bring about a parti-
cular sequence of behavior desired in the particular object(s).
(c) A selected line of action to bring about desired course of
events.
(d) A declaration of intent by the policymakers as to what they
intend to do and why.
(e) An implementation of the intent.
Thus, it may be quite instructive to examine discrete policies in terms
of these five components as a means of understanding the emergence of
particular policies in specific contexts. Furthermore, this set of
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components suggests a useful basis for comparative analysis.
2D. Three Main Dimensions for Analyzing Policy
In principle, the analysis of any policy can be made within the
framework of the following three main dimensions:
(a) The policy process(6)
(b) The policy content(17)
(c) The policy outcome(l8)
The analysis of the policy process is mainly focused on the action and
interaction over time of the forces and actors in the policy formation
system that mold the policymaker's ultimate choice of a particular
policy content; namely, the policy output. The analysis of policy
content relates to all five of the previously mentioned policy compo-
nents vis-a-vis a particular policy. A policy outcome is a term sug-
gested by Easton to distinguish the consequences of a policy output from
the output itself.(19) Policy outcome includes the way or ways in
which the course of events is in fact affected by the policymaker's
choice behavior. Policy outcome is influenced not only by the policy
alternative "chosen", but also by other antecedent factors and subse-
quent events, some of which could probably not have been anticipated
by the policymaker at the time he was reaching his decision.
2E. Parameters of the Present Study
In terms of policy components mentioned above, this study is
intended to deal with the first four of the five policy components
mentioned above. Although the framework does not explicitly deal with
the implementation stage of the policy formation process, it is strongly
oriented toward implementation strategies, the analysis of implementation
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capabilities, and the examination of organizational, political, and
economic implications of alternative policies, because these factors
are important and integral parts of the policy formation process.
Given the several dimensions for analyzing policy-making, and
recognizing the richness and complexity of the phenomenon, any reasonable
study of this type must emphasize certain dimensions rather than others.
Because of the author's primary interest in policy strategies, the present
study will be primarily focused on the operation and nature of policy
processes. A uni-dimensional approach to the study of the policy pheno-
mena will be avoided by focusing primarily on the policy process itself,
with a concern for policy content to the extent necessary to illuminate
-the main decisional problems comprising the policy formation process
and its dynamic operation over time.
Thus, the conceptual framework for analysis developed herein will
deal with the policy formation process, in terms of the five policy
components suggested by Ranney, but with a concern for the implementation
component being a strategic one, emphasizing the planning mode.
2F. Chapter Summary
This chapter has developed a definition of the concept of policy
as a set of major guidelines directed toward the future, pursued or intend-
ed to be pursued, which provide a framework for discrete decisions. This
definition was offered as one which is both broad enough to include the
main features of policy formation and yet operational enough to provide
meaningful guidelines for analysis and research. Beyond this definition
of policy, this chapter also identified five policy components: 1) affected
objects; 2) desired course of events; 3) selected line of action;
39
4) declaration of intent; and 5) implementation of intent. In addition,
three main dimensions for analyzing policy were identified: process,
content, and outcome. Finally, the definitional explanation of the
concept of policy was tied to the conceptual framework for analysis
by indicating that the framework will be primarily oriented towards
policy process (vice content or outcome) and that it will encompass
all five of the previously identified policy components, but with a
strategic and planning emphasis on the implementation component.
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Chapter Three
Policy Strategies
3A. Chapter Overview
This chapter will explore the relevant strategy literature with the
objective of formulating a policy-relevant definition of strategy, i.e.,
one which is useful for analysis of and research on the strategic choices
facing policy makers. Several different sets of strategy types will be
examined. In addition, the topic of strategy flexibility will be treated
in a policy context. Finally, an attempt will be made to operationalize
the concept of policy strategies by considering the objectives of
strategy, in terms of five Strategic Decision Issues affecting the policy
formation process.
3B. Definitions
The term strategy has a wide variety of meanings in the literature.
The "theory-of-games" literature defines strategy as a detailed set
of planned responses to all possible contingencies. Here, the strategy
is an explicit statement made by or about a player before the game begins.
In this context, the strategy statement specifies exactly what action will
be taken under every conceivable situation that might arise during the
course of the game., In the absence of a precise and complete formulation
of these contingencies and related responses, no mathematical algorithm
can be applied. The policy strategies of concern here apply to situations
so complex that such a complete specification of contingencies and response
actions is impossible. Thus, there is little evidence that game theory,
as presently developed, is a useful tool for solving strategic problems
in a policy context.
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The "theory-of-games" may be distinguished from "war games
as the latter is used in a military context. War games are based on
simulation models, and although game theory is one type of simulation,
its basic precepts are used only in minor ways in war gaming. Simula-
tion games were first developed as war games and were then applied to
business situations and to models of international relations.(3 )
Presently, simulation is most widely used as a tool for teaching and re-
search in the social sciences.(4)
In the international relations( 5 ) and defense( 6 ) literature, the
concept of strategy refers to those fundamental policies and overall
postures which are applied to the strategic analysis of main goals and
principles for operations, which thus serve as a framework for tactics
in military and foreign policy planning. Military planning emphasises
the pre-eminent position of the objectives in the formulation of strategy
or strategic plans. In military usage, the selection of objectives, with-
in the guidelines of an "ultimate objective", is almost universally
considered to be the most important aspect of strategic planning. The
situation is quite similar in regard to foreign policy planning.
Sometimes a distinction is drawn between "strategy" and "grand
strategy". However, for purposes of this study there is no reason to
employ two separate categories. Therefore, in this context, the term
strategy is intended to encompass both concepts. Thus, the term strategy
will be used here in a meta-policy context(i.e., policies on how to
(7)
make policies) as defined by Dror. This usage connotes a meaning
close to that intended in the analysis of foreign relations and defense
and military planning. More specifically, the term policy strategies,
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as used in this study, means a "series of master policies, clearly dis-
tinct from detailed discrete policies, (though these two pure types
are polar cases on one continuum with many in between cases) which estab-
lish the framework of guidelines and the boundaries of the policy space
within which operational policies are to be established and decisions
are to be made."( 8 ) (For a definition of the term policy, see Chapter 2.)
In view of the importance of strategies (implicit and explicit) as
basic policy shaping forces, the dearth of empirical research focused
explicitly on the strategy issue is quite surprising. A search of the
relevant literature did not reveal any empirical research which attempted
to analyze policies in terms of their implicit or explicit strategies
or to identify the applicability and effectiveness of various policy
strategies under different conditions. The present research effort should
be viewed as a tentative, initial step in that direction. The conceptual
framework for analysis is intended to serve as an heuristic guide for
the conduct of such empirical research.
3C. Strategy Types
The topic of policy strategies is a relatively neglected one in the
literature. To the extent it is addressed, it is usually dealt with only
within a single or at most a narrow range of policy strategy types.
In a policy context, strategy should not be thought of as a homogeneous
concept. A monolithic assumption masks the existence of a variety of
different types of strategies which afford strategic options to the
pWlicymaker. For policy purposes, it may be more useful to consider at
least the following three distinct sets of strategy types:
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--Identical vs. Mixed Strategies
--Comprehensive vs. Narrow Strategies
--Disequilibruim vs. Balanced Strategies
We will consider each of these main types separately, with no intention
of designating any one type as "best". Rather, an effort will be made
to show some of the implications and possible consequences of employing
(or ignoring) any particular type.
3C1. Identical vs. Mixed Strategies. Some promising work aimed at
broadening the range of policy strategies has been provided by Dror( 9 )
and by Etzioni.(1O ) These authors have pointed out the potential value
of employing mixed in lieu of identical strategies. They have suggested
that even relative to single policy, two or more different strategies
can be followed simultaneously or at different points in time. Such a
course of action may serve to broaden and enrich the strategic choices
facing the policy-maker. Explicit treatment of the question of to
what extent different policy targets can/should be given different
strategic treatment may thus generate an array of strategic options.
Of course, the very question as to whether to employ identical strate-
gies (e.g., a decision to proceed in a mode of radical change vis-s-vis
various policy target areas) or to adopt a strategy mix (and if so, the
nature of that mix) may itself be a critical strategic decision.
3C2. Comprehensive vs. Narrow Strategies. A second major set of
strategy types is the comprehensive vs. narrow category. Under this
set, the focus of attention is on the degree to which policy formation
is focused on a broad range of policy components, as opposed to dealing
with only a few or even a single component. Treatment of the comprehen-
sive vs. narrow strategic issue is especially important because it neces-
sitates explicit examination of the widely accepted tacit theory that
every "good" policy must be comprehensive in the sense of striving for
synchronized change in multiple policy components.(ll) This a priori
assumption, which is reflected in most of the wisdom literature, is
strongly reinforced by much of general systems theory( 1
2
) and systems
(13)analysis writing. Such an approach neglects the possibility of
achieving critical mass threshholds(1 ) by means of focusing scarce
policy formation resources (cognitive, economic, organizational, and
political) on a few strategic controlling variables which, through appli-
cation of a possible multiplier effect, may achieve a significant change
in policy through a directed set of changes, each one of which, by it-
self, may be incremental. Thus, recognition of the existence of a multi-
plier phenomenon, and the identification of main policy controlling
variables, may allow less costly changes in policy than would be possible
by pursuing a uni-dimensional comprehensive strategy.
3C3. Disequilibruim vs. Balanced Strategies. The third major set of
strategy types encompasses the balanced and the disequilibrium strategies.
Disequilibrium strategies are costly and are, therefore, seldom used.
They are effectively employed when the main aim is to shock a system
into changing, as opposed to an attempt to carefully control the rate
and direction of change in policy. When a strategic objective is the
radical transformation of a system, creation of a shock effect, which
first unbalances(6 ) the system, may open it up for redesign or redirec-
tion. This may be a preferable strategy whenever a system is deemed to
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be particularly rigid, or to be frozen with respect to change initiatives.
However, it is a risky and usually an expensive approach.
The risky and expensive nature of disequilibrium strategies
arises out of the sharply increased probability of unexpected (and often
undesired) occurences significantly beyond those already existing in
every major policy. Minimizing the consequences of such unexpected
events requires the existence of quite advanced monitoring mechanisms
which in themselves are costly and complex. An added complication is
the possibility that some unanticipated occurence will result in goal
displacement because of the tendency of a post-decision dissonance
effect to adjust the image of desired consequences to match the actual
outcome.(17)
Explicit consideration of the pros and cons of a disequilibrium
versus a balanced strategy can be useful in two ways. First, by helping
the policy actors to overcome any a priori preference for balanced change,
(18)
which is strongly reinforced by biological analogies of the organiza-
tional system, which may contribute to a conservative point of view.
Secondly, by explicating the risks and costs of "shock-change", and by
highlighting the need for risk reducing mechanisms, in situations in
which a change in policy is approached from a radical change perspective.
What emerges from this brief discussion of strategy types is the
realization that the policy-maker needs to formulate a "strategy of
strategy types". This will provide a broad level framework which will
facilitate the necessary, but difficult, trade-offs by encouraging expli-
cit. identification of possible alternative strategies, along with an assess-
ment of their respective costs and benefits, implications, and conse-
quences. Although there is little significant theoretical foundation for
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such a strategy on strategy types, beyond the fragmentary evidence already
cited, it seems likely that any such theory would have to be a contin-
gency one which would allow both conceptual and pragmatic adaptation to
particularistic policy situations.
3D. Strategy Flexibility
The degree of flexibility built into alternative strategies, and the
resultant impact on policy formation, constitutes an additional focus of
this study. Given that most macro level policy decisions are characte-
rized by a relatively high degree of uncertainty, mechanisms for changing
strategy in response to feedback and the capability to "hedge" against
(19)uncertainty through intentional strategy elasticity, are extremely
(20)important but often overlooked components of a viable strategy.
Under certain circumstances, a rigid strategy may be the most appropriate
choice. For example, when a particular policy goal cannot be compromised,
when time constraints are important, and when opposition is likely to
be strong, a rigid strategy may preclude delay and dilution of policy
formation efforts. However, experience and research suggest that the
more serious problem is either an originally inflexible strategy, or one.
which becomes rigid over time in the absence of periodic reassessment,
clearly defined contingency responses, and inherent elasticity.(2)
3E. Strategic Decision Issues
The mystique which permeates most discourses on the types of strategy
contributes to the erroneous impression that strategy can be "made",
"pursued", "implemented", etc., without regard for phenomenological or
empirical referents. The very concept of strategy is an empty abstrac-
tion unless it is grounded in a clear delineation of the objectives of
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strategy. Policymakers must make strategies about something. The set
of "somethings" about which strategic decisions must be made constitute
the core of the earlier definition of strategy as being, "a series of
master policies.
The conceptual framework identifies, topically, such a series of
master policy issues. These are identified as "Strategic Decision Issues",
meaning that they are high-leverage issues so fundamental to the process
of policy formation, that strategic decisions about them will have a major
impact on the ongoing substance and character of that ensuing policy
process. In short, strategic decisions about these issues will energize
and drive the policy formation process. Topically, the framework identi-
fies the following Strategic Decision Issues:
--The Decision to Make a Decision
--The Scope and Intensity of Change
--Time Preferences
--System and Issue Boundary Delimitation
--Policy Instruments
Inclusion of these items in the framework was this author's decision, but
it was, of course, influenced by early exposure to the work of Yehezhel
Dror. The essential argument here is that an indispensable input to the
policy formation process is a series of strategies (master policies) which
address the above decision issues. Of course, these strategic choices
may be either explicit or implicit, sophisticated or superficial, timely
or late, etc.
The basic point is that the inherent logic of the policy formation
process demands strategic responses along the above dimensions. At the
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present time, neither academicians nor policymakers are capable of
dealing meaningfully with the quality of such strategic responses from
a prescriptive perspective. The much more modest goal of this study is
to demonstrate descriptively; first, the importance of these basic
decision issues; secondly, the need and opportunity for strategic choices
regarding them; and, finally, some implications and consequences related
to different strategic choices. To this end, each of the Strategic
Decision Issues listed above is included in the framework and is elabora-
ted on below.
3E1. The Decision to Make a Policy Decision. The strategic decision to
make (or not to make) a policy decision on a discrete issue is perhaps
the most important and the most difficult policy decision. It would be
incorrect to state in any unqualified way that the greater the number
of policy decisions made, the better. It is not self-evident that in
every case a policy decision is either needed or desirable.
In many cases a policy decision on a value-laden issue may endanger
essential consensus maintenance which is needed for system (nation,
organization, etc.) survival. In such cases it may be preferable to
decide "not to decide". Maintenance of basic consensus and essential
coalitions depends on leaving some policy problems (and their underlying
values) unexplicated so that a degree of ambiguity and simultaneous
preference for contradictory values can serve to meet the requirements
of consensus and agreement. An illustrative example of such a case
may be the decision not to make a policy decision on the "separation
between Religion and the State" in Israel.
Similarly when the results of present policies are perceived by the
52
policy actors, and the social strata on which they depend, in a manner
which suggests that slow incremental change is sufficient for achieving
an acceptable rate of improvement in policy results, there is no need
for a policy decision. Yet it is clear that the decision not to decide
is of equal significance as a policy output as is a positive decision
to decide.
There are costs (economic, political,and organizational) connected
with any attempt to make a policy decision. Some costs are relevant
whether the attempt succeeds or fails. Indeed, the costs may be higher
in the case of a failure. Such real costs and opportunity costs can
have a direct affect on the decision as to whether or not to decide
(to make a policy).
3E2. The Scope and Intensity of Change; This Strategic Decision Issue
is concerned with the conditions under which key policy actors evidence
(implicit or explicit) preferences for a particular change strategy,
i.e., radical or incremental change. This particular phenomenon remains
relatively unexplored in the literature. It is considered by this author
to be of critical importance to the understanding and operation of the
policy formation process. Because this Strategic Decision Issue is a
central concern of this study, it is treated in detail in Chapter Four.
3E3. Time Preferences. The issue of target time, i.e., when the key
policy actors wish the main results of a policy to be produced, is another
important strategy dimension which may shape the overall policy formation
process. Policy formation is by definition, a continuous process aimed
at trying to shape the future. It includes both present decisions on
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future action (especially in the "planning" mode(22) of policy -:mation),
and decisions on the timing of policymaking itself, (i.e.. what issues
to defer for future decision).(23) Therefore, establishment of time
preferences for comparing results located at different points in the
time stream constitutes a significant dimension in policy formation, and,
as such, is an important target for the behavioral study of policy
processes. Of course, attention to the concepts of time and timing is
not totally absent in the decision-making and social change literature.
Indeed, such considerations are, for example, rather explicitly treated
in classical sociological work by Weber (24) and Shackel!25) However,
the impact of time on the policy formation process is far from clearly .
understood. Thus, inclusion of this item in the framework is intended
to foster analysis and research of such temporal considerations, in a
policy context.
This strategy dimension suggests a close interrelation between
strategies and analysis in the sense of the necessity for iteration and
reconsideration of strategy decisions in light of detailed analysis.
Thus, while an a priori desire of the actors may often favor fast results,
a more detailed analysis of the issue under investigation may make it
obvious that significant results can only be achieved in a longer time
period. This is a strategic input which in some circumstances may lead
to consequent reformulation of the time preferences. In other circum-
stances, external variables such as political feasibility or crisis may
prescribe rigid time constraints and thus limit time availability.(26)
Therefore, identification of the existence of such rigid time constraints
may be essential for strategy consistency, because the scope of overall
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policy goals must often be reduced because of non-elastic time preferences.
And finally, an analysis of time preferences may help distinguish
between the anticipatory and the crisis policy modes(2 7 ) of policy
formation, topics which are treated in later discussions in this paper.
3E4. Systems and Issue Boundary Delimitation. The undefined,open,
dynamic and value dominated characteristics of any policy formation
issue requires strategic decisions regarding policy delimitation; namely,
what are the boundaries within which the policy will be confined? In
other words, what is the domain of institutions and issue areas which
will be considered as an appropriate object of policy? Not a less
important question involving the boundary issue is, within what domain
did the actor look for relevant policy consequences?
Systems delimitation is one of the most important strategic decisions
in every policy formation process and, as such, it shapes the whole
policy space. We know very little about the variables which determine
policy actors' decisions on systems delimitation. Two concepts existing
in the literature are relevant here; the concept of the "definition of
the situation", and the concept of "operational code".
"Definition of the situation" is a concept introduced by Snyder to
indicate that a decision results from the manner in which policy-makers
interpret the occasion for decision. Snyder has written, "The key to
political action lies in the way decision makers as actors define their
situation", that is, their "selection and evaluation of objects, events,
symbols, conditions and other actors.(28) Harold and Margaret Sprout
introduce a concept quite similar to "definition of the situation",
called the "psycho-milieu". Their concept consists of the individual
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decision-maker's "images or ideas derived from some sort of interaction
between what he selectively receives from his milieu (via his sensory
apparatus) and his scheme of values, conscious memories, and subconsciously
stored experience." ( 29) The Sprouts distinguish between psycho-milieu
from the "operational mileu" by noting that the latter is the environ-
ment relevant to the decision outcome as it is defined by observers
rather than by decision makers.
(30)The concept of "operational code" introduced by George follows
the distinction made by Brim, et'. al.,(31 ) between epistemological and
instrumental beliefs. The "operational code" includes two main components
l)the actor's "instrumental beliefs", that is, "his beliefs about ends-
means relationships in the context of political action"; and 2) the
actors "philosophical beliefs, that is, "assumptions as premises he
makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of politi-
cal conflict and the role of individuals in history." Both Snyder and
Sprout recognize that it is not the milieu itself, but the policymaker's
interpretation of that milieu that influences the nature of the decision.
George stresses the "instrumental beliefs"; namely, actors beliefs
about ends-means relationships in policy. These conceptualizations are
valuable and might provide important insight into policy process generally
and decisions about system delimitation particularly, but their utilization
here requires further refinement. Therefore, an additional dimension is
suggested here. That is, the perception of the interrelatedness between
the policy in question and other issues and systems held by the actors
may be an additional important explanatory variable which needs to be
subjected to empirical investigation, especially in a policy context.
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The concept of systems delimitation is a dynamic one, with
theoretical roots in the General Systems Theory literature.(32)
In a complex policy process the policy issue will be usually delimited
in several stages and there is a necessity for iteration and reconsidera-
tion of these strategic decisions in light of detailed analysis and
policy plans. Also, external variables (e.g., political feasibility)
often establish rigid constraints on policy delimitation. Theoretically,
the possibilities for formulating and delineating the policy issue
range between two extremes (with many in between cases). On the one
hand,the issue can be formulated narrowly, neglecting the interdepen-
dencies between various policy system variables. This may be convenient
when considering slight incremental changes. However, when dealing with
broad policy issues, a narrow restriction in policy boundary delineation
may assure in advance that policy formation will be impaired, and it may
also result in a tendency to overlook the basic characteristics of the
system under investigation. Conditioned by the policy goals on one
side, and determining the policy space within which policy instruments
may be searched on the other side, the issue of systems delimitation is
one of the most important strategy decisions facing policy-makers. Thus,
it is included in the conceptual framework as one of the strategic
Decision Issues requiring strategic choices by the policymaker.
3E5. Policy Instruments. The term '"olicy instruments" is used here in
a very broad way, ranging from the mechanism of redundancy of analysis
to using law or crisis as an instrument of policy. Usually, policy
planning means adoption of a mix of policy instruments which, within
given constraints, are perceived by the actors as an appropriate tool
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to achieve policy goals. It is, therefore, in the selection of policy
instruments and their manipulation (in the objective sense of the term,
without any negative connotations) that strategies are transformed into
policy plans and policy action.
The main strategic decision is, therefore, the most appropriate
mix of instruments to choose. The preferable mix of policy instruments
is, in the main, a function of the concrete circumstances of each
particular policy situation. Specific policy needs, the availability
of different resources, historic traditions, and indigenous political
culture--these illustrate some of the unique variables which make impossible
the existence of any universal strategies for selecting policy instruments.
One of the main potential contributions of analysis to policy
formation is a broadening of the range of policy instruments by trans-
forming factors which are regarded (for ideological, political, or
organizational reasons) as being beyond consideration, into potential
policy instruments. There is a close relationship between policy instru-
ment examination and systems delimitation, in the sense that important
feedback from policy instrument evaluation may show, for instance, the
necessity to broaden policy boundaries so as to include an additional
set of instruments within the domain of policy. On a much more pragmatic
level, strategic decisions regarding policy instruments may include,
among others: decisions on policy formation; systems configuration;
monitoring mechanisms; modes for management of the analysis; designing
and monitoring multiple advocacy; etc. In major policy systems, strategic
decisions may be required regarding the use of the task-force device,
educational campaigns, high level boards and commissions and other such
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potentially costly but high leverage policy instruments.
Inclusion of this item in the conceptual framework is intended to
focus analysis and research on the implications of strategic choices
regarding the selection of various policy instruments to be employed at
key points in the policy formation process. This topic is given only
scant and fragmented attention in the voluminous literature reviewed
during this study. This suggests the critical need for both stronger
conceptualizations and serious empirical research. Some first policy-
relevant steps in this direction have been taken by scholars such as
Glaser,(33) who has studied the task-force device, and Popper(34 ),
who has focused on the use of presidential commissions.
3F. Chapter Summary
In Chapter Three, we have reviewed the policy-relevant literature
on strategy and have suggested a "meta-policy" definition of the term
"policy strategies" as a series of master policies which serve as a
framework of guidelines within which operational decisions are made.
Moving beyond this definition, we identified the following three distinct
sets of strategy types:
-Identical vs. Mixed Strategies
-Comprehensive vs. Narrow Strategies
-Disequilibrium vs. Balanced Strategies
The implications of usage of these various strategy types was explored.
The very recognition of the existence of options as to strategy type was
an important point made in this chapter. We saw that the policy-maker,
in effect, needs to formulate a "strategy of strategy types"; one which
allows and guides adaptation to particularistic policy situations.
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The need for strategy flexibility was considered in view of the
unstructured, high uncertainty, and dynamic character of the policy
formation process. The need for flexibility in many cases was contrasted
with the greater appropriateness of a more rigid strategy in situations
where a particular policy goal cannot be compromised, time constraints
are important, and opposition is likely to be strong. It was suggested
that many policy strategies are either originally inflexible, or become
rigid, over time, in the absence of periodic reassessment, clearly
defined contingency responses, and inherent elasticity.
The final part of Chapter Three was devoted to operationalizing
the concept of policy strategies by identification and examination of
five strategic Decision Issues which energize and drive the policy
formation process. The following five Strategic Decision Issues were
identified for inclusion in the conceptual framework:
-The Decision tb Make a Decision
-The Scope and Intensity of Change
-Time Preferences
-System and Issue Boundary Delimitation
-Policy Instruments,
Through individual examination of each of the above Strategic Decision
Issues, we saw that these are likely to be high leverage issues, early
decisions about which may have significant and continuing consequences
for the nature and direction of the ensuing policy formation process.
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Chapter Four
Scope and Intensity of Policy Change
4A. Chapter Overview
As noted in Chapter Three (Section 3E2), one of the five Strategic
Decision Issues included in the conceptual framework for analysis is the
scope and intensity of policy change. This vital dimension is concerned
with the conditions under which key policy actors evidence (implicit
or explicit) preferences for a particular change strategy, i.e., radical
or incremental change. This particular phenomenon remains relatively
unexplored in the literature. Because this study is concerned with
the strategic dimension of policy formation processes, it is felt that
this topic is deserving of further development. This conviction is
based upon a presumption that explicit or implicit strategic choices
regarding the scope and intensity of change can influence both the
nature and output of policy formation processes.
More specifically, this chapter will deal with a number of
definitional issues (including: the scope and intensity of change;
radical vs. incremental change, means/ends influences, etc.). However,
the central purpose of Chapter Four is to review the theoretical founda-
tions of the incremental vs. radical change debate and to critically
analyze the leading change models; including, Lindblom's "incrementalism"
and Etzioni's "mixed-scanning" model. In particular, this critique
will focus on the degree to which theoretical and empirical work to date
has identified the conditions under which policymakers' may choose a
radical vice incremental policy change strategy.
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4B. Definitional Issues
A policy-relevant discussion of the strategic options available
(and their implications for policy formation) is hampered by a lack
of suitable concepts and terms. This necessitates first dealing with
a number of basic definitional issues so as to provide some commonly
understood frame of reference. Therefore, in this section we will
attempt to provide at least a working definition of concepts and terms
such as: scope and intensity of change; radical vs. incremental change;
means and ends aspects of change strategies; and, risk-taking behavior
as a variable influencing change strategy preferences.
4B1. Scope and Intensity of Change. By scope of change is meant the
degree of comprehensiveness of change in terms of systems components
and policy issues to be dealt with. By intensity of change, is meant
the degree of reorientation in policy and the time span in which the
desired policy output is to be attained. Thus, a given policy change
may be effected through small incremental changes of a few systems
components over a long period of time, or through comprehensive and
rapid system redesign or nova-design.
4B2. Radical vs. Incremental Change. From a strategic policy formation
perspective, the degree of the scope and the intensity of a policy
change will be conceptualized as lying along a continuum of possible
states, bounded by "radical" and "incremental" as polar cases. Because
these are relativistic terms, it is extremely difficult to precisely
define either radical or incremental change. The same change in policy
may be either radical or incremental in different systems or in the same
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system at different times.
Radical change suggests directive and systemic change of main
systems or policy critical variables, it will usually be broad, funda-
mental, intense and innovative in the sense of system reorientation
and redesign or even nova-design. This suggests four main characteris-
tics of radical change: comprehensiveness; intensiveness; innovativeness;
and criticality. This definition recognizes the existence of a continuum
between incremental and radical change. The exact borderline between
these two depends on one's perception of what are the systems critical
variables and what constitutes an innovation.
These terms are no easier to define for research purposes but some
useful attempts have been made in recent literature. Lin and Zaltman,
for example, suggest that an innovation is ". .. any idea, practice
or material artifact perceived to be new by the relevant unit of
adoption." Rogers and Shoemaker utilize a similar definition which
suggests that innovation is an idea perceived as new by the actors
involved.(2)
In the absence of any absolute, objective standards as to what
constitutes radical or incremental change, this study will follow the
general and flexible definitions utilized by Walker and Wilson in regard
to a similar research problem. In research on the diffusion of
(3)innovation among American States, Walker defines innovation:
". .. simply as a program or policy which is new to the
organization adopting it, no matter how old the program
or policy may be or how many other organizations may have
adopted it."
Wilson( 4) utilized a similar approach by suggesting that:
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"What is "fundamental" and "significant" cannot be given
a precise a priori definition, for in our scheme, the
meaning of these terms can only be determined by the
organizations themselves. Each organization, we assume,
can rank proposed (or actual) changes in terms of how
"radical" they will be (or are)."
Following the above approaches, the degree of the scope and the intensity
of a policy change will be considered as that point on a radical-
incremental continuum preceived by the main actors and knowledgeable
observers in a given policy area.
4B3. Strategic Choices: Means and Ends. Any discussion of strategic
options affecting policy actors' preferences regarding change strategies
should draw a clear distinction between means and ends. It should be
noted that the concepts of scope and intensity of a change in policy
apply both to the intended policy outcome (i. e., the intended change
in the before and after states of the system) as well as to the means
of accomplishing that intended objective. In terms of policy strategies,
strategic choices are necessary regarding both means and ends. Further-
more, it is important to realize that there is a strong interdependency
between means and ends vis-a-vis radical versus incremental policy
changes. It is quite easy to focus (erroneously) on only one aspect
of this dual nature of the concept of scope and intensity of change.
The reader is cautioned to avoid this tendency and to bear in mind both
this dual nature and the close interdependency between means and ends.
4B4. Risk-Taking Behavior. It is being suggested here that the strategic
choices necessary to define either a radical or an incremental approach
to a policy change are greatly influenced by the degree of risk acceptable
to the main policy actors. Risk-taking behavior( 5 ) is manifested because
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the policymaker explicitly or implicitly expresses either a readiness
to accept the higher degree of risk normally associated with more
radical change, or a preference for the lower degree of risk usually
associated with incremental change. In game-theory terminology, the
choice is between "minimax" behavior on the one hand or "maximin" behavior
on the other hand. (6)
4C. Theoretical Foundations of the Incremental Change Strategy
The basic rationale underlying incrementalism as formulated by
Charles Lindblom( 7 ) is that the more an alternative deviates from past
policies, the higher are its unpredictable consequences. Therefore,
it becomes more difficult to recruit support for it; that is, it has a
low degree of political feasibility. Since radical changes in policy
have a high probability of generating unexpected and undesirable conse-
quences (and therefore, a low degree of policy feasibility) Lindblom
recommends that policy formation be limited to marginal changes. In
other words, the basic strategy of incremental change is one of maximiz-
ing security in making change.
4C1. Lindblom's Model of Incremental Change. The leading proponent of
the incremental change model has been Charles Lindblom. The intellectual
justification of "disjointed incrementalism", advanced by Lindblom and
others,(8) grows out of the need to adopt policy formation strategies
to the limited cognitive capacities of the decisionmakers, and to
reduce the scope and cost of information collection and of computation.
Lindblom has summarized the essence of his model in terms of the
following six propositions:
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1) Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation
of all alternatives, the decision maker focuses only on those policies
which differ incrementally from existing policies.
2) Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are con-
sidered.
3) For each policy alternative only a restricted number of "important"
consequences are evaluated.
4) The problem confronting the policymaker is continually redefined.
Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments,
which, in effect, make the problem more manageable.
5) Thus, there is no one decision or "right" solution but a "never
ending series of attacks" on the issues at hand through limited analysis
and evaluation.
6) As such, the resultant decision-making is described as remedial,
geared more to the alleviation of present, concrete social imperfections
than to the promotion of future goals.
4C2. Ideological Assumptions of the Incremental Strategy. It is desirable
to place Lindblom's propositions about '.partisan mutual adjustment"(lO)
in their proper perspective. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in
mind that his model is directed at the American political system as a
whole. Thus, for understanding of his main thesis, it is essential to
take into consideration those ideologies, belief patterns, and socio-
economic conditions which implicitly or explicitly underlie the incre-
mental strategy.(ll) Beyond a model and strategy of decision-making,
"disjointed incrementalism" also posits a model of societal structure
based on processes more characteristic of pluralistic societies than of
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more directed societies. Influenced by the free competition model of
the economists, Lindblom replaced the economists "invisible hand" with
"partisan mutual adjustment", thus rejecting the notion that policies
can be guided from the central institutions of society. Policies are
instead presumed to be fashioned by "partisan mutual adjustment", that
is, by bargaining among numerous societal "partisans". Therefore, the
measure of a "good" policy becomes the degree of agreement about it
among the decision makers.
The logic of "partisan mutual adjustment" implies not merely
automaticity and inevitability of coordination; it also suggests
that the policy choice that emerges will be about as good as can be ob-
tained, given the complexity of the issue and the variety of interests
activated by the various alternatives. Thus, incremental decision-making
is claimed to be both a realistic account of how the American polity (and
other Western democracies) decides, and also a normative statement of
the most effective approach to societal policy formation. In this sense,
it presumes to be both a descriptive and normative model simultaneously.
4C3. Criticisms of the Incremental Approach as a Normative Model. There
are numerous critics of the incremental model, and especially of its
normative connotations. Nonetheless, there exists a general consensus
that the main strength of the incremental model lies in its realistic
description of decision and policy formation behavior. There is little
doubt that policy formation usually proceeds (but not always) through
incremental changes from past policies. There are a number of forces
which operate so as to constrain policy formation in an incremental mold.
These include the barriers which hinder and often prevent utilization
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of a radical change strategy. These barriers, which are relatively well
documented in the literature, include: 1) various defense mechanisms
(such as risk avoidance through dealing mainly with short time periods);
2) the needs of coalition maintenance(l2 ) (which often are best served
by some repression and ignorance of alternatives having explicit
choices)(13); 3) low aspiration levels which are satisfied by the
results of incremental change and are not disturbed by large "performance
gaps
"
and 4) a fixation on precedents and past experience, combined
with a rigidity of the organizational cognitive set( 1 5 ) which is shaped
partly by organizational interests and predispositions.
Incrementalism tends to neglect the forces of basic societal
innovation by focusing on the short-run and by seeking no more than
limited variation from past policies. It remains an open question
whether or not a series of incremental changes can lead to a major
shift in policy. For, as Etzioni( 16 ) has observed:
"While an accumulation of small steps could lead to a signi-
ficant change, there is nothing in this approach to guide the
accumulation; the steps may be circular--leading back to
where they started, or dispersed--leading to many directions
at once, but leading no where."
In a similar vein, Boulding comments that according to this approach,
"we do stagger through history like a drunk putting one disjointed
foot after another.
"
(l7) In addition to questioning the possible lack
of any systematic aggregation of a series of incremental steps, some
authors see in the incremental model a strong conservative bias in
terms of its impact on decisionmakers. As Dror has observed:(18)
"Although Lindblom's thesis includes a number of reservations,
these are insufficient to alter its main impact as ideological
reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces."
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Thus, the incremental model has been criticized for hindering or pre-
cluding major reform, innovation, and anticipatory or planned change.
4C4. Empirical Critique of the Incremental Model. In addition to the
conceptual reservations just discussed, the incremental model is subject
to a number of empirical criticisms. First, Lindblom clearly recognized
that the incremental strategy does not apply to "large" or "fundamental"
(19)decisions, such as a declaration of war. However, he fails to
recognize that while incremental decisions greatly outnumber fundamental
ones, the latter's significance for societal policy formation is not
commensurate with their small number. Therefore, it may be a mistake
to relegate non-incremental decisions to the category of "exceptions".
Moreover, it is often the case that fundamental (strategic) decisions
set the context for numerous incremental ones which follow. Secondly,
Lindblom limited the applicability of his model to "stable western
societies", thus, failing to recognize the existence of "underdeveloped"
and "unstable" segments within highly developed societies and even
within one organization. Third, Lindblom's suggestion that "agreement"
on a policy equates to high quality maybe quite specious when one
recognizes that frequently competitors are unevenly matched; have,
through collusion, divided up the market; engage in unfair competition;
squeeze-out or buy-off weaker competitors; etc.(20) Thus, the "agree-
ment" which results from bargaining may be very one-sided, because, as
Rowen has observed:( 2 1 )
"There are not only wide differences in the bargaining power
of the firms (actors), but this bargaining power is not
necessarily highly correlated with the information or the
power to take relevant action to accomplish objectives
with high degree of efficiency."
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4C5. Bargaining Aspects. Critics of the extreme bargaining model have
been more constructive in this respect, but generally they have been
content to argue the case for centralized management tools and they
stop well short of developing a sound theoretical base for the bargaining
model.(22) On occasion, Lindblom himself has briefly acknowledged the
possible deficiencies and potentially poor performance of the bargaining
model, though such acknowledgement usually appears parenthetically in
the context of a lengthier argument on behalf of the necessity and
virtues of bargaining. For example, he has acknowledged that "carried
to decision-making process in which a strong hierarchial element is
desirable, bargaining in the wrong place at the wrong time accounts for
some of the worst aspects of American Government." ( 2 3 ) Nonetheless,
Lindblom has displayed little interest in articulating the conditions
necessary for effective performance of the incremental model. Lindblom's
model overemphasizes the importance of agreement, neglecting the dynamic
nature of the agreement-reaching process, and the fact that political
feasibility is only one among several dimensions of policy formation.
4C6. Applicability Domain. It has already been noted that very little
is known concerning what is perhaps the most critical aspect of change
strategy choices. That is to say, to date, both policy scholars and
policymakers know very little about the conditions under which the
incremental (or radical) change model would be more appropriate, or at
least would be perceived as being more appropriate by the policy actors.
An important step toward articulation of the conditions defining the
applicability of the incremental model has been taken by Dror, who set
forth the following three interrelated pre-requisite conditions as
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being essential to a determination of an incremental change strategy as
a preferable policy:(24)
1) A high degree of satisfaction with present or past policies
so that incremental changes are sufficient for achieving an
acceptable rate of improvement.
2) A high degree of stability in the nature of the problem.
3) A high degree of stability in the available means
(technology, knowledge, etc.) for dealing with the problem.
Dror recognized the restrictive nature of these conditions, acknowledging
that "most modern men live under conditions they regard as increasingly
unsatisfactory. . . science may provide many new alternatives. .. and
,(25)the acute problems require new policies."
4D. The Mixed-Scanning Alternative
In addition to the just cited work of Dror, a second theoretical
attempt aimed at articulation of conditions for incremental and radical
(fundamental) changes has been made by Etzioni. Etzioni has outlined
a third approach to policy formation which combines elements of both
the incremental and radical change models and is presented under the
label of "mixed-scanning". His mixed-scanning model( 2 6 ) is aimed at
avoiding the strongest criticisms leveled at the rationalistic and
incremental models; i.e., the unrealistic cognitive and other resources
requirements of the former, and the limited validity domain and con-
servative bias of the latter. 7 ) Because he views these criticisms as
being manifested primarily in the search phase of the policy formation
process, Etzioni has designed a two stage search mechanism to facilitate
distinguishing between what he calls "fundamental" and "incremental"
decisions.(28 ) Fundamental decisions (as defined by Etzioni) are
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strategic policy decisions which define decision premises for lower
level decisions; incremental decisions then become the supporting
tactical or operational decisions.
Operationally, Etzioni's "mixed-scanning" search phase calls for
an initial broad and long-range scan of the environment in order to
locate and identify what, on the basis of only minimal analytical
evaluation, appear to be the major significant problems. Only in the
second stage are scarce decisional resources devoted to a much more
focused, intensive search and evaluation of a few main strategic
alternatives. In Etzioni's words:
"Fundamental decisions are made by explaining the main alterna-
tives the actor sees in view of his conception of his goals, but
. . . unlike what rationalism would indicate. . . details and
specifications are omitted so that an overview is feasible.
Incremental decisions are made, but within context set by
fundamental decisions (and fundamental reviews). Thus, each of the
two elements in mixed-scanning helps to reduce the effects of the
particular shortcomings of the other: incrementalism reduces the
unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required
in fundamental decisions, and contextuating rationalism helps to
overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring
longer-run alternatives. Together, empirical tests and comparative
study of decision-makers would show that these elements make for
a third approach which is at once more realistic and more effective
than its components."(29)
Thus, it becomes clear that the "mixed-scanning" is at once a descrip-
tive and a normative model.
For purposes of this study, the most useful aspects of Etzioni's
"mixed-scanning" model are the following policy-relevant considerations:
1) the attempt to combine intellectual manageability with conscious
self-direction; 2) the basic distinction between strategic (fundamental.)
and non-strategic decisions; 3) the emphasis of the dominant role of the
strategic decisions in policy formation; 4) the explicit recognition
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of the need for different models and modes of operation for each type
of decisions; and 5) the interdependence between strategic and non-
strategic decisions. What is less useful is the assumption of isomor-
phism between non-strategic and incremental decisions, because both
strategic and non-strategic decisions may be "incremental" and "radical"
in different systems and in the same system at different times. While
recognizing that different strategies may be needed under different
conditions, Etzioni offers very little in the direction of an elabora-
tion of various strategies in terms of applicability, effectiveness, and
(30)efficiency under different conditions.
In discussing his mixed-scanning model, Etzioni clearly points out
the possibilities of utilizing mixed strategies. This supports the ear-
lier argument (Chapter 3) that in a given area of policy, different
strategies may usefully be followed in various policy instances. Thus,
the incremental versus radical choice is only one among several strategy
options which can influence the policy process.
4E. Policy Formation Ramifications of Incremental vs. Radical Change
Preferences
At this point, it is appropriate to complete the discussion of the
basic policy formation process ramifications of the incremental vs.
radical change strategy dimension. We have been considering the degree
of change in policy, defined in terms of the scope of change and the
intensity of change. It is important to stress that explicit situational
consideration of the pros and cons of each strategy option is essential.
This is especially true in view of the previously mentioned tendencies
of policy actors to employ risk avoidance mechanisms, and because of
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commonly found organizational behavior barriers which frequently preclude
use of a radical change strategy. To some degree such barriers may
serve to counter-balance the tendencies toward unfettered radical change
which are often found in reform policies having a predisposition towards
quick, demonstratable results.
A radical change strategy often involves significant political,
organizational, and economic costs. Therefore, explicit consideration
of cost factors and a systematic assessment of acceptable risks in
policy alternatives may lead policymakers to select an incremental
strategy, or to attempt to balance a radical change strategy with risk
reducing mechanisms such as experimentation, sequential decision-
making, etc. Moreover, as will be pointed out in the later discussion
of the topic of political feasibility (Section 5E3) one important
strategic consideration may be a determination of the extent to which
different policy components should be treated with identical strategies.
Given that different policy target areas may differ in their degree
of feasibility, a decision to follow an "incremental" change strategy
regarding some target areas and a radical or mixed strategy in other
areas may be desirable. The specific strategic decision would, of
course, depend upon the policymaker's goals, intentions, and estimation
of the probable results of employing different strategic alternatives.
4F. Research Needs
This review of the various strategic options regarding the scope
and intensity of change clearly shows the need for both theoretical
and empirical work aimed at development of specifications of the validity
and applicability domain of the incremental versus radical change
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approaches to policy formation. Other than the debate stimulated by
Lindblom's previously cited work, relatively little theoretical work
has appeared in the literature, and there is a great dearth of empirical
work relating to this important topic. Particularly lacking is any
serious attempt to define those conditions under which policymakers
would tend to choose a radical vice incremental change strategy. This
study is intended to be a first step in that direction.
4G. Chapter Summary
Chapter Four has been concerned with an elaboration of one of the
five Strategic Decision Issues contained in the conceptual framework
for analysis; the scope and intensity of policy change. The discussion
started with a presumption that policymakers can and do exercise (ex-
plicit or implicit) choices regarding change strategies and that these
choices can influence both the nature and output of ensuing policy
formation processes.
After dealing with a number of definitional issues, this chapter
reviewed the theoretical foundations of the incremental-radical change
debate. The change models of Lindblom (incrementalism) and Etzioni
(mixed-scanning) were presented and were critiqued from a policy formation
perspective. We saw that Lindblom's model overemphasizes the importance
of "agreement", while neglecting the dynamics of the processes by which
agreement is reached. A further problem with the incremental model is
its implicit assumption that political feasibility is the only major
variable influencing the policy formation process. In addition, we
saw that although Etzioni's model embodies a number of useful, policy-
relevant aspects, he too offers very little in the way of any elaboration
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of various change strategies in terms of applicability, effectiveness,
and efficiency, under different conditions.
From a policy formation perspective, this lack of attention to the
applicability domain of the leading change models is a significant
problem because little or nothing has been done to raise our level of
understanding about the variables which affect policymakers' preferences
for alternative change strategies. It was noted that both Dror and
Etzioni have taken small, first steps in this direction, at the theore-
tical level. However, attention was drawn to the nearly complete
absence of related empirical investigation. Therefore, Chapter Four
concluded by highlighting the need for policy-relevant empirical
studies which would attempt to define those conditions under which
policymakers would tend to choose a radical vice an incremental
change strategy.
As was noted at the end of this chapter, this study is intended
to be a first step in the direction of specifying such conditions.
Thus, the conceptual framework for analysis includes scope and intensity
of policy change as a Strategic Decision Issue as a means of focusing
both conceptual and empirical efforts on this seemingly crucial dimen-
sion of the policy formation process.
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Chapter Five
The Concept of Policy Feasibility
5A. Chapter Overview
The main purpose of Chapter Five is to examine why certain poten-
tial policies actually energize (i.e., become "accepted for processing"
by) the policy system, while many others do not. Based on the presump-
tion that those policies which survive the transformation process known
as policy formation have certain identifiable attributes, attention will
be devoted to the development of conceptual tools for identifying and
dealing with these attributes. For analytical purposes, the dominant
cluster of such attributes will be called "policy feasibility". The
nature of policy feasibility will be explored through definition and
analysis.
Political feasibility will be examined as one component of policy
feasibility, with an emphasis on the forces affecting the molding of
this important variable. Because one primary means of shaping political
feasibility is through coalition formation and maintenance (which in
turn is dependent upon consensus building, the major theoretical impli-
cations of coalition formation and maintenance will be discussed. Both
the sociological and psychological foundations of coalition formation
and maintenance, along with the theory of political coalitions, will be
treated, in order to form the basis for an appreciation of coalition-
consensus inputs to policy feasibility.
Overall, an attempt will be made to examine the fundamental nature
of policy feasibility as a means of understanding its basic components
and their interdependencies, and as a vehicle for highlighting the hypo-
thesized dynamic nature of this concept which is a critical aspect of the
policy formation process.
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5B. Introduction to the Concept of Policy Feasibility
Common sense suggests the existence of a nearly inexhaustible
supply of potential policies. Of that total universe, only some
fractional sub-set actually become inputs to a particular policy for-
mation process. Only an even smaller sub-set survive the rigors of the
transformation process which is here called policy formation. A lack
of understanding of the true nature of the transformation process makes
this type of study necessary.
An important, but yet unanswered question is, why do certain poten-
tial policies eventually energize (i.e.,become "accepted for processing"
by) the policy system while many others do not? Furthermore, what are
the reasons why so very few of these actually emerge from the policy
formation process in the form of identifiable policy outputs? One
contribution towards the answer to such questions may lie in the formula-
tion of the concept introduced here under the name "policy feasibility."
Because of an appreciation of the validity of the warning given by Katz
and Kahn as to the tautological dangers of thinking that a process
has been explained simply because it has been named, policy feasibility
is suggested here not "merely" as a name to be ascribed to a complex
process, but rather, as a multi-dimensional concept which can serve to
order and focus thinking about policy formation phenomena.
5B1. Definition. For purposes of this study, policy feasibility is
defined as the probability that a policy alternative will be accepted,
approved, and successfully implemented by the relevant policy system.
The term will be used here merely as a short-hand notation for a rather
complex concept which requires fairly extensive elaboration. Furthermore,
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policy feasibility will be conceived of as an "umbrella" concept under
which is included several different types of feasibility, as that term
is commonly used in other disciplines. These common conceptions of
feasibility are modified and integrated so as to make the composite
concept more "policy-relevant". Thus,for present purposes, policy feasi-
bility is defined as a cluster of intervening variables, which, when
present in the proper mix and in sufficient magnitude, enhance the
probability that a given potential policy will be transformed into an
identifiable policy output which, in turn, is likely to result in a
policy outcome having a high degree of isomorphism with original policy
intentions.
5B2. Main Components. The exact composition and nature of the cluster
of variables here named policy feasibility remains quite elusive. There-
fore, the identification of some indicators of the degree of policy
feasibility present in a given situation will provide a useful starting
point. Using this approach, it is suggested that policy feasibility may
be usefully analyzed in terms of three inter-related main components;
economic feasibility, political feasibility, and organizational feasibi-
lity. In the discussion that follows, each of these main components
will be examined individually, although it should be recognized that a
significant interdependence exists among them.
5C. Economic Feasibility
The concept of economic feasibility is already quite well developed
in the economic literature. Because this concept is well grounded in
both theory and practice, there is no need to elaborate on it here. In
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policy-relevant terms, economic feasibility relates to the resource
requirements and the resource implications of various policy alternatives.
A policy alternative having a high degree of economic feasibility is one
for which the required economic resources have not only been identified,
but also have been determined to be available or obtainable on accep-
table terms.
5D. Organizational Feasibility
The second main component of policy feasibility is organizational
feasibility. The critical problems related to policies having low
organizational feasibility is implied in Allison's recent suggestion
that the seeming inability of the U.S. Government to translate major
policy intentions into desired policy outcomes represents a major crisis
in modern government. Several aspects of this translation problem
are included in the conceptual framework under topics such as "transforma-
bility" and "behavioral barriers". However, thus far, these two notions
have been treated in relation to the generation, evaluation, and presen-
tation of policy alternatives. Although clearly related to these dimen-
sions, organizational feasibility is a broader and more elusive concept.
The focus here will be on its operation and implications in a meta-
policy context.
The concept of organizational feasibility is tri-partite in nature.
It consists of technological, behavioral, and structural elements.
These are not uni-dimensional, mutually exclusive elements. Rather, they
may best be thought of as multi-variate clusters of variables which are
here separated and categorized for analytical purposes. Organizational
feasibility is concerned with both the "capability" and the "willingness"
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attributes of system response. It is concerned with the degree to which
policymakers evidence an "institutional awareness".(4) Moreover, be,-
cause various policy alternatives are likely to have different degrees
of organizational feasibility, this dimension of policy feasibility
is a probabilistic concept. Therefore, organizational feasibility is
defined as the likelihood that various policy alternatives can and will
be operated on by the relevant implementation system (or focal organi-
zation) so as to produce policy outcomes which are largely congruent with
policy intentions.
The present emphasis on organizational feasibility is not meant to
imply that all ramifications and details of policy implementation can
or should be addressed during the policy formulation stage. Rather,
the more limited suggestion here is that implementation strategies, in
broad outline, are a relevant and necessary input into the early stages
of policy formulation. There is an extensive literature dealing with
(5)
organizational change and the implementation of such change , but
there is relatively little literature, and virtually no empirical work,
which focuses on the explicit consideration of implementation strategy
(6)during the policy formulation process. Thus, organizational feasibi-
lity is included in the conceptual framework as a means of focusing
analytical attention on the timing and the degree of consideration (during
the policy formation process) of the relative implementation probabilities
of the various policy alternatives. A closely related second purpose is
to highlight the potential interactive influence between organizational
feasibility and the resultant degree of success of policy implementation.
The main emphasis here is on the linkages and interdependent influences
CD-
9o
between the implementation stage and the earlier stages which comprise
the total policy formation process. In the same sense that elsewhere in
this paper an attempt is made to demonstrate the mutual influences be-
tween the generation of policy alternatives and the subsequent policy
choices, here it is suggested that there exists a similar relationship
beween policy formulation and policy implementation. Further, it is
suggested that an examination of organizational feasibility will provide
valuable insight into the nature of these little understood mutual in-
fluence channels.
5D1. The Need for Explicit Consideration of Organizational Feasibility
in Policy Formation. Both organizational experience and the management
and organization theory literature indicate the existence of a tendency
to minimize the amount of attention given to organizational feasibility
during the policy formulation process, especially in the formative early
stages. A number of factors appear to at least partially explain the
persistence of this tendency. Time is one critical factor. Near term
time pressures, which are aimed at early development of a plausible (or
perhaps novel) solution, operate to surpress implementation considera-
tions. Proposed "solutions" tend to have an immediate, intrinsic appeal
which generates excitement and committment. Implementation issues, on
the other hand, represent unresolved problems of a more mundane, uninspir-
ing character. It is not surprising, then, to find that where solution-
oriented time pressures are high, they tend to overpower future-oriented
implementation issues, especially when the implementation phase extends
several years into an uncertain future.
Complicating the time element is the fact that many analysts and
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policymakers tend to view organizationally related implementation issues
as relatively minor details which will (hopefully) be "ironed-out" later.
This low priority subjectively assigned to implementation issues probably
stems, in large part, from a general lack of awareness of and sensitivity
to organizational variables, and from the operation of a variant of Snow's( 7 )
"two culture" syndrome. That is, the orientation, training, and skills
necessary for the analysis of a problem may be quite different from
those required to plan for implementation of a policy alternative.(8)
This frequently results in the naive assumption that policy implementa-
tion can be accomplished by simple fiat, or that a "good" policy will
be self-implementing.
Other factors contributing to the persistent tendency to de-
emphasize organizational feasibility during policy formulation include
the limited cognitive capabilities of the policy actors, the limited
power of existing conceptual tools and technology, and the existence
of policy goals which are difficult or impossible to operationalize.
Given the existence of a strong propensity to ignore, supress, delay,
etc., early commitment of resources to an assessment of organizational
feasibility,a more normative need is suggested to systematize or to
institutionalize the practice. This, of course, may be a tenuous and
costly venture. However, history has repeatedly shown examples of the
extremely high costs associated with a failure to give sufficient and
timely consideration to organizational feasibility during the policy
formation process. A classic example here is McNamara's TFX decision,
but one need not look far to find other important illustrations. The
literature dealing with organizational change and innovation implicitly
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recognizes the importance of organizational feasibility, but in a frag-
mented way, and with a micro orientation. Thus, a number of authors have
suggested consideration of the following aspects of (organizational)
feasibility: technology, human resources, facilities, organizational
environment, client receptivity, access to needed information; and effect
(9)
on organizational interdependencies.
Other literature tends to separate (organizational) feasibility
into technical, operational, and behavioral categories. While these
categories may be appropriate at the micro level, they appear to be less
useful at the macro level of concern here. The several elements of
organizational feasibility have not been definitively identified or
examined at this broader level. In one of the few attempts to do so,
Hurwicz distinguishes between "behavioral" and "material" feasibility.(lo)
This two dimensional approach is a useful beginning, but it tends to
obscure system configuration design considerations which may become
quite important when policy formulation and implementation have an inter-
organizational impact. The importance of the design efficiency of
structural features of the implementation system has been critically
examined by Katz and Kahn( 1 ) and by Ansoff and Brandenburg(12).
These, and other authors point out the importance of structural design
variables as determinants of organizational effectiveness. Because of
the systemic nature of the macro level policy formation process, the
structural characteristics of the implementing system deserve explicit
consideration.
5D2. Concept Composition. In order to increase its salience to the
policy-level phenomenon, it is necessary to carry the concept of organi-
zational feasibility beyond its present usage in the intra-organizational
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change literature. Thus, for present analytical purposes, organization-
al feasibility may be usefully thought of as being composed of technolo-
gical, behavioral, and structural elements. The technological element
is primarily related to the set of technical capabilities possessed
(or which can be acquired at an acceptable cost) by the implementing
system. The bahavioral element refers to those factors which determine
the willingness of the implementing system to effectively apply these
capabilities to the attainment of policy goals. The structural element
refers to the capacity of the system to accommodate and facilitate
patterns of relationships and flows of energy and information which
will effectively integrate and channel system capability and willingness
towards the successful realization of policy intentions.
Technological factors would include the state-of-the-art of the
relevant technology; the level of human expertise; and the capacity
and capability of equipment and other physical facilities. Behavioral
factors would include those individual and interpersonal social-
psychological factors which could operate to either hinder or facilitate
policy implementation. This would encompass factors such as leadership
and motivation; predisposition toward change; organizational history,
culture, and norms; risk propensities; and, personal perceptions of the
likely impact of policy changes on the future degree of congruence
between organizational and individual goals. The structural element
encompasses system design variables such as: communications channels;
sub-systems interfaces; system boundaries; the distribution of power;
patterns of incentive and reward systems; and organizational control
mechanisms.
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Because of the policy system attributes of complexity and equifina-
lity, alternative system designs will potentially be competing for atten-
tion and resources. Premature, or rigid sub-decisions made during an
extended policy formulation cycle can improperly limit the range of
possible structural alternatives and/or may force commitment to a structu-
ral design which may have later dysfunctional consequences during policy
implementation. Early assessment of the capability of an existing system
to implement policy changes may lead to the recognition of a necessity
to manipulate structural variables either by altering existing patterns
of relationships or by designing a new system configuration. Early
awareness of this opportunity or necessity can be a significant input
into the ongoing policy formulation process.
Conceptual and operational tools available for coping with the
challenges of system design are still quite limited, especially at the
inter-organizational level. Furthermore, even those available are not
fully utilized because of a general lack of appreciation of the importance
of structural variables. However, a significant research and experience
base does exist and can be used at least as a heuristic aid to system
design.( 1 3) Existing concepts cannot, of course, point the way to the
one best system design. Indeed, empirical work by organizational theo-
rists such as Burns and Stalker; Lawrence and Lorsch, Pugh, et. al.,
supported by theories developed by Bennis, Churchman, Argyris, Thompson,
Litwak, and others, tends to strengthen the case for contingency theories
of system design. These contingency theories shift the emphasis away
from a search for rigid algorithms, and move instead towards an understand-
ing of the implications and consequences of alternative system design
configurations and an awareness of the task and environmental conditions
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under which one design may be more appropriate than another. From a
policy perspective, this latter orientation offers great promise because
it facilitates creation of a sensitivity to structural implications,
early in the process of policy formulation.
Similarly, the emphasis on environmental influences created by
general systems theorists can be a positive force insofar as it induces
policymakers to give due consideration to the structural aspects of
organizational feasibility. However, the stress on exogenous variables
can be overdone, creating the belief that organization structure is a
dependent variable which will automatically adjust to changes in the
environment. Such a deterministic formulation shifts the attention of
the policymaker away from the implications of manipulating structural
variables. Such an approach is challenged by Eisenstadt (15) who
notes a wide range in the possible degrees of autonomy of a bureaucra-
tic organization vis-a-vis its environment. The present state of in-
complete knowledge regarding the relationship between organizational and
environmental variables, and the macro level context of policy formula-
tion, both tend to suggest the potential usefulness of explicit analyti-
cal examination of structural variables, at the policy system level.
In a business context, the relationship between strategy and
structure is a question which has long occupied the attention of scholars
and practicioners alike. The work of Chandler, for example, is indicative
of the need for organization structure to support strategy.( 6 ) Dror
and Selznick have dealt with similar phenomena in the public sector.(7)
It is neither crucial nor possible here or during policy formulation to
definitively answer the question whether strategy or structure is the
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dependent variable. However, what is much more important is that the
analyst and policy maker consciously be aware of the fact that an inter-
active relationship exists between these variables.
In a public policy context, the policymaker is usually facing the
necessity to deal with organizational feasibility at the intei-organiza-
tional (system) level. This compounds many of the difficulties noted
earlier and underscores the effect of the mutual influences between
policy formulation and policy implementation. For example, a convincing
case can be made to explain the numerous problems which arose during the
government-wide implementation of PPBS, in terms of inadequate attention
to organizational feasibility variables during the policy formation
stage.(18) Expecially relevant here is a whole host of problems which
evolved from the inter-organizational character of the implementing
system when an attempt was made to extend PPBS to nearly all federal
civilian agencies.
A concern for the dynamics of inter-organizational phenomena is
just beginning to influence the research and theory efforts of the
organizational behavior discipline. At present there exist only inad-
equate conceptual tools and only fragmented bits of theory to guide the
policymaker in this arena. The very recent multi-disciplinary work of
(19)Tuite, Chisholm-, and Radnor is an example of an attempt to begin
to deal with the thus far intractable inter-organizational problems which
surround this leading edge of the discipline, and which represent a
central concern to students and practicioners of the policy formation
process.
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5E. Political Feasibility
To complete-this examination of policy feasibility, let us now
turn our attention to the third main component; political feasibility.
Using Dror's approach, political feasibility (of policy) is defined here
as ".. . the degree to which policy is sufficiently acceptable to the
various decision makers, interest groups, and publics whose participa-
tion or acquiescence is needed, so that it can be translated into action"(20 )
Policy formation activity usually will be associated with a number
of different policy alternatives which may have different policical fea-
sibilities. Therefore, identification and estimation of political
feasibility is one of the important elements of the policy formation
process and as such is a natural target for the behavioral study of
policy formation. In view of the importance of political feasibility
in policy formation, it is quite surprising that it remains neglected in
organization theory literature and is not well developed even in the
discipline of political science.(2) For purposes of this study, politi-
cal feasibility may be analyzed along three interdependent dimensions;
i.e., those aspects which are actor related; those which are policy
alternative related; and those which are policy target area related.
5E1. The Actor Dimension. Relative to any particular policy actor
(i.e., individual, group, organization, etc.) political feasibility refers
to the space of effective political action within which the actor is
able to affect reality. In this sense, political feasibility is closely
(22)
connected with the concepts of influence and power. To avoid the
multiple meanings often attached to the terms "power" and "influence"
in the literature, and to facilitate more general analysis, Gergen's
*
The discussion in this section is, in part, based on the work of
Professor Yehezkel Dror of Hebrew University.
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use of the notion of political leverage(23) is followed here. Gergen
uses political leverage to refer to the ability of a policy actor to
influence policies and their implementation. (24) An actor's political
leverage might differ with respect to different policy target areas and
(25)
even within policy phases. The term, actor's leverage domain , will
be used in this study to refer to the action space within which a parti-
cular policy actor has demonstratable political leverage.
5E2. The Policy Alternative Dimension. Political feasibility might differ
in respect to different policy alternatives. When a number of policy
alternatives have different political feasibilities, a preferable policy
may be identified, in part, by trying to estimate the risks and costs
(economic, political,and organizational) associated with each alternative.
Therefore, the political feasibility of any discrete policy alternative
refers to an actor's (behavioral and probabilistic) expectation that the
political support necessary to insure approval and successful implementa-
tion of that alternative either exits or can be created within acceptable
and other resou ce constraints. (26)time and other resource constraints. Here the term policy feasibility
domain is used to describe the range of those expectations just described.
There is no intent here to imply that a policy alternative is
qualitatively 'better" simply because it appears to have a high degree
(27)
of political feasibility. Unfortunately, history has shown that
many "poor" policies in fact enjoy a high degree of political feasibility.
Be that as it may, the "quality" of policy alternatives is beyond the
scope of the modest objectives of this study. For present purposes,
it should be recognized that explicit evaluation of the political feasi-
bility of various policy alternatives might suggest to a policy actor the
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need to impose a limitation on the number of alternatives to be seriously
considered and analyzed. Or, it might suggest the need to establish
strategies aimed at creating or enhancing the degree of political feasi-
bility. In this sense, the topic of political feasibility is closely
related to the concept of coalition and consensus building which is
examined later in this chapter.
5E3. The Policy Target Area Dimension. As noted earlier, comprehensive
policies are likely to encompass several target areas. In such cases,
the degree of political feasibility of various policy alternatives might
differ.with regard to various target areas-within the same overall policy.
This may require the policymaker to make interactive trade-offs in an
attempt to achieve a viable overall political feasibility. However, the
analysis and evaluation of political feasibility (as discussed in the
prededing section) would seem to be a prerequisite even to recognize the
need for such action. Thus, in addition to the factors discussed earlier,
an assessment of political feasibility in regard to different policy.
target areas might lead the policy-maker to explicit consideration of the
possible need to employ different policy strategies in different target
areas. For instance, a strategy of "incremental change" might be
appropriate vis-a-vis one target area, while a "radical change" strategy
might be more appropriate vis-a-vis another target area. This suggests
the desirability of at least considering application of mixed strategies
and the utilization of various risk reducing mechanisms such as experi-
(27-1) (27-2)mentation , sequential decisionmaking (27-)etc. Here, then, is the
emergence of an interface between political feasibility and policy
strategies, an important topic which is discussed in Chapter Three.
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Thus, there are close logical and (at least suggestive) empirical
relationships between these three analytical dimensions of political
feasibility. Following the definitions above, in order for a policy
alternative to be politically feasible, it must be within political
(28)feasibility domain of the relevant policy target area. Furthermore,
empirically, the shape and dynamics of the policy feasibility domain
are at least, in part, influenced by the political leverage of the
policy actors involved in a given policy area.
5E4. Temporal Considerations. Political feasibility is a very time-
sensitive concept. However, the relationships between time and politi-
cal feasibility might be neither linear, nor fixed in direction, nor
continuous. In some cases, feasibility might increase possibly in jumps
over a large time-span, as a consequence of crises(29) as a result of
a breakthrough in technological innovation, or in response to pressures
and social dynamics. Or, in certain cases, it may decrease, thereby
endangering political opportunities or even resulting in their loss.
Therefore, changes in political feasibility domains may be non-continuous,
especially when various time spans in the policy formation process are
considered.
5E5. Molding of Political Feasibility. As already implied, in a policy
context, it is suggested here that political feasibility is not a fixed
commodity, nor is it a "given". Implicit in the definition of political
feasibility given above, is the notion of variation and change. This
underscores a critical point insofar as the policy-relevant aspects of
political feasibility. That is, it is a dynamic and not a static concept.
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Although political feasibility is, in part, shaped by environmental
factors beyond the control of the policy-makers, it is also, in part,
subject to some degree of control by the policy-maker. The seemingly
obvious, yet little understoodpremise here is that political feasibi-
lity is a variable which can be (at least) partly shaped and molded by
policy actors.
Thus, consistent with the earlier definition, it is suggested that
political feasibility can be created, maintained, and modified in scope
and intensity. This dynamic nature operates in response to strategic
and tactical actions taken by policy actors. These actions may be
explicit or implicit, planned or unintended. The potential result is
the same; political feasibility is shaped and molded not only over time,
but also in respect to the three interdependent dimensions discussed
earlier. One primary means of shaping political feasibility is through
coalition formation and maintenance, which in turn is dependent upon
consensus building. Because of the hypothesized centrality of coalition
formation and maintenance to policy formation, it will be worth-while to
examine some of the major theoretical implications of this important
process.
5F. Coalition Formation and Maintenance, and Concensus Building
The theoretical foundations of the concept of coalition formation
and maintenance are derived from two main streams of thought; the socio-
psychological foundations of coalition theory, and the theory of politi-
cal coalitions. Each of these schools will be examined separately. The
sociological and psychological foundations of coalition theory are
composed of a heterogeneous bundle of theories nominally referred to as
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"exchange theories". It would be a herculean task without direct rele-
vance here to attempt to summarize this entire body of literature.
Therefore, this brief review will be very selective.
5F1. Sociological Approaches. Theodore Caplow was one of the first
sociologists to deal with coalition theory in an organizational context.(30)
Since presentation of his first formal sociological theory of coalition
formation, many independent nomothetic studies and isolated attempts at
the construction of grand theory have ocurred. Between these two
extreme approaches lies a vacuum. Very little organizationally relevant
work has been done,despite Merton's early recognition of the pressing
need for "middle range theories".(31)
Attracted by the well developed set of analytical and conceptual
tools which economists have developed for treatment of material exchange,
leading sociologists have attempted to model social behavior as an
exchange transaction. The main assumption being that if the variables
are appropriately transformed, then much of the familiar economic
equipment can be applied to social behavior. This is the intersection
between Homan's and Blau's "exchange theories". Homan's (32) assumed
that social behavior could be conceived as a market transaction. This
was based on a presumed isomorphism between, and analogy with, market
and social behavior. This approach is not a helpful one, because of the
irreducible character of basic social values which cannot be reduced to
some common denominators, and which, therefore, cannot be treated through
"trade-off" mechanisms readily applied to market transactions.
In a much more sophisticated formulation proposed by Blau(33)the con-
cept of consensus-building is grounded in a broad definition of power.
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Blau's definition of power includes:
. . . all kinds of influences between person and
groups, including those exercised in exchange re-
lationships, where one induces others to accede to
his wishes by rewarding them for doing so" (p. 115).
Blau later extends this definition, following Parsons, to include ideas
of regularity, of overcoming resistance, and the use of negative sanc-
tions. The resultant conception, which is close to Dahl's definition
of power, refers to all asymetrical influence processes. Blau's
elegant formulation of power as an influence transaction is inherently
difficult to apply in any predictive way. This partly stems from the
"irreducibility" problem discussed above, partly from the non-quantifia-
bility of the power base, and partly from the fact that power-based
influences are but one determininant of behavior. The existence of
these problems in no way diminishes the significance of Blau's contri-
bution to an improved understanding of power analysis, focused at the
broadest level of general social phenomena. However, the very high
level of analysis employed by Blau limits the applicability of his
sophisticated theoretical work to more particularistic studies of
policy phenomena.
5F2. Psychological Approaches. The psychological research related to
coalition theory is voluminous. In his recent review of research dealing
with coalition and bargaining behavior, Gergen( 3 5 ) came to the conclusion
that most of the experiments from which these research findings emerge
are too artificial to have any significant policy relevance. He notes
that typically the subjects are bargaining for pennies or imaginary
dollars, are usually not allowed to communicate, and are dealing with
alternatives which are unrealistic and drastically restrictive. There-
fore, the general validity of the results of these studies, for policy-
oriented purposes, is problematical. Gergen concludes his survey by
observing that:
"If there is a general conclusion that might be reached,
it is that for any exchange between two people, there
may be multiple sources of satisfaction. .. Even though we
may know a good deal about people's overt behavior in
such situations, our knowledge of the underlying processes
is much more slim." (p. 70)
5F2-1. Thibaut and Kelley. One example of psychological work on human
behavior in interaction situations is Thibaut and Kelley's development
of their "interaction matrix" and their "fate control-behavioral control"
notions.( 3 6 ) Of course, the simple dyadic relationships that were
studied by these researchers are hardly comparable to complex policy
systems. But more fundamentally valid, for present purposes is Deutsch's
criticism of the following basic, but unrealistic, implicit assumptions
underlying the studies of Thibaut and Kelley:
(1) People pursue their self-interest mechanistically
without regard for any psychological aspects of antici-
pating the behavior of others.
(2) The absence of face-to-face communication on the
part of the interactants is not a significant behayioral
determinant in more general bargaining situations.M37)
It is not difficult to concur with Deutsch's conclusion that Thibaut
and Kelley's matrix outcomes may be useful in predicting behavior when
relationships have stabilized. However, in such circumstances, one is
simply using past behavior to predict future behavior, and the matrix
tends to become superfluous in those stablized cases. Therefore, it is
concluded that the real merit in the contribution of Thibaut and Kelley
lies not so much in the power of their theoretical concepts, but rather,
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in their emphasis on: 1) the influence of participant interdependence
on social interactions; and 2) their suggestion that rewards and costs
are not experienced as absolutes, but that their psychological
significance varies with each persons' past experiences and present
opportunities.
5F2-2. The Carnegie School. In a limited fashion, March and Simon(38)
and Cyert and March( 3 9 ) have attempted to deal with coalition formation
and maintenance in an organizational context, and their work is somewhat
unique along this dimension. However, for present purposes, even these
efforts are unduly narrow and closed conceptualizations. For example,
March and Simon limit their treatment of coalition formation to the
issue of an individual's decision to participate, with a resultant em-
phasis on the "inducement-contribution" balance. Cyert and March employ
a somewhat broader formulation when they, in effect, define the firm
as a series of emergant, ad hoc coalitions. However, their approach of
analyzing one decision at a time ignores the dynamics inherent in inter-
active and spillover effects and makes it extremely difficult to locate
stable coalitions which can only be identified through the examination
of choice and-alliance patterns persisting over time.
Thus, while these theorists of the Carnegie School have generally
gone further then most writers in attempting to make coalition theory
organizationally relevant, their work to date still reflects a grossly
oversimplified and static view of the actual dynamics of coalition behavior,
even in an intra-organization context. Such theoretical efforts have
very limited application in studies of policy phenomena, which, by
definition, occur in an inter-organizational setting where the dynamics
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of coalition behavior become considerably more complex and are more
sensitive to political variables. In recognition of this fact, let us
briefly review the theory of political coalitions.
5F3. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Despite Herbert Simon's
heroic attempts to seal the demise of the rational economic man,
much contemporary coalition theory( 4 1 ) and research( 4 2 ) in political
science still assumes that actors exhibit economically -rational
behavior.( 4 3 ) That is to say, that the decision criteria governing the
acceptance (or rejection) of one alternative from a set of multiple
(44)alternatives are based upon utility maximization, on the scarcity
of political resources,( 4 5 ) and on some attempt to reach "Pareto-
optimum" solutions.( 4 6 ) Each of these axiomatic assumptions is, in
fact, violated in the reality of complex policy formation processes.
For example, most behavioral research on decision-making clearly
demonstrates that the actors normally satisfice rather than maximize,
not only because of a lack of wits but often because of a lack of will. (47)
Furthermore, because of the dominant influence of classical economic
thought, even sophisticated political scientists still tend to assume
(erroneously) a high degree of isomorphism between the basic nature of
economic and political resources. Such thinking ignores critical generic
differences in kind. Although not unlimited, the supply of political
resources is not as rigidly constrained nor as finite as is the case with
economic resources. Opportunity costs are less evident and less real
for application of political resources than is the case with economic
resources. Thus, both in availability and in variety of application and
effect, political resources offer the policy actor much more flexibility
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than do economic resources. For example, political resources, when
employed in the form of favors or coercive moves, often result in
immediate power producing effects. It is difficult to conceive of
economic resources in analagous terms. Similarly, the classical models
of economic resources being either consumed or invested with continuous,
concave, production possibility curves are not readily applicable to
political resources employed to produce political power.
The main problem-cluster related to the "Pareto Optimum" assumption
involves a value question. This includes the quite well recognized
(though unsolved) problem of individual multi-dimensional utility
functions which can be neither aggregated nor compared. As mentioned
above, much of existing contemporary coalition theory assumes trade-off
possibilities between different goals, thus permitting "side payments"
and some use of Pareto Optimum as a choice criterion. But in value-
intensive policy issues, values assume more of an "all-or-nothing" form.
In such situations, Pareto Optimum may become logically irrelevant.
On the more pragmatic level, the study of coalitions is in large
part directed toward one basic question; i.e., in the process of policy
formation, which coalition(s) (from the set of all possible coalitions)
is most likely to form? Riker has suggested an answer derived from the
"pay off" principles of "n-person" games.( 4 ) The conclusion, which he
calls the size principle, states that rational actors, confronted by the
necessity to form coalitions to effect policy action, will, "create
coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning, and no
larger."( 9 ) Riker suggests that this deceptively simple norm has
considerable application in analyzing the formation of coalitions.
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Behavioral studies of policy formation and decision-making clearly
show that the fit between the above conclusion and reality is not
particularly good. Riker himself took note of this problem when he
suggested that the meaning of the "payoff" to a winning coalition is
somewhat obscure.(50 ) The basic problem can be traced to two of the
basic assumptions of the model; one being explicit and the other implicit.
First, the explicit assumption of zero-sum game conditions,(51) which
is crucial to the coalition minimizing logic, is not readily identifiable
as either an obvious or a necessary factor in the policy formation
process. Secondly, in political coalition theory there is an implicit
assumption that the game is played but once, or at least, that is is
(52)
not repetitively played by the same actors. In contrast, policy
formation in the real world involves coalition formation in a context
in which the game is repeated, not only once, but numerous times,
with different plays frequently overlapping each other. The behavioral
impact of recursive, overlapping plays is likely to be quite different
than that envisioned by the simplistic assumptions of Riker's model.
One of the most convincing criticisms of Riker's "size principle"
came from Anthony Downs. (5 3 ) While agreeing with Riker that winning
is the primary goal of rational actors, Downs questions whether the most
rational means for accomplishing this end is "to maximize only up to
the point of subjective certainty of winning." On the contrary,
Downs ascribes.to political parties the goal of maximizing votes without
limit, an objective which he regards as synonymous with the goal of
winning elections. However, more important from a policy perspective is
Down's identification of some institutional determinants of coalition
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behavior. Unlike most political scientists, Downs addresses the concept
of coalition formation and maintenance in an organizational context.
This additional insight extends the relevance of earlier coalition
behavior studies beyond the constraints inherent in the more typical
study which focuses on outcomes (expressed in terms of ad hoc voting
behavior) rather than on the institutional process producing those
outcomes. Attention to the institutional dimension highlighted by
Downs may provide a bridge between traditional political science
coalition behavior studies of voting behavior and more recent inter-
disciplinary attempts to examine the determinants of joint, cooperative
decision-making at the inter-organizational level, in.a policy context. (5 4 )
Despite the reservations expressed above, the political theory of
coalitions can provide a useful metaphor for studying policy-relevant
coalition behavior, providing that a distinction is made between its
core ideas and its secondary apparatus, and if the behavioral dimension
is strengthened on the basis of empirical evidence. This necessitates
moving beyond the narrow focus of"voting studies" which neglect the
dynamics and behavioral aspects of coalition formation and maintenance,
and of consensus building. From a policy formation perspective, the
preceeding brief review of the theory of political coalitions has suggested
several useful concepts. These include: the need for consensus building;
the notion of required coalitions; and the implications of side-payment
exchange. Also relevant is Riker's concept of the proto-coalition( 5 5 )
which deals with the dynamics of the timing of incremental changes in
coalition membership.
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5F4. Role-set Theory and Coalition Behavior. An alternative formulation
of coalition behavior in an inter-organizational setting is an attempt
to expand role-set theory beyond its original intra-organizational
focus.(56) Efforts in this direction are still in an embryonic stage
but theoretical work done to date( 5 7 ) offers the promise of a novel but
viable attempt to directly address the complications inherent in coali-
tion formation and maintenance processes in a policy system. Such a
formulation, for example, offers a useful way of thinking about the
"role conflict" created in policy systems where coalitions tend to be
overlapping and where-policy actors may at any moment be a member of
several coalitions formed for various ad hoc purposes.
These seminal efforts are, of course, fraught with numerous conceptual
and methodological problems. Conceptually, for example, treatment of
"non-role-connected" behavior is weak. Methodologically difficult
measurement and mapping problems abound. Nonetheless, an inter-
organizational role-set conceptualization of coalition behavior comes
closer to capturing the richness and variety of coalition behavior in
policy systems than does any of the partial, simplistic treatments
afforded by more traditional approaches which have, to date, dominated
the political science literature.
5F5. Coalition-Consensus Inputs to Policy Feasibility. Coalition
formation and maintenance, and consensus building, are the basic dimensions
of policy feasibility. As such, they are a natural and important target
for a behaviorally oriented study of the policy formation process. The
detailed modeling of this process is beyond the scope of this study.
However, the conceptual framework includes some important dimensions which
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may heighten our presently limited understanding of the impact of consensus
building and coalition formation and maintenance on policy feasibility.
5G. Variables Shaping Policy Feasibility
Although policy feasibility is a variable which can be shaped by
the actions of the policymaker, not enough is known about policy
feasibility to provide a firm empirical basis for statements about the
major variables which shape its main features. Nonetheless, it is
suggested that a list of such variables would include, inter alia, the
existence of a high degree of dissatisfaction with present policies;
intense external pressure; the existence of a perception of crisis;
technological innovation; the political leverage of policy actors;
actor's intentions; required coalitions; and related variables.
5H. Interdependencies Among Policy Feasibility Components
The several interdependencies among the various components of
policy feasibility become immediately apparent. For example, the alloca-
tion of scarce economic resources is, in reality, essentially a political
phenomenon. Resources are allocated not only to action-oriented social
policy proposals but also to the creation and extension of technology.
It seems plausible to speculate that, in general, political support for
a policy proposal may not be forthcoming until the necessary technology
is available. Furthermore, the allocation of economic resources to that
policy would probably be controlled by the degree of political support
present. In advanced,affluent societies, the constraints imposed by
political feasibility are likely to be more stringent than those imposed
by economic feasibility. However, for certain policy target areas,
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technological constraints may well be the dominant ones.
Recognition of the interdependencies existing among policy compo-
nents should not mask the fact that each component is defined by several
unique characteristics. For example, within a certain range, economic
and technological capabilities are mutually transformable. This is less
true of political feasibility, which is of a different genre. For
example, the "supply" of political resources is less fixed than is the
supply of economic resources, and in application, political resources
tend to be much more flexible and less affected by opportunity cost
considerations. In contrast, economic feasibility suggests a context
of limited resources. This tends to drive the policy formation process
into a zero-sum game mode, resulting in competitive strategies and a
tendency to attempt to optimize the allocation of limited economic re-
sources by application to policy alternatives having a high degree of
political feasibility.
Clearly then, the several components of policy feasibility have
a chameleon-like nature. They are at once interdependent, uniquely
defined, and yet are interchangeable to some degree.
5I. The Basic Nature Policy Feasibility
In summary, policy feasibility, as the concept is used in this
study, is a multi-dimensional, dynamic phenomenon. The central purpose
in examining its numerous facets and dimensions has been to underscore
this dynamic nature and to highlight the critical fact that policy
feasibility is not a "given" but is a cluster of variables, the existence
and strength of which can be shaped by actions of the policy-maker.
The essential interdependency between policy feasibility and the
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policy formation process is captured by Lindblom who has noted:
"For any policy-making system has a prodigious effect on
the very preferences, opinions, and attitudes to which
it itself also responds. It is not, therefore, a kind
of machine into which are fed the exogenous wishes, preferences,
or needs of those for whom the machine is designed and out
of which come policy decisions to meet these needs, pre-
ferences, or wishes. The machine actually manufactures both
policies and preferences." (58)
Similarly, Lindblom focuses attention on the recursive, dynamic inter-
face between iterative assessments of policy feasibility and the
essence of the policy formation process itself when he tells us that:
"What is wanted is endlessly reconsidered in the light of
what is possible or most feasible. What is possible and
feasible is constantly reconsidered--and the possibilities
themselves restructured--in the light of what is wanted. "59)
5J. Chapter Summary
The primary purpose of Chapter Five was to examine why certain
potential policies are accepted for processing.by the policy system and
ultimately result in identifiable policy outputs. The concept of policy
feasibility was introduced as a conceptual tool for use in moving towards
that goal. Policy feasibility was defined as the probability that a
policy alternative will be accepted, approved, and successfully imple-
mented by the relevant policy system. It was shown that policy feasibil-
ity may be usefully analyzed in terms of three interrelated main compo-
nents: economic feasibility; political feasibility; and organizational
feasibility..
Because the concept of economic feasibility is already well grounded
in theory and practice, it was not extensively treated. In contrast,
organizational feasibility was developed in some detail, with a focus
on its nature, operation, and implications in a meta-policy context.
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This concept was defined as being tri-partite in nature, consisting of
technological, behavioral, and structural elements. Organizational
feasibility is concerned with "institutional awareness", and was defined
as 'the likelihood that various policy alternatives can and will be operated
on by the relevant implementation system so as to produce policy outcomes
which are largely congruent with policy intentions.
Thus, organizational feasibility was suggested for inclusion in
the conceptual framework for analysis as a means of focusing on the
timing and degree of consideration (during policy fromation) of the
relative successful implementation probabilities of the various policy
alternatives. The need for explicit consideration of organizational
feasibility was stressed, in view of the seemingly strong and persistent
tendency of policymakers to ignore, surpress, and delay early and thorough
attention to this critical aspect of policy feasibility, and especially
its inter-organizational complexities.
Political feasibility was analyzed along three interdependent dimen-
sions: those aspects which are actor related; those which are policy
alternative related; and those which are policy target area related. The
close logical and empirical relationships between these three analytical
dimensions were discussed, and the time sensitivity of policy feasibility
was demonstrated. Considerable emphasis was placed on the notion that
political feasibility is a dynamic and not a static concept. Thus, it
was suggested that political feasibility can be created, maintained,
and modified in intensity, in response to both strategic and tactical
actions taken by policy actors.
Because of the hypothesized centrality of coalition formation and
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maintenance to policy formation, the major theoretical implications
of these processes (which are, in turn dependent upon consensus building)
were examined. This examination included both sociological approaches
(relying heavily on "exchange theories" and general influence processes,
such as power) and psychological approaches (dealing with bargaining
and coalition behavior). It was shown that both of these approaches
had limited application to the study of policy phenomena because they
tend to be based on either grand theories or on rather artificial small
group experiments.
Because policy formation has been characterized as a dynamic,
inter-organizational process which is sensitive to political variables,
the theory of political coalitions was also reviewed. In particular,
Riker's size principle of coalition formation was critically analyzed
and was shown to be a potentially useful metaphor for studying policy-
relevant coalition behavior, despite some conceptual and operational
difficulties relating to the (artificial) zero-sum game assumptions
and the presumed non-iterative, non-overlapping nature of political
coalition behavior. Downs' identification of some institutional deter-
minants of coalition behavior was suggested as a possible bridge between
traditional political science studies of voting behavior and more recent
inter-disciplinary attempts to examine the determinants of joint, co-
operative decision-making at the inter-organizational level. From a
policy formation perspective, several useful concepts inherent in the
theory of political coalitions were highlighted. These included: the
need for consensus building; the notion of required coalitions; and the
implications of side-payment exchange behavior. Although the existence
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of significant conceptual and methodological difficulties was recognized,
an extension of role-set theory was suggested as a possible alternative
conceptualization of coalition behavior.
Finally, a suggestive list of some of the major variables shaping
policy feasibility was provided, and the interdependencies among policy
feasibility components was stressed. The major points emerging from
the discussion in Chapter Five are: first, the development of the concept
of policy feasibility as a tri-partite, dynamic phenomenon; and secondly,
the notion that policy feasibility is neither fixed nor given, but is
a cluster of variables, the existence and strength of which can be shaped
by actions of the policymakers.
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Chapter Six
Search and Evaluation Processes
6A. Chapter Overview
Chapter Six will examine search and evaluation processes, both
as they form an integral part of policy formation and as they might
usefully be employed in policy analysis and in policy research. Two
major areas will be addressed; first, the concept of search, and
secondly, the philosophy and methodology of analysis.
In regard to the concept of search, the forces which either
encourage or discourage search activity will receive particular atten-
tion. The search behavior of the policy system will be examined
along the following four inter-dependent dimensions: the initiation
of search; the scope and duration of search; the extension of search;
and the utilization of alternatives generated by search activity.
Attention will be devoted to the topic of philosophy and method-
ology of analysis because search and evaluation processes are thought
to be, at least in part, guided by some underlying philosophy of
analysis, and limited by the state-of-the-art of the existing analyt-
ical methodology. Rather than attempting to formulate a specific
definition of a philosophy and methodology of analysis, the approach
here will be to briefly examine several analytical concepts which may
represent useful dimensions along which to conduct policy analysis and
policy research. Specific attention will be devoted to the following
concepts: 1) explication of values, assumptions, etc.; 2) operational-
ity of policy goals; 3) learning feedback; 4) main inter-connections
with other issues and systems; 5) transformability of analytical outputs
into policy inputs; 6) redundancy of analysis.
128
129
6B. The Concept of Search
The concept of search is an essential thread in the theoretical
fabric which supports the process of policy formation. Of particular
interest from a policy formation perspective are the forces which encou-
rage or discourage search activity. These forces will be examined by
focusing attention on the nature and scope of the search processes
utilized in pre-choice analysis as a means of generating a spectrum of
policy alternatives for evaluation and ultimate choice. The notion that
this dimension is worthy of attention rests on the implicit assumption
that an attempt to generate a multiplicity of policy alternatives will
usually enrich the policy formation process. For a lucid discussion of
the potential contribution of multiple alternatives to policy making,
see the work of Alexander George. In addition to the somewhat norma-
tive arguments advanced by George, the value of searching for multiple
policy alternatives is central to the rationale underlying systems
analysis, operations research, and that related genre of disciplines.
It is further rooted in the construct of equifinality advanced in open
system theory, and is supported by the theoretical foundation which jus-
tify the redundancy of analysis thesis discussed below.
Choice-making is obviously a central aspect of policy formation.
Not quite so obvious, perhaps, is the relationship between the range of
alternatives utilized to define the universe within which choice-making
is exercised, and the nature of policy outputs. It is not the objective
of this chapter to experimentally examine the exact nature of that
complex relationship. Rather, for present purposes, it will be sufficient
to posit that policy choices are at least partly shaped by the perceived
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range of alternatives available as input to, or as generated by, the
policy formation process. Thus, the main emphasis here is on the search
behavior of the policy system. Four interdependent elements of search
behavior appear to be most relevant. These are: the initiation of
search; the scope and duration of search; the extension of search; and
the utilization of alternatives generated by search behavior.
6B1. The Initiation of Search. Although there is a large body of psycho-
logical literature dealing with human cognition, learning and decision-
making, search processes (and especially search-triggering mechanisms)
are given little attention in the decision theory literature. This is
probably because most decision oriented literature is grounded in the
discipline of economics, resulting in a normative bias and a preoccupa-
tion with that discrete behavioral act known as "choosing" or "deciding".
From an organization behavior perspective, the most relevant treatment
(2) (3)
of search behavior is that of Cyert and March( , Anthony Downs( , and
March and Simon(4 ). The basic contribution of these authors in this
regard is their recognition of the fact that search activity is generally
not self-initiating, or self-regenerative. Therefore, it must be triggered
and maintained by some energic stimulus. The literature just cited
suggests two closely related triggering mechanisms; the existence of a
performance gap, (negative feedback), and an escalating aspiration level.
6Bl-l. Negative Feedback as a Search Initiation Mechanism. The negative
feedback mechanism suggests a static-equilibrium model; that is, it aims
to return an outgoing system to its prior steady-state by searching for
the proximate cause of an aberration in system behavior -- i.e., a
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performance shortfall. Under such a model, there is no incentive to
trigger search for alternatives which would make system performance
different or better. Indeed, the generation of such alternatives would
be dysfunctional in the sense that they might suggest actions which would
upset system stability. While the sought after equilibrium may techni-
cally be dynamic rather than static, the conservative effect on search
behavior may be the same.
Identification of negative feedback as a dominant search initiation
mechanism has two important consequences. First, without an operation-
al goal, and/or in the absence of an evaluation and a feedback capability,
little or no search will be initiated. Secondly, this suggests that other
search mechanisms are operative only under a limited set of special
circumstances. Search initiation thus seems to be closely lihked to
the concept of aspiration level. If a high or escalating aspiration
level will not accept equilibrium as a suitable system dynamic, this
situation may provide the stimulus for change-oriented or improvement-
oriented search. However, as March and Simon argue, search behavior
oriented towards program maintenance appears to be much more common and
much less costly than does search oriented towards program elaboration,
improvement, or innovation. Thus, it is clear that most decision-making
literature conceives of search behavior as being problemistic vice
opportunistic in nature. This has significant implications not only in
terms of understanding search initiation mechanisms, but also in regard
to the scope and duration of search.
6B2. Scope and Duration of Search. Once search has been initiated, the
scope and duration of search behavior becomes of primary importance.
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Prevailing models of search process may be arrayed along a continuum,
ranging from the classical economic maximizing model at one extreme,
to Simon's satisficing model at the other. As ideal types, these
polar cases are useful conceptual devices for explaining the scope and
duration of search behavior. However, as is frequently the case,
some mid-point on such a continuum would seem to represent a more useful
basis for an explanatory cum prescriptive theory of search behavior.
At such a mid-point, we find models such as those advanced by Hitch
and McKean( 5), and Ackoff(6) These so-called economically rational
models suggest that the scope and duration of search are determined
neither by maximizing nor by satisficing. Rather, they posit that the
search for alternatives will extend only so far and will continue only
so long as the marginal benefits of doing so exceed the marginal
(opportunity) costs. While such a model displays conceptual elegance,
its usefulness for students of the policy process is limited by an
inability to operationalize its basic concepts. A major difficulty in
this regard is the well recognized, but still unresolved, group of
problems stemming from our inability to either meaningfully compare
or to aggregate the multi-dimensional utilities and intransitive prefer-
ences of individual decision-makers.
An even more formidable cluster of problems arises from the fact
that for the novel and innovative alternatives hopefully to be generated
from extensive search activity, both marginal cost and marginal payoff
become extremely difficult to identify and to measure with any reasonable
degree of precision. Thus, the marginal cost/benefit model becomes
tautological in that range where it is needed the most, and the value
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of "knowing" that search will continue only so long as it is useful,
becomes dubious at best.
The concept of aspiration level appears to be useful in explaining
not only the initiation of search, but also its scope and duration.
Level of aspiration can be translated into application of either a max-
imizing or a satisficing criterion to govern search activity. Thus,
in a satisficing mode, search will extend only so far and continue only
so long as it takes to identify an apparently acceptable alternative.
It seems plausible to hypothesize that a similar phenomenon occurs at
the organizational level. This is, of course, the Cyert and March( 7 )
finding regarding proximate search. What it ignores, however, is the
effect of any inducement to extend search.
There is little serious empirical support for the hypothesis that
organizations (or individuals) can or do engage in either pure maximiz-
ing or pure satisficing behavior. Thus, this dichotomy is of limited
value in understanding actual search behavior, and is of even less value
as a basis for building predictive models. Furthermore, a great deal of
the maximizing/satisficing debate is quite specious. More important
is Whitehead's observation that:
"The real question is not whether we want to
optimize, or even if we should try, but to find
ways of simplification of complex reality which
will produce as good a decision as we are able to
make within these limitations." (8)
In its extreme form, the maximizing model has few defenders, even
among enlightened economists. When Simon originally formulated his
concept of "satisficing" (over 25 years ago) as an alternative to the
maximizing model, his was a creative and useful contribution. However,
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since that time, most economists have moved in the direction of:
1) explicit recognition of the simplifying assumptions and limitations
inherent in their original concept of rational economic man; 2) acceptance
of the cost of search concept; and 3) recognition of the descriptive
validity 6f the satisficing model. The ironical situation is that as
economists have tended to become more "realistic" regarding behavioral
assumptions, students of organization behavior have tended to become as
rigid in their tacit acceptance of "satisficing" as a core assumption
in the discipline as were the early economists who staunchly defended
rational economic man.
The relatively low level of existing knowledge about search
behavior is in part due to the "either/or" stance of economists and
behaviorists alike. Another barrier in the road toward improved
understanding of search behavior is the persistent confusion over the
purpose, usefulness, and limitations of various models, concepts, and
partial theories. Criticism of descriptive models, because they lack
predictive power is no more useful than is criticism of the lack of
behavioral reality in many prescriptive models.
The test of the assumptions underlying behavioral explanations should
not be how realistic they are, but how well they can cope with the
problems they were meant to explore. Despite the growing consensus that
some models of rational action are not as "realistic" as some alternative
behavioral models, realism is not a sufficient or necessary criterion
for distinguishing between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" models. In his
recent book, Allison( 9 ) convincingly attacks "reality' as a necessary or
desirable criterion for judging the relative worth of seemingly competing
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explanatory models. His incisive work is an extension of earlier work
by Friedman(l1 ) and Machlup(ll) who argue that the realism of the assump-
tions underlying various economic models is not a meaningful issue.
Allison demonstrates the fact that assumptions which may be considered
gross simplifications by the behavioral student are often good enough
for explaining and predicting broader phenomena and for suggesting new
problems and hypotheses on the macro level.
Perhaps an even greater contribution in Allison's work is his con-
tention that the most useful understanding of macro level behavioral
patterns is that which results from the analysis of behavioral phenomena
through explicit application of several different models, based on vary-
ing assumptions about an only partially understood reality. This position
extends Webb's( 12 ) suggestion that despite the inherent weaknesses of
existing methodology, research on complex phenomena can proceed through
application of a number of different methodological approaches to the
same phenomenon. This approach generates several different "fixes", and
thus compensates for the limitations and biases of individual approaches.
Although there is ample evidence to confirm the reality that very
few organizations engage in maximizing behavior as a natural or normal
mode of search, this situation does not justify the growing tacit and
total acceptance of the Lindblom thesis that incremental search is at
once descriptive and prescriptive.(1 3 ) Lindblom argues that incremental
search is both efficient and effective. It may be worthwhile to observe
that while it is undeniable that proximate search is extremely widespread,
there continues to be notable exceptions to this pattern which are at
least worthy of further study. Lindblom,(14) as well as March and Simon(l5)
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and Cyert and March,( 16 ) all tend to ignore variables such as missionary
zeal, strong ideological commitment, and idealized value systems,
which have encouraged or driven individuals and organizations to actively
search for new and creative alternatives. These deviations from the
incremental search norm, when operating at the macro-policy level, may
so drastically affect policy formulation as to suggest potential advan-
tages to an induced expansion of the scope and duration of search acti-
vity, thereby extending the range of policy alternatives.
6B3. The Impact of Crisis on Search Behavior. The pressures created by
a crisis situation may be considered to be an extreme case of negative
feedback. It is important to examine the possible effects of crisis on
search behavior. In a crisis situation, a consensus may quickly emerge
among policy actors regarding the desirability or necessity to, "do
something". Furthermore, response time is usually a critical factor.
These perceived imperatives for rapid action may preclude adequate
examination of the cost and risks associated with any particular
alternative, and may foreclose on the opportunity to seriously search
for other alternatives. President Truman's rapid response to the invasion
of South Korea( 1 7 ) and President Johnson's decision to land U. S. troops
(18)in the Dominican Republic represent classic examples of this phenome-
non.
At the level of the individual decision-maker, psychological research
has revealed a tendency for individuals to experience "cognitive rigidity"
when exposed to stress. One consequence of this mental closure is an in-
ability to recognize alternative means of coping with the problem at
han4.(l9) Other psychological experiments, such as those reported by
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Robinson, et al.,have shown that "under crisis, both the search for
alternative courses of action and the actual number of such alternatives
considered by the political decision-maker are reduced." These re-
searchers did recognize, however, that earlier experiments have
shown that, ". . moderate stress produces creative decision-making
including search, and induces more search and innovation than either the
absence of stress or the presence of intensive stress." (20 ) These
findings are consistent with the work of H. Wilensky(21) and 0. R. Holsti,(2)
who have suggested that crisis forces may generate or harness energy not
normally released.
The applicability of psychological research findings to higher level
social systems remains an open question. However, at least some scholars
contend that such individual behavioral pathologies as cognitive rigidity
and premature search closure can also afflict formal organizations.
Rokeach, et al., for example, demonstrate a relationship between threat
(23)
and the degree of organizational dogmatism. It becomes clear, then
that any serious analysis of search behavior muast be grounded in an
awareness of the behavioral implications of the presence of crisis-related
variables .*
6B4. The Impact of Coalition Behavior on Policy Alternative Search
Patterns. The need to form and maintain coalitions may have a consider-
able impact on the scope and duration of policy alternative search patterns
by setting some limits on the degree of explicitness and on the operation-
ality of policy goals. The imperatives of coalition needs may require
For an elaboration of the concept of crisis, see Chapter 7.
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that some sensitive alternatives be excluded from serious consideration.
However, within these limits, policy actors retain, in many circumstances,
considerable freedom of choice regarding alternative search patterns.
The scope of this discretion depends on variables such as: (a) how many
different coalitions might be formed from various potential actors;
(b) how well the actors can "sell" policies to potential coalition members,
without respect to what the specific policy is about; (c) how strong the
forces are which maintain coalitions even when certain members of the
coalition oppose some specific policies; and (d) how much the actors can
buy support by means of inducements that do not depend directly on the
policies in question.
6B5. The Extension of Search Behavior. At this stage, it seems reasonable
to conclude that, largely because of the as yet unexplicated costs (and
potential benefits), search behavior has been dominated by the proximate
mode. In recognition of the conservative and non-self-regenerative
nature of organizational search behavior, March and Simon implicitly
characterize the search process as a type of stimulus-response behavior.( 2 4 )
While this (perhaps unintended) characterization suffers from most of
the shortcomings which led to the demise of the early behaviorist (stimu-
lus-response) school in.psychology, it is useful for the purpose of
focusing needed attention on the question of how more extensive search
behavior might be encouraged and even institutionalized. Beyond recog-
nizing that since there are costs associated with all search activity,
and that, therefore, an explicit investment of resources would be
required in order to encourage extensive search behavior, the full answer
to that question lies outside the scope of this paper. One relevant
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mechanism for encouraging greater breadth and depth of search is the
use of analysis. The author's theorizing and research suggest that per-
haps the most important contribution of analysis to policy formulation
lies in its potential ability to encourage and strengthen search
behavior by:
1) pointing out (if necessary) the inappropriateness of "obvious"
alternatives; especially in cases where such obvious alternatives mask
the fact that, "the king is naked".
2) extending the range of alternatives so as to include some low
probability (or even counter factual) ones, thereby permitting policymak-
ers to select an alternative best approximating their subjective judg-
ment over all issues which are value-laden. This does not imply that
this subjective value judgment cannot be affected by analysis. (This
issue is more thoroughly discussed in the section dealing with value
explication.)
3) encouraging reformulation of the problem, and thereby opening
the system to innovative alternatives.
Of course, there are significant limitations on the ability of any
analysis to facilitate and strengthen search activity. This is especially
true when search must extend beyond easily recognizable alternatives
in an attempt to generate new ones. It may well be that different modes
of thinking, different intellectual capacities, and a differing technology
are required for these two tasks. The role of analysis, including these
limitations, is explored in the work of Dolenga.(25)
On the surface, it might appear that there are circumstances, under
which it is neither desirable nor necessary to encourage search activity.
Frequently, for example, specific alternatives are strongly advocated by
140
vocal proponents. In these cases, one might assume that the proposed
alternatives could be treated as given and that,therefore further search
activity is unnecessary. In other cases, crisis generated pressures may
propel certain obvious alternatives to the forefront. However, in both
situations, the extension of search efforts may still be quite important
as a means of encouraging articulation of certain alternatives which may
lack vociferous advocates, and as a means of moderating precipitous
action which might result from too ready acceptance of "given" or
"obvious" alternatives.
6B6. Utilization of Search Output. An important converse problem arises
when a viable policy alternative is strongly advocated by certain spokes-
men, but that alternative is not perceived as relevant or legitimate by
the policy system. Thus, any useful analysis of the search behavior em-
ployed to generate policy alternatives should give explicit recognition
to the fact that the output of the search process (i.e., more and better
alternatives) may or may not be accepted and utilized by the policy
system. This fact once again underscores the strong inter-relatedness
of the various dimensions of the conceptual framework for analysis. For
example,. in policy analysis and research it is not enough to merely
identify the existence of a search (or other) capability, because its
existence by no means insures its utilization. Furthermore, even if a
sophisticated search capability does exist and is utilized, the output
of the search processes may be modified, ignored, or rejected by the
policy system; sometimes for reasons which are quite rational and legi-
timate from the point of view of the policymaker, even though an analyst
who conducted the search (analysis) may not concur.
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6B7. Search as a Tool of Problem Reformulation. Before concluding, it
should be emphasized that throughout the preceding discussion of the
concept of search, the "search for alternatives" is not intended to be
constrained to be a search for new solutions to old problems. Indeed,
much of the value of expanding the scope, depth, and duration of search
activity may well lie in the discovery, creation, or recognition of a
fundamental reformulation of the problem. (26)
This Chapter has focused on the search for multiple and creative
alternatives because of the fact that policy choice necessitates the
availability of meaningful alternatives from which to choose. However,
it should be noted that search can and should be employed for other
purposes, such as: 1) an accurate assessment of reality as a basis for
action; 2) the exploration of various policy dimensions such as policy
feasibility; 3) recognition of an opportunity/necessity for a decision--
i.e., engagement of the policy system. For further amplification of
these multiple purposes of search (and analysis more broadly defined)
see the work of Dolenga.(27)
6C. Philosophy and Methodology of Analysis
Search and evaluation processes are, at least in part, guided by an
underlying (explicit or implicit) philosophy of analysis, and are, of
course, limited by the state-of-the-art of the analytical methodology
available for application to policy analysis and policy research. For
purposes of this study, it is necessary to conceptualize both a philo-
sophy, and the supporting methodology, in a broad, policy-relevant frame
of reference. That is, analysis (which is here considered to be a
convenient label to capture the broad-scope search and evaluation processes
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which are the subject of this chapter ) should not be thought of as being
limited to any single approach, methodology, or set of techniques. In
particular, analysis should not be equated with or constrained by quanti-
tative methods. All of these are, of course, necessary components of
analysis, but no one is alone sufficient.
This author's initial thinking about a philosophy and methodology
of analysis was influenced by a long-standing relationship with Professor
Yehezhel Dror of Hebrew University. However, based on extensive experience
in various positions in the Israeli Government, coupled with the
experience of doctoral studies in the Graduate School of Management at
Northwestern University, this early thinking has been extended and
refined. In addition, field work conducted in connection with study has
served to further elaborate and test initial thoughts about this subject.
Even at this stage, this author must agree with Dror's recent observation
that "any set of policy analysis concepts is of provisional utility and
sure to need early revision." (2 8 )
In the previously cited work of Dolenga,(29) the concept of analy-
sis is extensively treated in a manner which is fully compatible with the
conceptual framework for analysis developed in this study. Indeed, Dolenga's
work could readily be integrated into this framework because he deals
with a broad, policy-relevant concept of analysis and examines the role
and impact of analytical inputs on the policy formation process. The
reader seriously interested in the study of policy formation is urged
to review Dolenga's complementary work in conjunction with this study.
Rather than attempting to formulate any specific definition of a
See Vita, p.
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philosophy and methodology of analysis for application to search and
evaluation processes which influence policy formation, the approach here
will be to briefly examine a number of analytical concepts which are
included in the conceptual framework being developed herein because they
are potentially very useful dimensions along which to conduct policy
analysis and policy research. The following concepts will be treated in
subsequent sections of this chapter:
-Explication of Values, Assumptions, etc.
-Operationality of Policy Goals.
-Learning Feedback.
-Main Inter-Connections with Other Issues and Systems.
-Transformability of Analytical Outputs Into Policy Inputs.
-Planned Redundancy of Analysis.
6C1. Explication of Assumptions and Values. The reasons for examining
the degree of explication of values, assumptions, tacit theories and
ideologies in analysis are both moral and functional. Morally, policy
formation involves choice and every choice involves some value judgment.
Clearly the invocation of value judgment is a legitimate political
function, but since value judgments have a significant extra-scientific
component, there are no objective criteria by which to "judge the
judgment". As Vickers has noted, judgment is an art and its exercise
represents an ultimate category which can only be approved or condemmed
by a further exercise of the same ability.(30) The explication of
values, assumptions, etc., underlying judgments reached by policy-makers
serves to at least facilitate understanding by the members of a plural-
istic society. Functionally, the nonexplication of values and assumptions
may impair the utility of an analysis as a heuristic aid in policy
formation. Even a brief look at many analytical studies will reveal
that the hidden value judgments and assumptions implied in many of them
strongly affected both the conduct and the output of such studies.
The potential importance of bringing hidden assumptions (which may
be critical for a given policy) out into the open, lies in the fact that
ideological values, "operational codes " ( 3 1 ) ,prototype images" ( 3 ),
and other tacit theories that can be roughly labelled under Simon's
".(33)
"decisional premises33 may, in some cases, be so strong and unquestioned
among analysts and policy makers as to dominate their decisions.( 3 4 )
In situations in which the composition of the policy formation
group is such that decisional premises are not uniformly held among
policy actors, the process of policy formation itself may be of some
significant importance if it succeeds in bringing decisional premises
and initial perceptions under introspection before policy premises are
solidified behind one policy option. This is one of the stages of the-
policy formation process where the role of analysis in policy formation
may be of crucial importance, if expertly handled. The potential
advantages to result from the explication of values and assumptions as
mechanisms in policy formation is a topic nearly ignored in organization
theory literature.
In policy systems, the main barriers noted in the literature,( 3 5 )
which hinder and often prevent the explication of values, underlying
goals, assumptions, etc. are usually associated with the requirements of
consensus building and coalition formation and maintenance (See Chapter
Five). Consensus building and coalition maintenance between different
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actors with diverse points of view depends on some repression and
ignorance of alternatives and even more on an intentional non-expli-
cation of underlying assumptions and values.
It is important to introduce at this point a caution against unre-
stricted value explications. In some cases, value explication may have
negative consequences as a result of ignoring essential political
realities. The fact that most available behavioral studies have pointed
out that we are far off from the point of "diminishing utility" of
additional value related to the explication of values and assumptions
is no reason to ignore the existence of a point of diminishing utility
(36)or even negative utility.
This element is included in the conceptual framework in order to
call attention to the need to apply analytical methods to assess the
degree of explication of various values, assumptions, theories and ideol-
ogies in various phases of the policy formation process.
6C2. Operationality of Policy Goals. Clearly, search and evaluation
processes are closely related to the policy goals implicitly or explicit-
ly held by the main policy actors. Beyond this axiomatic observation,
it is suggested that the degree of operationality of policy goals may
have a significant influence on the policy formation process. Therefore,
in this section, the focus is on the degree to which operational goals
were elaborated in various phases of the policy formation process so as
to be specific enough to provide a meaningful guide for action and post
evaluation. The concept of goal operationality and its importance as a
tool for action and evaluation is discussed by Simon,( 3 7 ) Rosner( 38 )'
Pelz and Andrews,( 39 ) Rubenstein,( 4 ) and is treated in most of the systems
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analysis and planning literature.
Three main problem clusters, which are not equally treated in the
literature, and which might impose certain restrictions on the capability
and desirability of operationalizing policy goals in specific instances,
can be identified:
1) The first problem cluster is related to the formulation of
operational goals. Although this problem exists in an intra-organizational
context, it becomes much more difficult when moving into an inter-organ-
izational context. The difficulty is that the non-formulation of opera-
tional goals may have some advantages for coalition management and con-
sensus building. Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that "the more
goals are operationalized . . . the better always". This is not the
case, even though the importance of operationalization of policy goals
is nearly universally accepted in the literature. This caveat is
completely ignored in most of the planning and systems analysis litera-
ture and is sometimes overemphasized by the more behaviorally-oriented
students of organizations.
2) The second problem cluster is related to goal expectations.
Formulation of operational policy goals involves formalization of expec-
tations. Even if such expectations are formulated in stochastic terms,
they can serve as criteria for evaluation of policy outputs. This may
hinder the tendencies of policy actors towards post-decisional dissonance
(the presentation as a goal of whatever is achieved), and may lead to
formulation of easily achievable "operational goals" as a self-defense
mechanism. These problems, while generally recognized, have received
insufficient attention in the behavioral research and literature, mainly
because of an apparent lack of interest in prescriptive policy-oriented
research.
3) The third problem cluster is related to the serious difficulty
of translating sometimes very abstract and symbolic policy goals into
operational terms. Some (but not all) policy goals may defy not only
quantification, but even conceptualization. Nevertheless, the process
of developing operational criteria for a set of complex goals has been
shown to be theoretically and empirically possible by Maglin, Maas,
Wilson, Prest and Turvey, Rothblatt and many others.(42)
The above problem areas, in combination, may explain the normal
lack of attention paid to the operationalization of goals in many policy
formation instances. This in turn, seriously hinders any attempts at
policy achievement evaluation. In contrast, formulation of operational
goals may often serve as an important instrument to facilitate recruit-
ment of public support in order to obtain the necessary political and
economic resource. This aspect tends to be ignored by the most of the
literature. Available research clearly points out that in conditions of
war, crisis, etc., the formulation of operational goals is not only
desirable, but is relatively easier to achieve. Issues requiring empirical
study include; the consequences and implications of such "crisis-induced"
operationalization, and ways in which a high degree of operationalization
might be achieved under "normal" circumstances.
6C3. The Degree of Learning Feedback from Prior Policies. Feedback as
an aid to decision-making has been given its most precise formulation by
those who have followed Wiener's lead in trying to describe social processes
(4 3)generally as cybernetic networks. * Two basic kinds of feedback may
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be differentiated; goal seeking, the feedback of new external data into
a net whose operating channels remain unchanged; and, learning,the feed-
back of external data which change these operating channels themselves.(4 4 )
Thus, feedback serves two purposes: 1) finding out whether discrete
policies need to be revised during implementation; and, 2) enabling
the policy formation system to "learn" from prior experience. However,
we must keep in mind that such a distinction as to purpose is more for
analytical convenience than for description. Because of the continuous
and'iterative character of policy formation and organizational learning,
such a distinction is only roughly approximated in reality.(45)
The first type of feedback would involve adjusting the choice between
implementation of alternative courses of action in order to more fully
realize the original policy intentions, and, as such is beyond the scope
of Uds study which focuses on the pre-implementation phases of the policy
process. Therefore, here we are focusing primarily on learning feedback;
namely, the degree of engagement in systematic study of relevant prior
policies and policy outcomes and the continuous input of the results of
any such analysis into current policy formation.
This would be too obvious a requirement to deserve more than pro
forma notice were it not for the relatively well documented evidence of
a lack of sensitivity to this dimension even when learning feedback
data was available and was embodied in easy to identify form. In other
instances, even though past policies have been studied, there is little
indication that such study was then translated into operative conclusions
which could serve as input to an ongoing policy formation process.
However, despite the seemingly self-evident values to obtain from
explicit incorporation of learning feedback into an ongoing policy
149
formation cycle, the concomittant danger exists that an over-dependency
on learning feedback could create or perpetuate such dominant historical
constraints as to hinder recognition of articulation of innovative alter-
natives. Thus, the inclusion of this item in the conceptual framework
is intended to focus attention not only on the existence (or lack of)
of the use of learning feedback, but also on the scope and intensity of
its use. In a normative sense, a fine balance best describes the optimum
influence of learning feedback. Its application must, of course, be
contextually and situationally tailored to meet specific policy forma-
tion needs.
6C4. Main Interconnections With Other Policy Issues and Policy Systems.
The desirability of identifying connections between particular policies
and related issues and systems has a strong theoretical and pragmatic
grounding in the concepts underlying general systems theory,(46)
systems analysis(4 7 ) and related disciplines. Sir Geoffrey Vicker's( 4 8 )
observation is instructive in this regard:
"Those who are engaged in a course of decision-making
soon become aware that each decision is conditioned
not only by the concrete situation in which it is taken
but also by the sequence of past decisions; and that
their new decisions in their turn will influence fu-
ture decision... " (p. 15)
The unfixed, open, and undefined boundaries of many of the complex
policy formation issues require some exploration and identification of
cross-impact interdependencies between the specific policy under inves-
tigation and other potential related issues and systems. Also, the frag-
mented structure of much of the policy formation system makes all the
more necessary the identification of'variables endogenous to a specific
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policy, and also variables which are exogenous to a specific policy, but
which influence that policy through cross-impact.
More specifically, the identification of main interdependencies is
essential for policy systems delimitation, i.e., a determination of the
boundaries within which the policy is to be confined. In other words,
what is the domain of issues and institutions to be treated in analysis
and to be considered by the policy actors as appropriate objects of
discrete policy formation? No less important a question and one also
involving boundary issues is, within what domain did the policy actors
look for relevant policy consequences? Related questions are, what was
regarded by actors as first order consequences, as second order conse-
quences, etc.?
System delimitation is one of the most important strategic decisions
in every policy formation because it shapes the whole policy space.
Theoretically, the possibilities for formulating and delineating the
policy issue range between two extremes: on the one hand, the issue can
be formulated narrowly, neglecting the interdependencies between various
policy system variables. This may be convenient when we are speaking
about broad policy issues, then a narrow restriction in policy boundary
delineation may assure, in advance, that policy formation may be impaired
as a result of ignoring some of the basic characteristics of the system
under investigation. On the other hand, it is unavoidably true that
every problem posed for decision must be delimited in such a way as to
render it susceptible to analysis within the constraints posed by limited
understanding and scarce resources.
See Chapter Three for a discussion of systems delimitation as a strate-
gic decision issue.
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The few available behavioral studies of policy formation clearly
point out that a lack of attention to this dimension often results in
ill-considered, over-atomized, and truncated policy reform attempts
which tend to be ineffective.(49 ) Nonetheless, it is important to
recognize that although the identification of such inter-connections is
essential, it is by no means easily accomplished. Although systems
theory and ecological science has made us aware of the high degree of
inter-relatedness among components of natural systems, in an organi-
zational context, little has been offered to ameliorate the extreme
difficulty of operationally dealing with this "inter-connectedness of
all things." The problem is all the more difficult because of the
existence of a set of barriers, both general and specific.
Broadly speaking, three main clusters of barriers which tend to
inhibit operational consideration of cross-impact and interrelatedness
can be identified. These are: 1) Cognitive limitations of human analysts
and decision-making, 2) Behavioral barriers, and 3) Methodological
barriers and the absence of reliable theory. Let us briefly examine
each of these three main clusters of barriers.
1) Cognitive Limitations. The cognitive limitations of human analysts
and decision-makers, and the costly resources needed to at least partially
overcome these, are discussed extensively in the literature by Simon,( 5 0 )
(51) (52)Cyert and March, Lindblom,( 5 ) and others. These well-known works
will not be repeated here. However, what should not be overlooked is the
fact that, despite the general usefulness of such literature, a major
shortcoming of these authors is that they have confused or at least inter-
mingled diverse phenomena deriving from relatively'fixed cognitive
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limitations on the one hand, and from behavioral barriers (interpersonal
interactions, vested interests, human inertia, etc.) that are more
susceptible to directed change, on the other hand.
2) Behavioral Barriers. In many concrete situations, the failure
or seeming inability to deal with main inter-connections of issues and
systems is at least partly inspired by very prosaic and less "objective"
reasons. These include factors such as, the general inertia of indivi-
duals and organizations, tendencies toward conflict avoidance, vested
interests in parochial aspects of broad policy issues, etc. These
barriers are relatively more susceptible to conscious improvement through
efforts directed at change. This underscores the necessity to distin-
guish between relatively fixed underlying characteristics and nominal
behavior patterns that can be modified.
3) Methodological Barriers and the Absence of Reliable Theory. The
third cluster of barriers involves methodological difficulties; namely,
a scarcity of methods for identifying, elaborating, and dealing with
cross-impact interdependencies. Compounding these methodological
problems are the added complexities of the absence of reliable theory and
the existence of a large number of dynamic variables, about which reliable
predictions are often impossible. Insofar as the absence of theory,
General Systems Theory has made us conscious of the interrelatedness
phenomena. However, the theory has provided us with very few guidelines
or operational tools to use in specifically describing and dealing with
interrelatedness. More difficult from a policy formation perspective is
the near total lack of tools and methods for predicting consequences and
cross-impact relations between potential policy alternatives. However,
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some promising efforts in this direction are underwary, and some limilted
capability for the identification of interrelatedness exists and can
be utilized even in this primitive stage of the state-of-the-art.( 5 3 )
Although progress is slowly being made along both theoretical and
methodological lines, even the newer capabilities are only partial, at
best. Yet, in the absence of an ability to determine casual relation-
ships, even a partial and tentative analysis of inter-relatedness may
have some valuable pay off, given the existing lack of understanding of
many complex policy issues.
One emerging approach is the mapping of some possible intercon-
nections with condition sensitivity review, as suggested by Churchman
and Shainblatt.(5 ) Alternatively, identification of some links between
present and future, and even "speculative thinking", may improve the
quality of policy by sensitizing policy actors to additional and pre-
viously unrecognized dimensions of policy.( 55 ) This is especially
important, because of the not uncommon organizational tendency to
ignore uncertainty, to repress ambiguity, and to create the impression
that one knows what one is doing. Therefore, in respect to some policy
variables, focusing on potential null hypotheses may be very important.
Furthermore even without efforts to influence some policy variables,
because of a lack of knowledge of the probable direction of cross-impact,
there exists an opportunity to carefully "monitor" some variables in
order to create a capacity "to adjust to the uncontrollable", as noted
by Dror.(56) Finally, it should be recognized that not all policy targets
are identical in their complexity, cr in their time perspectives. There-
fore, for some policy variables, the nature and direction of possible
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interrelatedness may be quite visible (and thereby susceptible to control)
even with a minimum of focused search and evaluation effort.
The preceding discussion attempts to provide the intellectual and
empirical justification for including an assessment of the degree of
search and identification of inter-connection in the conceptual frame-
work. However, a note of caution is in order. Because the relationships
that are relevant to many broad policy issues are often so numerous and
so complex, we cannot, at this stage, hope to understand completely the
full range of possible permutations. This means that the interrelated-
ness we are addressing is really the perceived interrelatedness at a
point in time. It is not surprising, then, when a breakthrough is made
to illuminate a new perception of interrelatedness, new policy instruments
fairly readily emerge and can be put into use in policy analysis which
is aimed at the identification of the main inter-connections between
issues and systems.
6C5. Transformability 6f Analytical Outputs Into Policy Inputs. While
dicussing possible improvements in the communications systems of large
organizations, Katz and Kahn highlight the necessity for ". . . the per-
fecting of translation mechanisms. . . (57) Inclusion of the issue of
the transformability of analytical outputs into policy inputs in the frame-
work is in recognition of the value of examining the operation of such
mechanisms in an ongoing policy process. In a broad sense, the transfor-
mability issue can be conceptualized as the area of interface between
analysis and policy formation. This is one of the main areas of inquiry
dealt with by Dolenga and the interested reader is referred to his work.(58)
The phenomenon of transformability is operative at all levels of the
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policy system and in all phases of the policy process.( 5 9 ) The funda-
mental need for application of a "translation mechanism" arises out of
the implications implicit in Snow's "two culture" syndrome.(60)
Furthermore, there is ample historical evidence that even competent
analytical work has had, in many cases, a limited impact on policy
formation. This suggests the possibility that analytical outputs
need to somehow be transformed from their "normal" state, into a state
which will render them more acceptable to, and efficacious in, the
policy system. (Of course, the difficulty does not all lie with the
form of analytical outputs or with analysis itself; this aspect is part
of dynamic process now being isolated here for purposes of examination
and exposition.)
Before proceeding, it must be emphasized that the transformability
of analytical outputs into policy inputs is one of the most difficult
and complex issues treated in this chapter because it touches upon the
basic characteristics of policy formation as a process operating in a
system composed of organizations, roles, and human individuals.
In the earlier discussion of policy feasibility (see Chapter 5)
it was noted that of the infinite number of potential policy issues, only
a very few actually become inputs to the policy formation process. It
is hypothesized here that at this broadest level, the transformation of
potential policy issues into actual policy issues is significantly
influenced by two main cluster variables; policy crisis and policy analy-
sis. Since a concern with this broad conceptualization of transforma-
bility permeates the entire study, no attempt will be made to encapsulate
all of its ramifications here. Instead, the present, more limited objec-
tive of this section is to focus on some features of transformability of
156
of analytical outputs into policy inputs on a more pragmatic level,
including: 1) formats for presentation of analysis; 2) communicability
and accessibility to policy makers; and 3) the degree of multiplicity
of alternatives presented to policy makers for decision. Each of
these features will be examined individually below.
1. Formats for the Presentation of Analysis. The results of
analytical studies can be presented with a variety of visual aids,
graphic descriptions, issue mapping, and even computer simulation. The
form of policy analysis presentation can be adjusted to different
audiences ranging from highly professional experts to mass media communi-
cation. In all versions, the variance might be in the degree of elabo-
ration and details, while the basic features of analysis are not impaired.
The focus of this section is primarily on policy analysis outputs
directed at individual policy actors; namely, senior executives, politi-
cans, union leaders, etc. The concrete needs of formats for the output
of analytical studies depend on the characteristics of discrete policy
formation systems, and the personal characteristics, habits, and
idiosyncracies of the individual actors occupying such discretionary
policy positions.(6l) For instance, different policy formation systems
may be able to absorb the output of analytical studies at different
levels of abstractness and through different channels. This makes it all
the more necessary to plan carefully both the channels and the formats
which the presentation of analysis will utilize. Thus, studies might
be presented on different levels of abstraction, through different
channels, utilizing various audio-visual aids and communication media to
fit the needs, preferences, and idiosyncracies of different policy actors.
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That the formats for presentation of the results of analytical stu-
dies should be easy for policymakers to use is too obvious a require-
ment to deserve more than pro forma notice. Nonetheless, this require-
ment requires explicit treatment because of a tacit assumption, widely
shared by many analysts that "good" analysis is sure to "reach" policy-
makers and even to influence policies in the direction they (the
analysts) intend. If for no other reason than the fact that analytical
inputs are but one of several complex influences on the dynamics of
policy formation, it is naive to assume that the results of analytical
studies (no matter how high the quality) will "sell themselves."
Thus, this item is included in the conceptual framework in order
to encourage examination of the degree to which attention was paid
(during policy formation) to the tailoring of formats and channels to
the particular circumstances surrounding a discrete policy process.
2. Communicability and Accessibility to Policymakers. A related
issue to the question of appropriate policy analysis formats is the
problem of languages; namely, the need for a reduction in and unification
of the technical jargon which usually proliferates and hardens as a
result of the institutionalization and professionalization of an analy-
tical capability. For example, the existence of Snow's previously
mentioned "two cultures" syndrome (namely, differences in modes of
thinking and operation, in disciplinary base, professional codes, etc.,
between analysts, and policymakers), might lead to differences in the
various languages used by actors and analysts and thus inhibit effective
communications. Similarly, Weiner (6
2
) has suggested that meta-languages
do develop within organizations and professional groups which might be
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completely understood only by the professional elite. Therefore, it
is very easy to visualize a different "definition of the situation"
arising between persons who are used to thinking in terms of differing
conceptual and disciplinary frames of reference.(63) This again
raises the problem, previously discussed, of translation of these different
languages for various audiences, i.e., the necessity to plan and
to tailor policy formats. These differences in languages might also
conceivably affect differently the views and thinking processes of
various participants.
March and Simon( 6 4 ) and Thayer(6 5 ) have concluded that the more
professionalized is organizational activity, the greater would be the
differentiation of information between participants. This difference
may be expected to increase even more in policy formation situations
because of their broad scope and complexity. Both theory and research
have shown that both individuals and organizations filter information
in relation to their own experience in response to familiarity with the
use of symbols used to communicate.(6 6) The prevailing language, or
meta-language, might be strongly affected by the type of individuals
involved.(67) Katz and Kahn(68), and Thayer(69) have suggested that
biases often develop within and between professional groups which could
cause them to interpret the same information differently. This might
be an even more serious problem in policy systems given the inter-discip-
linary composition characteristics of such systems.
The research in this area is voluminous and considerable work has
been done at Northwestern University,(70) but if there is one universal
recommendation, it is the need for a reduction in and unification of
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technical jargon.
Another issue which is related to the communicability dimension
emerges from available theory and research. It is associated with the
need for sufficient organizational flexibility to prevent monopolization
and to permit use of unconventional communication channels and formats
and to insure adequate access to policy makers. For example Douds and
Rubinstein( 7 1 ) Thompson ( 7 2 ) and Rogers and Shoemaker( 7 3 ) have all
pointed out the dysfunctional impact of rigid hierarchial organization
levels on effective communication. They point out that, if new, novel,
or innovative ideas are perceived as disturbances (i.e., as "noise" in
the communications network), they tend to be screened out of the stream
of upward communication. In related work, Hage and Aiken(74 ), and Aiken
(75)
and Hage, have demonstrated that the rate of innovation was higher
when the degree of centralization, formalization and stratification
(76)
was low. Similarly, Walton and Dutton have stressed the importance
of maintaining open, flexible, and informal structures of interaction.
(77)In another context, Litwin and Stringer have emphasized the impor-
tance of a loose and informal organizational atmosphere for creativity.
Similarly, Lawrence and Lorsch(78) found that departments operating in
more uncertain environments had a more flexible organizational structure
than did those operating in established, certain environments.
Although most of the research cited above was carried out in
business organizations and was focused on relatively low echelons,
there is a dearth of similar relevant research in a public policy con-
text. However, it seems reasonable to assume that these research findings
have some potential relevance in policy formation systems such as those
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of concern here.
The concrete requisites of communication and access depend on the
characteristics of discrete policy formation systems. For instance,
in different systems, different channels can fulfill different roles
in promoting communication and access of analysts to policymakers.
Generally acceptable requirements include, the existence of standardized
communication and access channels, along with sufficient flexibility to
prevent monopolization and to permit unconventional communication and
open access to policymakers.
3. The Degree of Multiplicity of Alternatives Presented to the
Policymaker for Decision. The final aspect of the topic of transfor-
mability is conceptually and pragmatically related to the complexities
of the nature of the relationship extant between the policy-maker and
the analysts and advisers who are providing inputs into his decision
process. There are many aspects to that relationship. Of particular
interest here is the set of interactive variables which influence the
behavior of the analyst in his decision regarding the multiplicity of
alternatives to be presented to the policy-maker for decision.
Policymakers may frequently have an early intuitive feeling or
ideological predisposition regarding the general direction in which
they would prefer to move vis-a-vis a given policy issue. However, given
the scope, complexity, and far-reaching consequences which characterize
macro-level policy decisions, policymakers rarely, if ever, act without
the advice and counsel of several advisors. Typically, this advice and
counsel is based on one or more analytical studies of the issue at hand.
The output of such studies may be transmitted directly to the policy-
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maker, or it may be filtered through one or more advisors before reach-
ing him. In either situation, an important issue arises regarding the
degree of multiplicity of policy alternatives presented to the policymaker
as a basis for his selection of an alternative best approximating his
subjective judgment over all elements, especially those which are not
purely scientific or technical in nature.
The basic justification for including this variable in the frame-
work is that policy formation involves choice and every choice is partly
shaped by the range of alternatives presented to the policymaker. It
should be recognized that extre-rational factors such as, "intuition",
"judgment", and "tacit theories" (subjective images of "what makes the
world tick") also play an important, if little understood, role in policy
(79)formation. The importance of bringing some of these processes out
into the open for explicit consideration by policy actors has previously
been discussed in the section dealing with the topic of explication of
values and assumptions (See Section 6C1).
Given that policy formation normally involves choice between alter-
natives, perhaps the most important potential contribution of analysis
to policy-making lies in its capability to broaden the perceived universe
of such choice through presentation of multiple alternatives (including
some low probability and even counter-factual ones), and through explicit
specification of assumptions and contingencies. Management Science and
related disciplines are built on the assumption that decision-making is
improved by expanding the range of alternatives considered. In political
science, George argues convincingly that increasing the range of policy
alternatives facing the policy-maker is likely to improve the quality of
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the resultant policy.(8 ) In a less normative vein, it is suggested here
that there is wide agreement among policy scholars that the degree to
which alternatives are searched and presented constitutes one indicator
of the quality of policy analysis. This is consistent with a pattern
of explicit recognition of the costs and benefits involved in'searching
for multiple alternatives.
There exists evidence that the range of alternatives presented to
the policymaker is often smaller than the range which was considered in
analysis. Dolenga discusses a number of barriers which may exist in the
structure of the relationship between the analyst and the policymaker
which tend to operate so as to create a sometimes significant gap between
the range of policy alternatives treated in analysis and the range
presented to the policymaker for decision. In his analysis, Dolenga
explains that this is not a pre-determined situation, but is one that can
be molded by the skillful application of behavioral science knowledge.
In any event, it is clear that the degree of multiplicity of policy
alternatives presented to the policymaker can have a significant influence
on the transformability of analytical outputs into policy inputs. The
issue of transformability is included in the conceptual framework so as
to focus attention on the degree to which the various dimensions of
transformability were considered in the course of policy formation in
discrete instances.
Given the existence of barriers which inhibit the presentation of
a wide range of policy alternatives to the policymaker, behavioral in-
centives might be useful in minimizing the dysfunctional consequences
See Dolenga (1972) for a penetrating examination of several policy rele-
vant aspects of the relationship between analyst, adviser, and decisionmaker.
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of such tendencies. At the strategic level, some structural adjust-
ments (system redesign) may be helpful. For example, Churchman(82)
suggests that "counter-planning" units be established as one means of
balancing biases likely to be found in any one analytical group. The
implications of this and other structural alternatives are discussed in
the following section which addresses the concept of planned redundancy
of analysis.
6C6. Planned Redundancy of Analysis. Evaluation of the output of analy-
sis is a critical task of the policymaker. As noted in the preceeding
section, one action the sophisticated policymaker might take is to so
structure the relationship between himself and his analysts as to
encourage the presentation of a wide range of policy alternatives for
his consideration. Beyond such behavioral restructuring of relation-
ships, a system redesign possibility was noted in Churchman's suggestion
to establish counter-planning units. This latter type of planned
systemic restructuring is of particular concern here as we examine the
concept of redundancy of analysis.
The theory of redundancy(83) was originally conceived of in the
domain of information science and natural automata (neural networks)
but it appears to have wider application, even to policy formation
processes.( 8 4 ) The basic idea of redundancy as elaborated in cyber-
netics is one of "multiplexing" (i.e., the establishment of multiple
independent lines in parallel). In a policy system, this would mean the
creation of a high redundancy of analytical units (or analysis) perform-
ing the same functions, and thereby penetrating a threshhold level which
minimizes or randomizes the mistakes (and biases) likely to be manifested
in a single or by a smaller number of such parallel units (or analyses).
To put this in an organization theory context, this is equivalent to the
(85)creation of multiple mechanisms for the "absorption of uncertainty".
(86)In what is now a truly classical paper, von Neumann demonstrated
one way of reducing uncertainty; namely, by adding "sufficient redundancy".
Further development of redundancy theory contains a complicated set
of mathematical formulations and it would serve no direct purpose here
to dwell upon its complexities in such detail.
For policy purposes, the presence of multiple, independent analyses
(or organizational units) may help to assure policymakers of a broad
base of advice and may also guard against the danger of a "closed
system" with men in power isolated from the potentially healthy effect
of criticism and advice from a number of different perspectives.
Experience indicates that any system for policy formation, however well
designed, is subject to periodic failures and gross malfunctions. A
number of these policy system pathologies or malfunctions have been
suggested by Alexander George. 8 8 ) In a similar vein, Harold Wilensky
has emphasized several factors that encourage chronic pathaologies of
information and advice.(89) As a result, organizational theorists have
increasingly emphasized that the design of machinery and operating pro-
cedures for policy formation must take into account human failures,
individual and group dynamics, and the organizational pathologies and mal-
functions that can occur. Thus, for example, Anthony Downs suggests
various strategies for reducing or avoiding distortion in hierarchial
communication networks within an organization. These include the use of
redundant channels, of counter-biases, etc.(90)
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The use of multiple information channels (both parallel and redundant)
has also been proposed by Guetzkow,(91) Katz and Kahn, (92) and Churchman(9 3 )
Redundancy may increase the aggregate effect of policy analysis on
policy formation, while also providing a safeguard against trained incap-
acities, one-sided value biases, and parochial professional prejudices.
Obviously, there are economic, behavioral, and other costs associated
with a decision to intentionally create redundancy just as there are
costs associated with all other aspects of search and evaluation
procedures. Unfortunately there is no workable algorithm for precisely
balancing the relative costs and benefits to be derived from the utiliza-
tion of redundancy of analysis. At best, the policymaker can be aware
of two factors. First, that there are very real costs which result from
distortions and errors introduced in the absence of redundancy, and,
secondly, given the broad scope of the macro level policies of concern
here, the added costs of redundancy may well be more than offset by either
minimizing the first type of cost, or as a result of an innovative break-
through insofar as the creation of novel alternatives or reconceptuali-
zations of old problems.
Of course, there is no quantitative universal standard regarding
the redundancy of analysis; multiplicity of analysis is therefore more
reliable as a negative indicator insofar as it is absent, than as a
positive indicator, when present. Inclusion of this item in the conceptual
framework is meant to systematize attention to such indicators and to
encourage development of more useful trade-off standards.
Throughout the framework, but especially in this section, the over-
all aim is to encourage direct, systematic attention on the part of the
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policy analyst and policy researcher to an assessment of the patterns
of search and evaluation utilized in any particular policy formation
situation under study. The objective, of course, is to heighten the
knowledge of the analyst or researcher as to how and why a particular
policy outcome was reached. That such enlightenment can come from an
examination of search and evaluation processes is suggested by Vicker's( 94 )
description of the process:
"Everyone with experience of decision making knows that the
more closely we explore alternative courses of action, the
more clearly we become aware of limitations of various kinds
which restrict the courses open to us. Sometimes decision
making proves to be no more than the painful process of dis-
covering that there is only one thing to do or even "nothing
to be done". On the other hand, experience also recognizes
situations in which the decision maker can in some degree im-
pose a pattern on the future course of affairs, rather than
merely responding to its demands. . ." (p. 14)
6D. Chapter Summary
The primary objective of Chapter Six was to examine search and
evaluation processes as they form an integral part of policy formation,
and as they can potentially be usefully employed in policy analysis and
in policy research. Two major areas were addressed; first, the concept
of search and, secondly, the philosophy and methodology of analysis.
6D1. The Concept of Search. The concept of search was suggested as the
principal mechanism for generating a range of policy alternatives which
could form the basis for ultimate choice by the policymaker. This em-
phasis represented a shift in focus away from a preoccupation with
"choosing", and instead directed attention to the processes which create
and delimit both the size and nature of the universe of alternatives
within which choice is finally exercised. The forces which either en-
courage or discourage search activity received particular attention.
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The search behavior of the policy system was examined along the
following four interdependent dimensions: the initiation of search;
the scope and duration of search; the extension of search; and the
utilization of policy alternatives generated by search activity.
Negative feedback (i.e., performance shortfall) was seen to be a
dominant search initiation mechanism. Search initiation was also seen
to be closely linked to the concept of aspiration level. It was noted
that most decision-making literature conceptualizes search behavior as
being largely problemistic rather than opportunistic in nature. The
concept of aspiration level was shown to be useful for explaining not
only the initiation of search, but also its scope and duration. In
this context, aspiration level was translated into a search mode; i.e.,
satisficing, or maximizing. As pure types, both of these models were
rejected for lack of explanatory power. Although proximate, satis-
ficing-type search behavior was acknowledged as being widespread, this
fact was not accepted as sufficient grounds to justify the growing
acceptance of the Lindblom incremental search model as being at once
descriptive and prescriptive. We saw that Lindblom, and others, tends
to ignore variables such as missionary zeal and strong ideological
commitment which sometimes result in aggressive search for new and
creative policy alternatives.
The extension of search activity was seen to be an often desirable,
but usually expensive undertaking which cannot be evaluated, a priori,
in terms of return-on-investment criteria. The non-self-regenerative
nature of search, and its energy consuming naturewere noted as the
basis for difficult trade-off decisions facing the policymaker.
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Although it was recognized that the existence of partisan advocates
seems to obviate the need for extensive search activity, it was shown
that the institutionalized extension of search efforts may still be
very important during policy formation, as a means of encouraging the
articulation of unrecognized or unfavorable alternatives, and.as a
means of moderating precipitous action which might result from too
ready acceptance of "given" or "obvious" policy alternatives.
In terms of the utilization of search output, it was pointed out
that even if a sophisticated search capability exists and is utilized,
the output of the search processes may still be modified, ignored or
rejected by the policy system for numerous technical and behavioral
reasons.
Although this chapter emphasized search as a means of generating
multiple and creative policy alternatives, it was pointed out that
search activity plays several different, but related, roles in the
policy formation process, including: problem reformulation; the assess-
ment of reality; the exploration of various policy inputs; and the
engagement of the policy system.
6D2. The Philosophy and Methodology of Analysis. Chapter Six under-
scored the motivational influences of an underlying philosophy of anal-
ysis. The need for a broad conceptualization of a philosophy of analysis
was pointed out, as was the realistic necessity to consider any set of
policy analysis concepts in a very tentative manner, subject to
conceptual refinements and empirical testing.
The methodology of analysis was explored in terms of the follow-
ing policy-relevant dimensions: 1) the explication of values, assumptions,
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etc.; 2) the operationality of policy goals; 3) learning feedback;
4) main inter-connections with other issues and systems; 5) trans-
formability of analytical outputs into policy inputs; 6) planned
redundancy of analysis. It was shown that examination of any discrete
policy formation process along these dimensions could yield considerable
insight into the dynamics of that process.
More specifically, it was pointed out in this chapter that the
importance of explicating underlying values, assumptions, premises.
tacit theories, etc., lies in the fact that these "decisional premises"
may, in some cases, be so strong and unquestioned (among analysts and
policymakers alike) as to dominate their decisions. Thus, explication
may not only facilitate understanding on the part of "outsiders", but
perhaps more importantly, it may also serve to sharpen the judgment of
those intimately involved in the policy formation process.
The discussion of the operationalization of policy goals highlighted
the potential value of a high degree of operationalization in terms of-
providing a guide for action and a criterion for evaluation, and for
support recruitment. On the other hand, we saw that there exist a
number of problems which might limit the desirability and capability of
operationalizing policy goals in specific instances.
Learning feedback was defined as the degree of engagement in
systematic study of relevant prior policies and policy outcomes and the
continuous input of the results of any such analysis into current policy
formation. We learned that despite the self-evident values to obtain
from explicit incorporation of learning feedback into an ongoing policy
formation process, this appears to be a frequently overlooked or
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inexpertly handled variable.
The difficulties often closely related to a failure to identify the
main interconnections with other issues and systems was contrasted with
the severe problems inherent in operationally dealing with the fre-
quently high degree of system and issue inter-relatedness often found in
policy systems. Dealing with perceived inter-relatedness at a point
in time was suggested as one useful interim approach, pending the
emergence of new and more powerful policy instruments.
The necessity to transform analytical outputs into policy inputs
was discussed. It was noted that this need exists at all levels of the
policy system. In this chapter, the focus was on a pragmatic level,
including a concern for: 1) formats for presentation of analysis;
2) communicability with and access to policymakers; and 3) the degree
of multiplicity of policy alternatives presented to policymakers for
decision. Of these, the latter item was found to be the most complex,
involving at intricate structure of roles and relationships among and
between analyst, adviser, and policymaker. It was concluded that the
degree of multiplicity of policy alternatives presented to the policy-
maker can have a significant influence on the transformability of
analytical outputs into policy inputs, and on the nature and outcome
of the policy process itself.
It was suggested that behavioral incentives might be useful in
overcoming the barriers which tend to inhibit the presentation of a wide
range of policy alternatives to the policymaker. It was pointed out
that at the strategic level, structural system redesign (e.g., the
establishment of "counter-planning" units or the institution of planned
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redundancy of analysis) would potentially be more effective.
Planned redundancy of analysis was suggested as a possible antidote
to a variety of policy system pathologies and malfunctions. This type
of redundancy was conceptualized as being analogous with the deliberate
creation of multiple mechanism for the "absorption of uncertainty",
as that term is used in the organization theory literature. The usually
high cost and uncertain payoff of redundancy were recognized. However,
it was also pointed out that, given the broad and long-term impact of
policy decisions, the added cost of redundancy may be offset: 1) by
reducing distortion and error inherent in complex processes, and 2) as
a result of a possible innovative breakthrough in terms of the creation
of novel policy alternatives or reconceptualization of old problems.
Throughout Chapter Six, the objective has been to encourage direct
and systematic attention (on the part of both policy analysts and policy
researchers) to a continuous assessment of the patterns of search and
evaluation utilized in actual policy formation instances, in order to
increase our understanding of policy processes.
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Chapter Seven
The Concept of Crisis
7A. Chapter Overview
Chapter Seven is intended to provide at least a partial remedy for
the relative absence of any integrated treatment of the topic of crisis
(other than crisis management) in the literature and research of
organization theory.(1 ) Thus, this chapter is based mainly on a review
of the attempts at the conceptualization of crisis in other disciplines.
These attempts generally fall into one of the following three categories:
-Crisis as a turning point.
-Crisis as a trait(s).
-Crisis as a situation.
Each of these categories will be examined separately, with a view towards
synthesizing a policy relevant conceptualization of crisis as an important
variable which influences the policy formation process.
7B. Crisis As A Turning Point
Many investigators of social behavior have defined crisis as the
critical turning point or branching point in some state of affairs,
a definition analogous to the one in common medical use.(2) When crisis
is defined in this manner, it is associated with rapid or sudden change.
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences discusses the concept of
crisis in an economic context and defines it as, "a grave and sudden
disturbance of economic equilibrium".(3) Some scholars define crisis as,
"a fluctuation in the energy applied by social entities to a situation.
Other definitions are focused not on the speed of change or the
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quantity of energy invested in it, but rather the degree of change.
Wolfstein, for example, conceives of crisis as a situation which threat-
ens to transform "an existing political and social order. " (5 )
Martin, et al. define crisis as a situation that triggers change,
rather than one that constitutes the change itself. These authors have
attributed a failure of reform programs to the absence of crisis, saying
by way of example in their study, "If Onadaga County faced crisis, more
incentive for change might be found.
A more restricted use of crisis as a critical point confines the
term to sudden variation in conflict as a specific type of change. Thus,
Wiener and Kahn describe a crisis as, "a situation involving significant
actual or potential conflict in either novel form or at an abruptly
changing level." ( 7 )
Other scholars associate the notion of crisis with war.. For instance,
from comparison of the boom-depression business cycle and the diplomacy-
war international cycle, Boulding concludes that although both systems
proceed, "to some kind of boundary turning point," the absence of counter-
cyclical instruments in the international system "frequently leads to a
crisis in the form of war.
Crisis defined as a turning point is easily associated with a syste-
matic level of analysis. In other words, the interaction patterns between
the members of the system can be scrutinized for abrupt changes in their
conflict behavior or in some other variable.
7C. Crisis as Trait(s)
In contrast to defining crisis as a turning point in the interaction
pattern of systems units, crisis can be specified as certain traits of
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an isolated situation in a unit such as an organization, nation, etc.
Some scholars who use trait definitions attribute to crisis a single
characteristic. For instance, Schelling notes "the essence of the crisis
is its unpredictability." ( 9 ) Hamblin( l ) also defines crisis as a single
trait. More often, several traits are used to define crisis. Triska,
for example, identifies three traits that are of concern to decision-
makers; threat, a reduced time for decision, and stress.( 1) Hermann
utilizes Triska's approach , with slight variation, suggesting; high
threat, short time, and surprise.(l2)
Miller and Iscoe(l3) isolate the following five traits from studies
of individuals and of small group behavior;
Time dimension: The crisis is, "acute rather than chronic
and ranges from very brief periods of time to longer periods which
are not yet clearly defined."
Change in behavior: "Behavior under crisis is characterized
by inefficiency, frustration and scapegoating."
Subjective aspects: "There is a perception of threat or
danger to important life goals . . . accompanied frequently by
anxiety, fear, guilt, or defensive reaction."
Relativistic aspect: "What constitutes a crisis to one
individual or group does not constitute it for another group.
Organismic tension: "The person in crisis will experience
generalized physical tension which may be expressed in a variety
of symptoms including those commonly associated with anxiety."
The following more extensive compilation of crises characteristics
is provided by Wiener and Kahn: (14)
1. Turning points are perceived by the decision makers.
2. Decisions and actions are required: Action decisions
are defined to include explicit judgment to postpone action
and decisions not to take action.
186
3. Threats, warning, or promises are seen by decision makers.
Threat seen is a relatively powerful factor in forcing recog-
nition of situation as crisis, while promise seen is ordinarily
less likely to be judged a critical situation (except as). . .
a loss of some unique or irretrievable opportunity is threatened.
4. The outcome will shape the future: "the outcome of the
Icrisis will be important. .. moreover, the decision may be
determinative of the future events."
5. Events converge: "Crisis frequently has the aspect of
seeming to result from a convergence, confluence, or concurrence
of events."
6. Uncertainties increase: "In most crisis, relative to
normal uncertainties about the immediate future, there is a
large range of outcomes possible."
7. Control over events by-the decision makers is decreased.
8. Urgency increases: "The situation is felt as urgent, demand-
ing, and exigent. For many actors this results in feelings of
great stress and anxiety."
9. Information may become inadequate.
10. Time pressures increase.
11. Interrelations among actors are changed: "Bargaining
positions and other elements of power are altered by changes
in time pressures, urgency, uncertainty, etc."
Wiener and Kahn note that these eleven traits are not mutually
exclusive and that some are more important than others. They do not list
them in order of their importance, although they point out that an
increase in uncertainty is quite important. Although they suggest that
these dimensions could be used to define crisis, Wiener and Kahn do not
do so. Furthermore, they do not claim that the list represents the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of crisis.
The characteristics of crisis that appear in both of the above lists
are interesting, because of the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of the
researchers represented by these two compilations. A reduction in
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available time is mentioned by Miller and Iscoe (item 1) and by
Wiener and Kahn (item 10). Threats are also included in both Miller
and Iscoe (item 3) and Wiener and Kahn (item 3), as are the symptoms of
stress and anxiety.
A clear distinction is rarely made between the concept cyisis and
a number of closely related terms: e.g., anxiety, disaster, panic,
stress, tension, threat. Some scholars identify crisis as a stimulus to
which certain kinds of behavior like anxiety or panic are frequent
responses. Several of these terms are often found in a particular acade-
mic field. Thus, some fields of psychology study threat, anxiety, and
stress; whereas, disaster and panic are stressed more in the field of
sociology.
A crisis might more adequately be represented not as a single situa-
tion but as a succession of situations through a period of time, or
as a "time series", with each situation being partly determined by its
predecessors. This requires policymakers to redefine their image of the
situation on the basis of additional information and past experience.
Riker, in, "Events and Situations" ( 1 5 ) describes a situation as,
"The boundaries, the stops and starts, that humans impose on continuous
reality. . ." Or, more formally, "A situation is an arrangement and
condition of movers and actors in a specified, instantaneous, and spatially
extended location." This definition which is similar to that of Snyder,
et, al., suggests the analogy of a single frame in a continuous motion
picture. This suggests that the antecedent conditions that precede the
initial situation of any arbitrary sequence are at least as important to
the definition of crisis as are the immediate events of a particular
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situation.
7D. Crisis As A Situation
Two frequently used formulations of the concept of crisis have
been presented above. Crisis has been defined as an abrupt change in
some systems patterns, i.e., a turning point, or more precisely, a
critical turning point. It also has been defined in terms of the charac-
teristics or traits of a given situation. A third approach defines
crisis in terms of the following three situational dimensions:
1) Threats to the high priority goals of the decisionmaking
system.
2) Restrictions on the amount of time in which a response
could be made.
3) Surprise - i.e., the event was unexpected or unanticipated
by the members of the decisionmaking system.(16)
These dimensions are descirbed in terms of their impact upon the crisis
experiencing system. That is, the situation threatened the policymakers'
goals; it surprised them, and it forced them to deal with a short decision
time. In other words, crisis has thus been defined in terms of the
target unit's, "definition of the situation". (See Chapter Three for a.
discussion of the term "definition of the situation".)
7E. Critique of the Alternative Formulations
The main problem associated with defining crisis in terms of traits
and characteristics is that traits appear to characterize either phenomena
correlated with crisisjor phenomena that appear as an effect of or response
to crisis. Rather than isolating particular types of situations that can
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be described as crisis, some traits denote related behavior that may
be associated in some way with crisis. Although it is of great benefit
to identify the corollaries and effects of a variable, just as it is
helpful in establishing the presence of a disease by noting symptoms mani-
fested in the patient, in most cases successful treatment is dependent
upon isolation of the virus or other source of the ailment. The connection
between a virus and its symptoms can be systematically determined once
the disease has been identified. This analogy emphasizes the great
need for empirical inquiry as a means of better understanding of the
connection between crisis situations and related behavioral phenomena.
Both Miller and Iscoe and Wiener and Kahn acknowledge that their
list of traits are not a precise description of any given crisis. These
are similar to Webers "ideal types" to the extent that the traits specify
something, ". .. with which the real situation or action is compared
and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant compo-
nents. An actual feature is located on a continuum or dimension accord-
ing the degree of approximation to the ideal type." Thus, on a
particular dimension, a situation might be more or less crisis-like.
The main problem with the definition of crisis as a turning point
is that, by itself, the notion of turning point does not explain what
constitutes a crisis, but specifies only where in a temporal or spatial
dimension it takes place. In other words, from the predictive standpoint,
the turning point conceptualization is somewhat problematic because the
turning point construction means that the turn can be identified only
ex-post-factum. This weakness has been recognized by many scholars
who use such a definition for lack of a better one. Left unanswered is
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the method of identifying, in advance, the turning points, if an overall
view of the succession of events is not available beforehand.
Wiener and Kahn(l7) reason that a crisis exists when those policymakers
involved perceive it to be a critical turning point regardless of whether
a sharp change actually occurs or not. This position reduces the dependency
upon post-hoc analysis if there exist mechanisms to identify perceptions
of policymakers. Similarly, the trait definition depends on the per-
ception of the decision maker.
These two conceptualizations of crisis (turning point and trait)
represent two different perspectives on the study of crisis that may be
combined for some purposes. Conceptualization of crisis as a turning
point is a concept susceptible to the systemic analysis of systems behavior.
In this form of analysis, attention is drawn to various patterns of
interaction between various systems components. When the organization
is the unit of analysis, the systems approach examines the relationship
between organizations, rather than processes within an organization.
Crisis lends itself to the system perspective particularly when it is
defined as an abrupt change or turning point in patterns of interaction
between organizations. The trait definition can be also used in a systemic
approach, but such a definition is especially valuable when studying
internal processes by which policies are formed. If the characteristics
of .a crisis are interpreted in terms of what individual policymakers
perceive, then the concept becomes relevant to the decision-making
approach. Crisis becomes an occasion for decision. Attention is directed
to the way which the perception of the situation affects the policy
formation process.
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Since this study recognizes the interdependence between system
behavior and the policy maker's perception of the situation, it will
focus on both approaches in an integrated manner. This means that an
attempt will be made to identify the critical turning points which pre-
sumably shaped the crisis perception of the policy makers; and, simul-
taneously,emphasis will be placed on the potential impact of such per-
ceptions on the patterns of behavior and the nature of policies established.
7F. Chapter Summary
Chapter Seven has presented a review of several attempts at the
conceptualization of crisis in a variety of disciplines. These categories
included crisis as: 1) turning point; 2) trait(s); 3) situation. In a
brief critique of these alternative formulations of the concept of
crisis, we saw that no one approach is sufficient for all purposes. A
definition of crisis as a turning point, for example, does not explain
what constitutes a crisis, but specifies only where it takes place in
space or time. Furthermore, such an approach necessarily relies on
ex-post-facto identification of the turning points.
Similarly, defining crisis in terms of traits or characteristics
tends to focus attention on behavioral responses rather than on the basic
conditions or stimuli creating such response. This approach really begs
the question as to the relationahip between crisis situations and related
behavioral responses.
Defining crisis in terms of such situational dimensions as threat,
time, and surprise, was shown to be a useful approach in a policy context.
Examination of this approach led to formulation of the concept of the
perception of crisis by the policy actors. The use of actors' perceptions
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was seen as an integrative variable which facilitated some degree of
synthesis of the concept of crisis as a turning point, as trait, and as
situation. This formulation rests on the policymaker's "definition of
the situation", a very useful concept developed in Chapter Three.
Thus, in Chapter Seven we have seen the need to synthesize the
currently existing, fragmented conceptualizations of crisis. Because
the conceptual framework developed in this study recognizes the inter-
dependence between system behavior and the policymaker's perception of
the situation, we have seen the potential value of integrating the three
alternative formulations of the concept of crisis and of focusing on a
policy actor's perceptions of crisis rather than on some intractable
reality.
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Chapter Eight
The Case Study
8A. Application and Testing of the Framework
In Chapter One, it was stated that the primary contribution of
the conceptual framework for analysis developed in this research lies
in its ability to suggest useful ways of studying policy formation
reality. My claim was that the framework would offer the policy ana-
lyst and policy researcher a group of indicators which would suggest
where to look and what to look for when attempting to analyze and
understand the mix of forces which energize, maintain, and direct the
operation of major level policy systems. In short, the framework was
offered as a potentially useful mechanism for selecting and ordering
dynamic behavioral data, and for describing, analyzing, and explaining
policy formation phenomena.
As was emphasized in Chapter One, it cannot be said of the set of
concepts which comprise the conceptual framework that it is right or
wrong. The only meaningful test is whether or not this set of concepts
proves to be useful when applied as an heuristic aid in policy analy-
sis and policy research. This utility will be at least partially deter-
mined through application of the framework (by means of secondary analy-
sis) to case data used by Dolenga for development of the Postal Reform
Case Study.(l) I am hopeful that even this preliminary application
and testing will demonstrate both the theoretical soundness and the
pragmatic value of the framework as a sensitizer, an heuristic aid,
and a set of guidelines to direct and focus analysis of the policy
formation process as manifested in the Postal Reform Case.
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8B. Case Development(2)
In a separate, but related and very complimentary research effort,
Dolenga has developed an analytical case study of postal reform and
reorganization. Because of our mutual and long-standing interest, in
policy systems, Dolenga and I collaborated in our respective research
design and development efforts as fellow students and colleagues in
the Doctoral Studies Program in the Organization Behavior Department,
Graduate School of Management, Northwestern IJniver:iity. This collab-
oration took place under the guidance of our common Dissertation Advi-
sor, Dr. Michael Radnor. The various stimuli generated by this intel-
lectual and empirical collaboration enriched both of our research pro-
grams without undermining our individual academic objectives or our
scholarly development.
Dolenga's development of the Postal Reform Case was based on two
main inputs. First, there was an exhaustive review of public and pri-
vate documentation. Secondly, there was an extensive field interview
program in which some seventy-five key individuals were interviewed
in regards to their direct participation in or close knowledge of the
postal reform and reorganization policy formation process. The persons
interviewed were top level policymakers (and in many instances, mem-
bers of their immediate staff) such as members of congress, union
presidents, members of the White House Staff, several Postmasters
General, the top management of the then Post Office Department itself,
and members of the Presidential Commission on Postal Organization.*
*For a complete interview schedule, see Appendix C to Dolenga's disser-
tation.
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Almost all of the interviews took place on-site, so to speak,
in Washington, D.C. Most of these interviews were conducted jointly
by Fuchs and Dolenga.* The interviews themselves were mainly unstruc-
tured, consisting of open-ended questions. Not infrequently, the
interviews took the form of an "exchange of ideas" between interviewer
and interviewee. Given the basically exploratory nature of the re-
search, this proved to be an effective mode for probing the behavioral
dimensions of a very complex process.
Development of the theoretical aspects of the conceptual frame-
work and the conduct of the field interviews (and the analysis and
interpretation of them) were neither sequential nor mutually exclusive
steps. Rather, this was an interactive, interative process, with a
resultant significant degree of mutual influence between these two
aspects of the research. I believe that this interaction strengthened
both the framework and the interview process.
8C. Case Analysis
As has already been noted, application and testing of the con-
ceptual framework will take the form of a selective analysis of the
Postal Reform Case. The behaviorally oriented Case prepared by
Dolenga contains unusually rich and comprehensive data. It would be
a monumental task to complete a thorough and complete analysis of it,
*This author's participation in the field interview program, and in
both the development of the interview protocol and the interpretation
of interview data, accounts for the use of the terminology in the body
of the case analysis which often states "During our interview..."
200
and that will not be attempted here. Rather, the case analysis to
be discussed in subsequent chapters will necessarily be partial and
quite selective.
It should be emphasized that the present analysis is not intended
to deal with the substance of the postal reform policy, per se. In-
stead, the purpose is to examine the -policy formllation )process which
produced a particular policy outcome which (although fascinating and
imprtant) is of only periperal interest for purposes of this study.
The main focus of the analysis will be on the policy strategies,
i.e., on the strategiclcomponents of the conceptual framework. Thus,
this selective analysis will focus on an examination of the policy
formation process- in terms of its implicit and explicit strategies.
The primary purpose of this analysis is to test the viability of the
conceptual framework as an heuristic aid to policy analysis and policy
research. A secondary objective will be an attempt to identify the
essential conditions under which policymakers may tend to choose a
strategy of radical vice incremental change.
8D. The Postal Reform Case
The analytical Case developed by Dolenga is quite comprehensive.
It is rich in behavioral data related to events which occurred during
a more than three year time period. For ease of exposition,Dolenga
has divided the Case into the following four major phases:
1) The Conception and Birth Phase - (The Initiation of
Policy Formation).
2) The Crystallization Phase - (The Search For Policy
Options).
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3) The Transition Phase - (The Transfer of Political
Sponsorship).
4) The Realization Phase - (The Achievement of Legisla-
tive Approval).
Based upon my familiarity with the primary case data, these Phases
appear to be eminently reasonable and will be useful during the anal-
ysis which follows. In general, the analysis will consist of appli-
cation of the conceptual framework to the above Phases. However,
these four Phases, although phenomenologically meaningful, are inher-
ently arbitrary. Therefore, an attempt will be made during the anal-
ysis of policy strategies to examine strategic issues both within and
across' Phases.
To assist the reader who has not been exposed to the entire Case,
the following information is being provided:
-The history of the postal reform movement is reviewed
(Section 8.4 below).
-An overview of the Postal Reform Case is provided (Sec-
tion 8.5 below).
-A summary listing of the main policy actors (especially
those referred to in the analysis.which follows) is pro-
vided (Appendix A).
This information should materially assist the reader by providing
relevant background data. However, it is emphasized that these brief
sections cannot do justice to the rich case data and in a sense are
an inadequate substitute for the original Case. Therefore, the reader
is strongly urged to read the basic Case (as well as other important
analysis and theoretical work) contained in Dolenga's complimentary
dissertation.
8E. The Historical Heritage of the Postal Reform Movement( 3 )
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8E1. Introduction and Overview; Recognition of postal problems was
hardly a new phenomenon. The historical record reveals a number of
studies, dating as far back as the late 1940's, which probed basic
deficiencies in the postal system and made various recommendations
for improvement. The improvement recommendations fell into one of'
two major categories; facilities modernization programs and structural
change recommendations.
As long ago as (about) 1948, Harold Seidman, then an analyst in
the Bureau of the Budget, was advocating that the U. S. Post Office
Department be converted to a government corporation. More compre-
hensive attempts at reforming the postal system can be traced back
to the 1949 Hoover Commission. In 1953, Stanley Chen of Advertising
Age conducted a comprehensive review of the Post Office Department
and recommended that total renovation of the system vice piecemeal
modernization, was long overdue. A number of additional studies were
conducted in the late 1950's and early 1960's, and these studies tended
to endorse structural reform as an antidote for system ills.
Although these early studies differed somewhat as to their find-
ings and recommendations, the most marked aspect they had in common
was their inability to significantly alter either postal operations
or the existing policies governing the postal system.* That is to
say, these early reform efforts registered a low impact on reality.
*In contrast, in 1967, the Labour Government announced that the British
Post Office Department was being converted into a government-owned cor-
poration, as the result of the recommendations of a "Select Committee"
which had conducted an extensive study of the Department's deficiencies.
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Despite the studies and recommendations, postal reform was by no means
a major policy issue during the nearly two decades which spanned the
original Hoover Conmission recommendations and the 1965 appointment
of Lawrence F. O'Brien as the sixtieth Postmaster General, except
possible in the minds of a very small number of individual and insti-
tutional reform advocates.
A more detailed discussion of these early reform efforts, includ-
ing their findings, recommendations, and supporters is provided in the
sections which follow.
8E2. Historical Antecedents. In 1953, Advertising Age published
the results of a comprehensive, five-part in-depth study of the Post
Office Department and its operations,which had been conducted by its
Washington Editor, Stanley Cohen. After examining an extensive list
of basic ills, Cohen suggested that the answer to the fundamental
problems plaguing the postal service lay in a fundamental restruc-
turing of the organization along the lines of an independent govern-
ment-owned corporation such as the TVA. There were striking similar-
ities between Cohen's proposals and those contained in what is now
viewed as an historic speech given by then Postmaster General Lawrence
O'Brien in April, 1967, in which major reform and reorgazization of
the Post Office Department was suggested.
Although Cohen's suggestion for conversion of the Post Office
Department into a government corporation was based on what was gen-
erally accepted as a high quality piece of investigative reporting
and flowed logically from his findings, the basic idea did not ori-
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inate with him. As the Advertising Age series noted, contemporary
efforts to reform the Post Office Department date back to the 1949
Hoover Commission Report. In fact, in addition to the Hoover Commis-
sion work, there have been a number of relatively formal studies and
proposals regarding reform of the Post Office Department which pre-
ceeded Postmaster General O'Brien's 1967 "postal reform" speech.
Significant specific early efforts in this regard which are deserving
of further elaboration include the following:
-Bureau of the Budget (Seidman) proposals - late 19410's
-Hoover Commission studies - 1949
-Cohen Plan - 1953
-General Accounting Office Study - 1962
-Congressman Udall's proposals - 1966
-Bureau of the Budget (Simon) study - 1967
We will briefly examine the policy-relevant contribution of each of
these efforts.
The Seidman Proposals. In the late 1940's, Harold Seidman,
then an analyst in the Bureau of the Budget, was advocating that the
U. S. Post Office Department be converted to a government corporation.
While the historical record is not definitive on this point, it appears
that Seidman's internal proposal was not institutionally sanctioned by
the Bureau of the Budget. However, it appears that the corporate struc-
ture advocated by Seidman had some influence on the first Hoover Com-
mission. Seidman's advocacy of the corporate structure appears to
have flowed from a long-standing predisposition to favor this struc-
tural form. As a matter of fact, Seidman, in later years, became the
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Budget Bureau's resident expert on government corporations, and in
1953 he co-authored a book expounding its presumed virtues.
Hoover Commission Studies. The roots of serious, contemporary
efforts at reforming and reorganizing the Post Office Department can
be traced back to the findings of the 1949 Hoover Commission. Although
the Commission made numerous recommendations for changing the organriza-
tional structure of the Post Office Department, it did not directly add-
ress the corporate form as an alternative. Howevevr, it miovcd in that
direction by recommending that significant portions of the Govcrnxrent
Corporation Control Act be made applicable to the Post Office. Full
implementation of this recommendation would. have given the Post Office
Department the essential attributes of a government corporation. How-
ever, when enabling legislation was introduced in 1949, considerable
opposition to it arose in the Congress and in the General Accounting
Office (GAO). Seidman explains this opposition in terms of an internal
power struggle in GAO, and in terms of Congressional reluctance to re-
linquish control over the postal rate-making process. Historical deve-
lopments confirm the high plausibility of Seidman's analysis.
Nonetheless, as Siegel has observed, several aspects of the orig-
inal Hoover Commission recommendation were eventually given legislative
approval, especially in the Post Office Department Appropriation Act of
1951 and in the Post Office Financial Control Act of 1950. These Acts
gave the Post Office Department authority to implement business-like
financial and accounting systems and procedures and generally increased
the management flexibility. Other structural changes recommended by the
Hoover Commission were accomplished by Reorganization Plan No. 3 which
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was submitted by President Truman in 1949. In his transmittal mes-
sage to the Congress, President Truman characterized these changes
as "an important first step in strengthening the organization of the
Post Office Department." Another major structural recommnendation of
the early Hoover Commission was regional decentralization of !;he Post
Office Department. Although originally opposed by both the President
and Postmaster General, it was largely implemented in later years.
However, Siegel has suggested that history has vindicated original
opposition to this decentralization recommendation because,
. . . regions now have inadequate authority or informa-
tion to pass on many issues put to them, and they often
function either as rubber stamps for the postmasters or
as intermediaries between the postmasters and the office
of the Postmaster General.
With regard to appointment of the top management personnel in
the Post Office Department, the Hoover Commission did recommend that
the President appoint and experienced executive to serve without limit
as to term, as Director of Posts, under the Postmaster General. How-
ever, except for the recommendation that the Postmaster General not
be a political party official, the Hoover Commission did not directly
address either the process of appointment for the Postmaster General
or his historical Cabinet status. Although President Truman's Re-
organization Plan No. 3 did incorporate the Director-of-Posts posi-
tion, it did not address the issue of the appointment of the Postmaster
General. From that time until the O'Brien era, only minor, sporadic
attempts were made in the Congress to implement the Hoover Commission
recommendation that the Postmaster General not be a political party
official. These isolated attempts proved futile, and until 1968 no
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serious effort was made to upset the historical pattern of selecting
Postmasters General from outside the Post Office Department, with
political expertise being a dominant if not exclusive criterion.
Possibly the most controversial recommendation of the Hoover
Commission was that Senate confirmation of postmaA:ters be abolished.
For technical reasons, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1949 did not deal
with this issue. However, in a special message to the Congress, Pres-
ident Truman strongly supported the concept of non-political selection
of postmasters. Furthermore, his position was strongly supported by
the Postmaster General, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. Despte this impressive coalition, and in spite of
the fact that nearly 100 bills, aimed at wholly or partially removing
political influence from the process of selecting postmasters, were
introduced in the Congress between 1949-1968, the Senatorial role of
"advice and consent" remained in effect through the end of the O'Brien
term as Postmaster General. It should be noted, however, that support
for the removal of political influence on the postmaster selection
process was steadily growing between 1949 and 1968.
The Cohen Plan (1953). Stanley Cohen's comprehensive review of
the Post Office Department for Advertising Age generally used the
earlier recommendations of the 1949 Hoover Commission as a point of
departure, but went beyond these. Cohen's approach was a more syn-
optic one and thus his recommendations were more systematic than the
more fragmented efforts of the Hoover Commission. Cohen constantly
argued for identifying and attacking the root causes of postal prob-
lems. He characterized the postal system as being a,
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. . . preposterous political gerrymander, with authority
so artfully diffused that it is almost impossible to hold
anybody responsible for anything.
Cohen saw the 1953 appointment of Mr. Arthur Summerfield as Postmaster
General as a great opportunity for a "successful businessman" and a
newcomer to Washington to demonstrate that modern business methods
could improve the efficiency of postal operation, which he (Cohen) saw
as basically a business (vice goverrunent service) type operation.
However, and perhaps more importantly, Cohcn felt strongly that
total renovation of the system, vice piecemeal modernization, was badly
needed. In this context, he urged a formal severing of' what he saw as
excessive and counter-productive congressional influence over postal
operations. Because he was convinced that the system had grown so huge
and the problem had become so deep-rooted, Cohen felt that drastic
measures were warranted. To this end, he recommended a major struc-
tural reorientation--the creation of a (TVA-type) independent, govern-
ment controlled corporation to counter the follow-ing basic structural
deficiencies which he identified in his study:
From the standpoint of efficient organization, the exist-
ing structure of the Post Office Department is an insur-
mountable barrier. As a department of government bound
by civil service procedures, and frozen to budgets, rates
and operating policies legislated by Congress, the Post
Office is consuming excessive input in order to provide
reasonable output.
There is little indication that when made, Cohen's study and his far-
reaching recommendations had any significant impact on Washington policy-
makers, and especially not in the Congress. As had been the practice of
prior Chief Executives, President Eisenhower, in his 1953 State of the
Union Message, touched on the problem of providing efficient postal
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service, and indicated that
. .. (in cooperation with the Congress) the Postmaster
General will institue a program directed at improving
service while at the same time reducing costs and de-
creasing deficits.
As noted by Seidman, President Eisenhower's Postmaster General, Authur
Summerfield, briefly revived the proposal for a postal corporation,
but no concrete legislative proposal to this effect was ever trans-
mitted to the Congress during the Eisenhower Administration.
General Accounting Office Study (1962). During the decade of the
fifties, both the size of the Post Office Department and the size of
its problems continued to grow. The public press and congressional
hearings of this period reveal an iterative cycle, repeated no matter
which political party was in power. The dimensions of that cycle in-
cluded concern over postal pay, postal rates, postal service, and the
postal deficit. Along all of these dimensions, except service, the
size of the problem continued to grow. Against this backdrop, in
October 1961, the Treasury-Post Office Sub-committee of the House
Appropriation Committee asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
to estimate the annual cost of operating the Post Office Department
as a private enterprise public utility.
In March 1962, the GAO issued a report in which it estimated that
some $57 million would be added to the cost of operating the postal
service if it had to pay such expenses as taxes, advertising, interest,
and services provided by other government agencies. The GAO report
did not deal with nor make recommendations concerning any of the under-
lying structural problems in the postal service. Instead, it was an
exclusively cost-oriented response to a very specific request from the
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Congress. In essence, the report was a rough approximation of some
representative costs normally incurred by a private company, which
were not paid by the Post Office Department because of its status as
a government agency. The apparent purpose of the House Appropriations
Sub-committee was to document the position that postal rates would
have to be significantly increased if the Post Office Department had
to pay taxes and other' operating expenses common to private enterprise
organization. I
Congressman Udalli's Proposals (1966). Congressman Morris K.
Udall, (D., Arizona), is known to have a long-standing interest in the
operations of the Post Office Department. Udall has reported that in
December 1966, in his capacity as a member of the House Post Office &
Civil Service Committee, he informed newly-appointed Postmaster Gen-
eral O'Brien of his feeling that serious problems existed in the postal
service and of his intention to introduce a bill in the Congress to
study the operations and problems of the Post Office Department. Udall
recalled that at the time, he was persuaded by O'Brien not to take any
action on this matter for a few months. Udall complied with Postmaster
General O'Brien's request and took no further immediate action.
Bureau of the Budget (Simon)Study (1967). Early in 1967, Mr.
Benson Simon was hired by the Budget Bureau and after a brief orien-
tation was assigned to that section of the General Government-Manage-
ment Division which was responsible for overseeing operations of the
Post Office Department. Simon's arrival coincided with the peak of
activity related to the annual budget cycle and so his supervisors had
little time to devote to him. Because of this situation, and by way of
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training and indoctrination, Simon was' given the classical assignment
which has been the introduction of innumerable newcomers to large
organizations; the study of a long-standing and clearly insoluable
organizational problem.
In his case, Simon was told to familiarize himself with the "pro-
blems of the Post Office Department." Left largely to his. own devices,
Simon proceeded to conduct a one-man management analysis of the Post
Office Department. Simon recalls that he was shocked to find what he
viewed as deep-seated, fundamental organizational problems up and down
the entire post office operation. He noted abundant evidence of low-
morale, of hopelessly clogged communications channels, and a total lack
of management flexibility--he concluded that there were few, if any,
effective management controls over this far-flung operations.
Simon was quickly convinced that management in the Post Office
Department was so hampered by the existing organizational structure
that it simply was unable to carry out its managerial responsibilities.
Unable to find any other vehicle for expressing his conclusions and his
righteous indignation over them, he decided to prepare a written report.
At the time of its preparation, neither the likely audience, nor the
official purpose of the report were at all clear. However, this March,
1967 draft report was to play an interesting role in later events as we
shall see as the case developes in subsequent chapters.
In his staff paper, Simon made a strong argument for conversion of
the Post Office Department into a government corporation. This central
recommendation was based on the fundamental premises that the Post
Office Department was more of a commercial/industrial type operation
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than it was a typical government policy agency, and that it met nearly
all of the classical criteria used to justify prior use of the corpor-
ate form in carrying out the varied functions of government. In addi-
tion, Simon saw in the corporation proposal, a symbolic signal of' intent
to make a clean break with the past by completely ending political pat-
ronage as a way of life in the Post Office Department and replacing
these (negative) practices with modern business management philiosophies
and techniques.
8E3. The British Experience With Postal Reform. Interesting from
numerous perspectives, including the historical and cross-cultural
dimensions, is the fact that a similar postal reform phenomenon was
incubating in England as well as in the United States during the same
time period. In August of 1966, Britain's Postmaster General, Sir
EdwaidShort, announced to the House of Commons, plans to abolish the
existing British Post Office Department and to assign its functions
to a proposed government-owned corporation. This announcement grew
out of a series of proposals made in early 1965 by the Minister respon-
sible for the British Post Office. These proposals, in turn, were
evolutionary steps in reform movement dating back to the 1930's. With
marked similarity to the American experience, early reform efforts in
Britain moved the British post office (over a period of 30 years) in
the direction of greater structural decentralization and toward finan-
cial independence from the central treasury (the Exchequer).
In a "White Paper" issued in March, 1967, the Labour Government
formally and publicly announced support for the conversion of the Post
213
Office into a public corporation. (For an insightful discussion of
the role of the "White Paper" and the "Select Committee" in the British
public policy process; a summary of the recommendations of the British
Select Committee on Nationalization Industries concerning the responsi-
bilities, structure, and organization of the propo:;ed conversion of the
British Post Office .into a public corporation; and detailed information
on the Labour Government's proposal contained in the British White Paper,
see Notes 22-24 of Chapter Five of Dolenga's Case). Although there are
significant similarites and differneces between the British and Anerican
experiences, these are not immediately relevant. The main purpose here
is to recognize the British experience as one of a number of early reform
efforts which was to shape later events.
8E4. Undercurrents in the Popular Press. In addition to the more for-
mal studies and proposals outlined above, the Post Office Department was
the subject of a growing number of feature articles in the public press
during 1966 and the early part of 1967. Typical of the tone of these
articles was the question in Nation, "What Ails the Post Office?", and
the Reader's Digest finding of a "Crisis in the Post Office." This and
other press reaction of this period was largely critical of declining
service and increasing rates. However, most of these articles were
problem definition rather than solution oriented.
8E5. Policy Implications. It is clear that it would be erroneous to
consider contemporary efforts at reforming and reorganizing the Post
Office Department as appearing tabula rosa. What is not clear is:
C
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1) why these early reform efforts had so little effect on policy reali-
ty; and 2) what impact the existence of these historical antecedents has
on more current reform efforts. These critical policy-relevant questions
(and to some degree, partial answers tothem) will be implicit in much
of the Case and in the analysis which follows.
8F. Overview of the Postal Reform Case(4)
8F1. Purpose. Because of the comprehensiveness and complexity of the
overall case study, this brief, highly over-simplified overview is pro-
vided to orient the reader so that he can better appreciate the extensive
case and analysis which follow.
8F2. O'Brien As Postmaster General. In a surprise announcement made pub-
lic in August 1965, President Lyndon Johnson nominated Lawrence F. O'Brien,
his Special Assistant for Congressional Liaison, to become the sixtieth
Postmaster General of the United States. O'Brien was to replace TMG
Gronouski who had just been appointed as President Johnson's new Ambas-
sador to Poland. For several months after his nomination, O'Brien con-
tinued to serve the President in his Congressional Liaison role. In No-
vember 1965, he formally assumed the role of Postmaster General
O'Brien's Frustrations. During his first several months in office,
O'Brien became quite frustrated with the tangled web of operational pro-
blems that plagued his Department. Soon thereafter, he created a small,
confidential task force and charged it with the responsibility of coming
up with recommendations for improving the overall management of the
sprawling postal system. At about the same time, the POD suffered a
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major crisis in Chicago where mail service virtually came to a halt.
After the Chicago crisis was alleviated through emergency measures,
O'Brien turned his attention to forthcoming legislative battles over
increases in postal rates and postal pay.
Early in 1967, the task force O'Brien had appointed the previous
fall presented him a confidential report in which it recommended a
major restructuring of the postal system. The central recommendation
was to create a TVA-type government owned corporation, with considerable
autonomy and independence, to run the postal system.
O'Brien's Speech. Armed with the recommendations of his task-
force, O'lr>ien obtained White House clearance to publicly propose the
corporat -,rpe reorganization. On April 3, 1967, PMG O'Brien appeared
as a lunc::on speaker before a Washington convention of the Magazine
Publishe2: s Association and the American Society of Magazine Editors.
O'Brien stunned his wholly unprepared audience by proposing sweeping
organizational reform of the massive postal system which he headed as
the Cabinet level appointee of then President Lyndon Johnson. The
essence of O'Brien's reform proposal was based on the following points:
1. The Postmaster General should cease to be a member of
the President's cabinet.
2. The Department should become a non-profit government
corporation, rendering essential public service.
3. It should provide postal service authorized by the
Congress.
4. It should be operated by a board of directors, appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Congress.
5. It should be managed by a professional executive, ap-
pointed by the board.
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6. It should be given a clear mandate on the percentage of
cost coverage for postal services, so that further revisions
in rates, should they be necessary, would be on a fixed for-
mula basis.
Postmaster General O'Brien justified his bold proposals by character-
izing them as the only viable means of averting the disasterous con-
sequences likely to result from what he saw as the Post Office Depart-
ment's, "Race with Catastrophe". O'Brien viewed the catastrophe as
being caused by a rapidly increasing volune of mail, a growing finan-
cial deficit, and a declinging level of service.
8F3. The Presidential Commission. Despite guarded congressional
reaction, there was widespread and favorable public reaction to PMG
O'Brien's reform program. This outpouring of support convinced the
White House that further action was appropriate. Therefore, only five
days after O'Brien's speech, and with much of Washington still not
recovered from the initial shock waves, Lyndon Johnson formally esta-
blished the President's Commission of Postal Reorganization and ap-
pointed Mr. Frederick R. Kappel, retired AT&T Board Chairman, to head
the group. The "Kappel Commission" was chartered to study the neces-
sity to reorganize the Post Office Department and to make recommen-
dations regarding any proposed new structure.
After about fifteen months, the Kappel Commission completed its
study, and in June of 1968, the Commission issued its formal Report to
the President, strongly recommending that the POD be reorganized into
a government-owned corporation. President Johnson's public response to
the Kappel Report was non-committal. He asked the Budget Bureau Dir-
ector and Marvin Watson, his new PMG, to review the Report and to make
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recommendations to him. (Meanwhile, O'Brien had resigned for the PMG
position in April, 1968, for personal reasons.)
The new PMG, Marvin Watson, immediately bagan to react negatively
to the recommendations of the Kappel Commission. However, just before
leaving office, Watson publicly endorsed a move by President Johnson
to encourage positive action on the Kappel Reprt. Thus, in his final
State-of-the-Union Message in January 1969, President Johnson formally
recommended adoption of the basic recommendations of the Kappel Com-
mission. However, he left the initiation of legislative action to the
incoming Republican Administration.
8F4. The Nixon Administration Action. During his 1968 Presidential
Campaign, Richard Nixon made several statements endorsing the need for
postal reform. A few weeks later, as the newly inaugurated President,
he directed his Postmaster General, Winton Blount, to make a thorough
study of the postal reorganization issue. At about the same time,
Congressman Dulski (D., New York), Chairman of the House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee, introduced in the Congress a Postal Reform
Bill known as H.R.4. The Nixon Administration did not immediately
react to the Dulski Bill but publicly pointed to the need for the new
PMG to have adequate time to formulate his own recommendations.
Based upon the results of Postmaster General Blount's study of the
Kappel Report, on May 27, 1969, President Nixon transmitted to the Con-
gress draft legislation (H.R. 11750) representing the Administration's
version of a postal reform bill. (A key difference between Rep. Dulski's
bill (H.R.4) and the Administration's reform package was that the former
retained for the Congress a significant role in the management of postal
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affairs, while the latter virtually removed the Congress from all
but a long range "oversight" function.) During the remainder of 1969
and the early months of 1970, much legislative maneuvering and lobby-
ing took place in an attempt to influence Congessional action on one
or another of the several versions of postal reform legislation by
then pending in the Congress. Near the end of 1969, the outlook for
favorable Congresseional action on postal reform legislation grew dim.
8F5. The Postal Strike. The impasse in the Congress over postal
reform legislation, coupled with anti-inflation pressures, led to delay
in Congressional passage of long pending pay raise legislation directly
affecting postal employees. Postal union dissatisfaction with what
they perceived to be inordinate delay on the part of Congress in approving
their pay raise became a significant factor contributing to mounting
frustrations which finally manifested themselves in the first postal
strike in the history of this country. On March 18, 1970, postal
workers in New York City walked off their jobs, and soon the strike
spread throughout the nation. The President called out federal troops
to move the mails but this was more a symbolic than substantive gesture.
Near the end of March, union officials, who had never officially sanc-
tioned the "illegal" strike, succeeded in getting at least some of the
postal workers to begin to return to work. Meanwhile, highly unusual
talks commenced between the postal unions and the federal government.
These talks were directed from the White House and included several
.government departments in addition to the POD.
An Historic Agreement. The strike was settled in early April after
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unique and intensive negotiations between the unions and the federal
government. On April 2, 1970, the unions and the government signed
an historic agreement which committed both parties -to support the
postal pay raise and postal reform as one inseparable package. In the
settlement, the unions gained a sizable pay raise and long-sought for-
mal recognition of a collective bargaining relationship with the federal
government. The Nixon Administration achieved a reversal of earlier
adamant union opposition to its corporation reform legislative pro-
posals. The President personally became involved in setting the stra-
tegy which led to this settlement.
8F6. Legislative Action. Prior to the strike, the Administration had
arranged for the creation of a bi-partisan Citizen's Committee for
Postal Reform. Former PMG O'Brien served as co-chairman of this group
which worked hard at cultivating public support for the Administra-
tion's reform package. Despite some lingering opposition in Congress,
this broad-based public support, when coupled with the united-front
presented by the Administration and the postal unions, proved to be a
sufficiently powerful coalition to insure ultimate passage of a postal
reform bill. Despite much legislative and political maneuvering, in
late June, 1970, both the Senate and the House passed their own version
of a postal reform bill. The essential differences between the two
bills were resolved in the House/Senate Committee and a compromise bill
was finally approved by both Houses in early August.
Legislative Victory. On August 12, 1970, President Nixon signed
Public Law 91-375, which is today known as the Postal Reorganization
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and Salary Adjustment Act of 1970. This historic piece of legislation
disestablished the Post Office Department and created the U. S. Postal
Service, as.a quasi-independent government agency. This creation gave
institutional form and substance to the essence of the reform proposals
originally contained in Larry O'Brien's "Race with Catastrophe" speech
delivered some three and one-half years earlier.
Notes for Chapter Eight
1) See Harold E. Dolenga, "An Analytical Case Study of the Policy For-
mation Process: Postal Reform and Reorganization"; unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Northwestern University, Graduate School of Management,
August 1972.
2) For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the Case, see
Harold E. Dolenga, ibid., Chapter 2.
3) This section is essentially reproduced (with slight modifications in
format) from Harold E. Dolenga, ibid., Chapter Five.
4) This section is essentially reproduced (with slight modifications in
format) from Harold E. Dolenga, ibid., Chapter Six.
221
Chapter Nine
Selective Analysis of the Conception and Birth Phase
9A. Introduction and Overview
Chapter Nine will present a selective analysis of the Conception and
Birth Phase of the Postal Reform Case. The analysis will be primarily
based on and directed by an attempt to apply the conceptual framework
developed in Part II to the data recorded in the Postal Reform Case.
Because of the richness of that data, it is impossible to undertake an
exhaustive analysis of it. The modest intent here will be to focus on
those components of the conceptual framework which are particularly re-
lated to the strategic aspects of the policy formation process. More
specifically, this analysis will emphasize the following aspects of the
framework as they are manifested in the case:
-The Decision to Make a Decision
-Strategic Decision Issues
-The Scope and Intensity of Change
-Time Preference
-Issue and System Boundary Delimitation
-Policy Instruments
-Policy Feasibility
-Policy Actors' Motivations
The objective here then, will be to examine the first phase of the
case by focusing on these dimensions suggested by the conceptual frame-
work and by drawing on the concepts developed in Part II during the deve-
lopment and elaboration of the framework. The analysis of the Conception
and Birth Phase will be quite detailed as this early phase is dominated
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by the interplay of strategic variables and it, therefore, affords a
meaningful opportunity to apply and test the usefulness of the conceptual
framework for analysis.
9B. The Decision to Make A Decision
During the Conception and Birth Phase, a strategic decision-to-make-
a-decision did not emerge, at least at the level of the Johnson Adminis-
tration. Instead, there emerged a very skillful pattern of decision
elaboration, so structured as to maintain maximum flexibility and several
open options insofar as policy initiation.
For example, as noted in the Case, Postmaster General (PMG) O'Brien's
strategy was not to ask for President Johnson's "approval" of the sub-
stance of the postal reform proposal per se. Instead he intentionally
asked only for approval to make the public speech and to indicate that
he (Johnson) was "aware" of the reform proposal and deemed it worthy of
further study. O'Brien's strategy obviated the need for any firm (and
potentially) costly expression of public commitment from the White House.
O'Brien's careful efforts to "protect" the President probably enhanced
the liklihood of his obtaining Johnson'S approval for the speech. Thus,
the policy process was initiated without any explicit decision to make
a decision. Only tentative, exploratory sub-decisions were made, leav-
ing considerable room for strategic retreat, if necessary.
After the favorable public response to the O'Brien speech, the ad-
ministration moved closer to a decision, but still stopped short of ex-
plicitly making it. The creation of the Presidential Commission repre-
sented a compromise strategic choice which enabled the Johnson Adminis-
tration to capitalize on the momentum and tension which had been built
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up as a result of the work of the Quadriad and O'Brien's public speech,
while still maintaining open options and minimizing the expenditure of
policy resources. As O'Brien stated later:
"President Johnson saw it as a real opportunity, and he
concurred with my initial notions that this would be a
real opportunity for the Administration to capitalize on a
sweeping reform proposal and to go to work and apply resources
to a proposal that offered some significant promise for
bearing fruit." (1)
This action may indicate an incremental movement closer to an ex-
plicit commitment, but the movement was a measured one--there was no
precipitous action in spite of O'Brien's desire to move quickly and
dramatically. In sharp contrast with President Nixon's later position,
during the Conception and Birth Phase, the Johnson Administration was
very careful to stop just short of any explicit public endorsement of
the postal reform proposal.
The cautious public actions of the Johnson Administration can be
understood in the light of the'overall context. PMG O'Brien was offering
an "opportunity" to the President. Although he spoke of crisis and the
need to act, that was not the main thrust of his argument to the White
House. Thus, with policy formation being initiated in an opportunistic
(vice a problemistic) mode, the policy system had many flexible options
which do not always exist.
9B1. Summary. We have seen that the policy process was initiated even
in the absence of any explicit decision-to-make-a-decision. Although
Although Califano implied, during our interview with him, that Presi-
dent Johnson was then convinced of the need for major reform in the pos-
tal system (but wasn't sure how best to achieve it), the impact of any
such commitment on the policy formation process was diluted by Johnson's
cautious public moves.
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several significant sub-decisions were made, the fundamental public
commitment to action was not forthcoming during the Conception and Birth
Phase. This demonstrates that even so fundamental a strategic decision
does not always "get made", either early, explicitly, or as of some pre-
cise point in time. In this situation the policy process moved forward
even in the absence of such a basic decision, primarily because the prin-
cipal policy actors were explicitly aware of their preference to care-
fully navigate a course toward pragmatic timely action, stopping short
of any total public commitment. In effect, there was a sophisticated
decision not to make a (public) decision.
However, as we shall see later, the absence of any strong, public
commitment on the part of the Johnson Administration was to have signi-
ficant dysfunctional implications during later stages of the policy for-
mation process.
9C. The White House Decision to Establish the Presidential Commission
In the absence of any public Presidential endorsement for the reform
proposal, the White House decision to establish a Presidential Commission
became the most significant strategic decision rendered by the focal po-
licy actor during the Conception and Birth Phase. This action merits
further scrutiny.
The literature on Presidential Commissions is voluminous and cannot
be treated here. Instead, we will give a brief summary of the existing
explanations in the literature regarding presidential intentions in
establishing such commissions. We will try to characterize the postal
case in such a framework, and if necessary to provide additional explana-
tory dimensions.
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Elizabeth Drew(2 ) has identified the existence of several domi-
nant motivations for establishing commissions. These include:
1) An opportunity to postpone action, while at the same time
being justified in saying that one is working on the problem.
2) The desire to provide a "lightning rod", by drawing political
heat away from the White House.
3) The desire to investigate and to lay to rest rumors so as
to convince the public of the validity of a particular set of
facts.
Popper(3 ) in his extensive literature review, has noted four major presi-
dential intentions-behind every commission:
1) Demonstration of concern about a problem.
2) Education of the nation.
3) The encouragement of new policy ideas.
4) Mobilization of support for presidential programs.
Similarly, Dean, (4 ) in his article about ad hoc commissions for policy
formulation notes the following seven reasons:
1) The capacity.to focus public attention on a problem.
2) Freedom from domination by the permanent agencies of govern-
ment.
3) The ability to represent diverse interests and points of
view.
4) Effectiveness in enlisting persons of national reputation
and competence.
5) The ability to collect and publish important information.
6) The value of forestalling precipitate action.
7) Effectiveness in increasing public support for governmental
action.
In the postal reform situation, the establishment of the Kappel
Commission is well explained in terms of Dean's points one, and four
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through seven, regarding presidential intentions. The action on the part
of the Johnson Administration is best seen as an ad hoc response to a
recognition of the opportunity for policy action created by the favor-
able public response to O'Brien's speech. Despite suspicions of many
critics (especially union leaders) I am convinced that the decision to
establish the Kappel Commission was not "pre-planned". After O'Brien's
speech, it became clear that "do nothing" was no longer an open option.
From this point of view, it is important to recognize that President
Johnson's earlier decision to approve the delivery of O'Brien's public
speech in effect became a partial constraint on later decisions.
The White House action in establishing the Commission is best
understood as the recognition of an opportunity for policy action, and
a desire to obtain competent advice on how to exploit this opportunity.
Beyond this, it is my best judgment that O'Brien's personal motivation
was more in the direction of mobilizing support for his specific pro-
posal. This may explain the tactical difference between O'Brien and Cal-
ifano as expressed in our interviews with them. O'Brien favored the
establishment of a commission by legislative action, being sensitive to
consensus building in the Congress vis-a-vis his proposal. Califano (and
Schultze) favored establishment of a presidential commission to be appoint-
ed by Executive order. As O'Brien told us:
"So, the President opted for the appointment of a Presidential
Commission and Califano went along with this idea. Although
it was not exactly as I had envisioned things in terms of a
commission, I certainly felt that it (postal reform) was de-
serving of Presidential influence. And, because my overriding
consideration was one of timing--I felt the necessity to move
quickly on this--I thought the notion of the Presidential
commission fit in quite well at that time." (5)
Thus, we see that different policy actors may have had somewhat
- ~~~~~~~~D
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different objectives--i.e., they may have agreed to a particular course
of action, albeit for somewhat different reasons. Assumptions as to
a monolithic and homogeneous character of the policy system may well
mask such subtle differences and distort a true understanding of be-
havioral data. Furthermore, we have seen that, when tested against the
Case data, the theoretical literature regarding residential ommissions
provides a useful framework for understanding behavioral reality.
9D. The Scope and Intensity of Change
The scope and intensity of policy change is presented in the concep-
tual framework as one of several basic strategic decision issues. I
have defined this dimension as the choice among various degrees of policy
change, in terms of a range of change varying from small incremental
changes in a few policy details over a long period of time, to major and
rapid policy changes. During the Conception and Birth Phase, this di-
mension received explicit consideration in various decisional processes.
A fundamental issue in the astal eform ase was a choice between a
strategy aimed at incremental improvements of various policy compon nts
within the existing structure and mode of operation of a strategy based
on major changes such as system redesign.
9D1. O'Brien's Strategic Choice. PMG O'Brien made an explicit choice
in favor of major change. His choice appears to have been influenced by
the following factors: 1) a high degree of dissatisfaction with the results
of past postal policies; 2) a well articulated perception-of-crisis syn-
drome; 3) a perception of the non-equifinality of the recognized strategic
options; and 4) the existence of a strong predisposition toward drastic
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systemic change, based on personal characteristics of the policy actor.
The existence of dissatisfaction with the results of past policies
and the existence of a perception-of-crisis have been vividly documented
in the Case. But perhaps the clearest explanation to why the radical
change strategy was chosen lies in O'Brien's own "definition of the sit-
uation." His definition of the situation included both a dissatisfaction
with past policies, and a perception that radical change might provide
at least a way out of an intolerable situation with some chance that it
could result in major improvements. In O'Brien's words:
". .. a primary question is whether it is worth risking abandonment
of unsatisfactory certainty for possible satisfactory uncertainty."(6)
O'Brien felt that the risk was definitely worth taking, and this fact may
provide one of the important explanatory variables regarding his stra-
tegic choice.
O'Brien did not perceive the two recognized strategic options (rad-
ical change and incremental change) as being clearly equifinal; that
is, at least potentially leading to the same or equivalent results. This
is a very important theoretical point because it challenges the widely
accepted notion that the main difference between the radical and incre-
mental strategy is in intensity of change. Namely, that an accumulation
of small incremental changes over a long time period may have an impact
equivalent to the effect of comprehensive and rapid change.
.
Based on an undated memorandum from PMG O'Brien to Fredrick Kappel on
the occasion of Kappel's appointment as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Postal Organization.
Radical change as used here is intended to connote fundamental, and
total change. That is, change which addresses root causes and the
foundation of system problems. It implies basic structural modifica-
tions and the emergence of new patterns of relationships.
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Radical or major change was perceived by O'Brien as including a
basic system reorientation and change in direction. This required
severing relationships with the past, and his feeling was that this
was unattainable through utilization of an incremental strategy. O'Brien's
policy leverage, based on his prior position as congressional.iiaison
man for two presidents and his personal characteristics, created some
predisposition toward major change. These characteristics are best under-
stood in terms of O'Brien's self description as a "big picture man" and
a person who always approached a job by going "whole hog" and taking
"full charge." This may suggest that policy actors capacities and
their policy leverage may have considerable impact on how a problem will
be approached, the direction of search, and, finally, on the strategy
preferences.
The Quadriad Report ultimately confirmed O'Brien's deifinition of the
situation as we can see from this excerpt from O'Brien's memorandum to
the President:
"This task force has been at work for well over a year.,
and its confidential report to me confirms my initial in-
clination that we should take bold, well designed, and timely
action to bring the postal service into line with the demands
and the needs of the times." (8)
The "demands and needs of the times", as perceived by O'Brien, were stated
in the memorandum thusly:
" . I have come to the conclusion that ultimate solution
to the problems of the postal service lies in taking the
Department out of its present context entirely." (9)
9D2. Quadriad Advocacy of Major Change. The Quadriad took a strong
(10)position in favor of major and fundamental change. The main under-
lying and explicitly stated assumption supporting this position was that
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the scope of the interface between the POD and the Congress made true
postal reform practically impossible unless these strong and pervasive
congressional ties were severed. The report noted that, "basic solu-
tions must involve removing the Post Office from the political arena."(11)
This definition of the situation was reinforced by a high percep-
tion of crisis and by a perception of non-equifinality of the alter-
native solutions. The Quadriad view was generally consistent with
O'Brien's initial thoughts about the nature and the direction of the
solution. From this point of view, the main contribution of the Quadriad
was not in the area of problem reformulation but, rather, in the valida-
tion and elaboration of already existing thoughts and the translation
of these into a more operational plan of action.
9D3. Risk and Cost as Strategic Considerations. One important variable
shaping the strategic choices necessary regarding the scope and inten-
sity of change is risk acceptability or risk-taking behavior. This is
largely a matter of the policymaker's readiness to accept the higher
risk which might be associated with more radical change, versus a pre-
ference for the lower degree of risk usually associated with more incre-
mental change. In both instances, the essence of the matter concerns the
costs of policy change. Cost, as used here includes both the direct
costs (which are usually more susceptible to ascertainment), and the in-
direct costs (including side-effects) which are usually nearly impossible
to ascertain in advance and are even difficult to identify even under
ex-post-facto conditions.
There is no explicit reference to reform costs in the Quadriad Report.
The apparent lack of concern for many cost elements in the deliberations
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and recommendations of the Quadriad was explained by several members
in terms of the existence of a high level of dissatisfaction with the
existing policies resulting in a strong desire to make a clean break
with the past, irregardless of costs. Such action was regarded as being
preferable to perpetuation of the status quo.(l2)
A similar explanation of the lack of emphasis placed on the cost
dimension was provided by O'Brien during our interview with him. When
asked whether any formal or informal assessment was made of relevant
costs and whether or not cost was a factor which particularly influenced
his choice of a strategy of radical change, O'Brien replied:
"No, costs were not really an important factor at that
time. I wasn't as interested or constrained by costs as I
was interested in the overall direction of bringing about
some drastic change and getting it started as soon as pos-
sible." (13)
This apparent insensitivity to the cost issue, which was reflected in
the behavior of both O'Brien and the Quadriad, may provide some explana-
tion as to why they both excluded from serious consideration the utili-
zation of risk (cost) reducing mechanisms such as sequential decision
making, experimentation, etc., and any effort to counter-balance some-
what the likely effects of the radical change strategy.
During our interviews with them, several Quadriad members expressed
a strong feeling that the acceptance of incremental change in the near
term ( or piecemeal change, in their terminology ) would foreclose on
the opportunity to effect any significant change in the future. This is
consistent with their position expressed in their confidential Report to
PMG O'Brien in which they stated:
"It is felt that if piecemeal change is made in the
near future, additional significant changes could not be
expected for some time to come." (p. 16)
233
A significant finding related to this phase of the policy formation
process is that O'Brien and the Quadriad perceived perpetuation of the
status quo as being more risky than radical or fundamental change was
likely to be. This behavioral finding tends to contradict existing
theory which associates high risk with radical change. This may suggest
that when existing policies are no longer acceptable because of a
perception of crisis, and the existence of a considerable performance
gap, the policy system may be more open to radical departures in policy,
despite the high risk involved.
9E. Strategy Types
The conceptual framework suggests the value of examining the degree
of attention paid to utilization of various strategy types in various
phases of the policy process, and in respect to various policy target
areas. We will now determine whether or not this is a useful suggestion,
when applied to the Postal Reform Case data.
9E1. Disequilibrium Strategy. In certain circumstances, e.g., when the
strategic objective is the radical transformation of a system, creation
of a shock effect which first unbalances the system, may open it for
redesign or redirection. This may be a preferable strategy whenever a
system is deemed to be particularly rigid or frozen with respect to change
initiatives. The ase data strongly portrays O'Brien's commitment to
the application of a disequilibiium strategy. This is especially clear
in his insistence on maintaining strict control over the entire process,
from the secret mode of operation of the Quadriad, to the dramatically
orchestrated public speech. When asked whether or not he had had a
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formal strategic plan for accomplishing postal reform, he replied:
". .* I couldn't say there was really much strategy up to
that point in time. As a matter of fact, it's a case of
Just me, Larry O'Brien, pushing this damn thing into the
spotlight trying to make it as dramatic and interesting
as I could to capture the imagination and the attention. . ."(14)
As noted in the Case, O'Brien's speech, which the press characterized
as a "bombshell", was the manifestation of a c.hock strategy. A major
objective of this shock strategy was to "unfreeze" an historically im-
mutable system and thus increase its receptivity to potential change
proposals. The Case also demonstrated a secondary advantage of such a
shock strategy. The elements of surprise and rapid follow-up action
(e.g. the Presidential Commission was established only five days after
O'Brien's speech) served to unbalance potential critics, thus minimiz-
ing chances of the early formation of an opposition coalition.
The above analysis indicates that O'Brien utilized the disequili-
brium strategy for both tactical and basic strategic considerations.
The basic proposal for corporate-form reorganization, although more
implicit than the tactical uses, may be viewed as the strategic employ-
ment of an innovative idea to shock the system, thus providing a ve-
hicle for opening it for change.
9E2. Comprehensive vs. Narrow/Focused Strategy. The framework also
identifies another important strategy set; the comprehensive versus
narrow/focused strategy. This set of strategy types is concerned with
the degree to which policy formation will be focused on a broad range of
policy components, as opposed to dealing with only a few, or even a single
component. This choice was explicitly considered by O'Brien and weighed
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heavily in the Quadriad's deliberations. The Quadriad explicitly recom-
mended the comprehensive strategy, relying on the reasons stated below:
"In addition, the public interest would be captured by a
bold, imaginative and timely proposal, thus endowing the
total program with a greater likelihood, of Congressional
approval than any single change such as greater latitude
in making transportation arrangements or greater latitude
in rate making. The unanimous feeling is that the major
package is the one which should be pursuedI for the whole
has far more appeal than the sum of parts.' (15)
In this instance, comprehensiveness was treated as being synonymous with
major change. That is, the terms imply both comprehensive in the sense
of a broad scope of policy components, and major change, taken together.
The possibility of achieving critical mass threshholds by focus-
ing search policy resources on a few strategic controlling variables,
which, through application of a possible multiplier effect, might achieve
a significant change in policy through a directed set of changes each
of which-by itself may be incremental, was explicitly rejected on the
basis of non-feasibility. In addition to feasibility considerations
(a variable which the Quadriad was explicitly asked by O'Brien to
ignore at this stage of analysis)(16 ) there existed a perception of
equivalence between the comprehensiveness of a policy and its importance.
This image, no matter how correct or incorrect, also presumably drew the
Quadriad toward a position of advocacy for a comprehensive strategy.
9E3. Identical vs. Mixed Strategies. The final strategy set identified
in the framework is that of identical versus mixed strategies. Examina-
tion of various decisions taken during the Conception and Birth phase by
their explicit or implicit strategies clearly reveals a tendency toward
the use of identical strategies; in this case--radical or major change.
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Not seriously explored was the possibility of using mixed strategies;
i.e., an arrangement in which for a given policy different strategies
can be followed simultaneously (e.g., follow a radical change strategy
in one policy target area and an incremental change strategy in another
area).
The main explanation for the lack of attention to the possibility
of following mixed strategies in O'Brien's decision and in Quadriad
deliberations lies in the dimension of an insensitivity to policy
costs. This lack of sensitivity to policy costs might explain not
only why a radical change strategy was adopted, but also the neglect
of serious consideration of the utilization of mixed strategies. Two
clusters of reasons may provide a plausible explanation of the apparent
lack of sensitivity to reform costs.
First, the existence of a perception that the risk of maintaining
the present situation.in the long run may be equal to or even higher
than the risk of radical reform. This perception was shaped by dis-
satisfaction with present policies and by a strong feeling of the
existence of a performance gap. Therefore, a clean break with the
past, disregarding the costs, was perceived as better than the per-
petuation of the status quo. This perception was reinforced by the
feeling that the political costs of the incremental st.i'ategy would
be equal to or possibly more costly than those connected with the
radical strategy. Both of these perceptions were based on intuition
and trained experience and neither of them was seriously challenged
by analysis. Secondly, the existence of instrumental beliefs (that
is, beliefs about ends-means relationships) in this situation in an
economic and management context, predisposed O'Brien and the Quadriad
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to certain policy measures which were consistent with those beliefs,
regardless of the costs involved.
Neither of these two clusters of reasons is by itself sufficient
to explain the lack of attention to the possibility of employing mixed
strategies. Taken together, these factors tend to reinforce one an-
other and constitute a composite explanation of the behavior of the
major policy actors.
9E4. Summary. In this analysis of the strategic decisions taken
during the Conception and Birth Phase, I have shown that the prefer-
ence for the radical change strategy was influenced by a combination
of following factors:
1) a high dissatisfaction with the results of past policies.
2) a well articulated perception of crisis.
3) a perception of non-equifinality among the various stra-
tegic choices.
4) the policy actors' policy leverage and intentions.
The incremental and the radical strategy were not perceived
as being clearly equifinal. The incremental change strategy was per-
ceived as inadequate for achieving the desired systems reorientation.
This finding challenges the widely accepted notion that the main dif-
ference between radical and incremental change is the intensity of
change. Namely, that the accumulation of small incremental changes
over a long time of period may produce a similar impact to that pro-
duced by comprehansive and rapid change.
A second significant finding related to the strategic decision
under investigation is the existence of a perception that the risk of
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maintaining the status quo may, in the long-run be higher than those
of radical reform. The existence of the above perception was rein-
forced by certain instrumental beliefs which predisposed the actors
to certain policy measures, regardless of the cost involved. This
apparent lack of sensitivity to the policy cost dimension also exclu-
ded from serious consideration the utilization of mixed strategies.
9F. Time Preferences
One of the several strategic decision issues highlighted in the
framework is the issue of the time preferences of the key policymakers.
Included under this dimension are two distict temporal considerations.
First, a concern with current decisions which express and influence
time preferences relating to future actions and policy outcomes; i.e.,
a policy planning orientation. Secondly, a concern with current deci-
sions which govern the timeing of instant inputs to and influences on
the ongoing policy process itself. Examples of both of thes aspects
of time preferences are found in the Postal Reform Case.
In the analysis of the Case data, the inter-connection between
time and other strategic decision issues facing the policymaker will
be of special interest. Special attention will also be given to the
time preferences of the major policy actors and to the different ways
in which time may affect both the speed and direction of the policy
formation process.
Turning now to the case data, we see that one of the first issues
regarding time preferences is the basic question as to what event(s)
or force(s) energized the policy process. Empirically, a question is
raised as to the nature of the temporal relationship (and by implica-
239
tion, the possible causal relationship) between the "Chicago crisis"
and PMG O'Brien's decision to establish the Quadriad.
Because neither the Chicago breakdown nor the decision to esta-
blish the 7adriad were discrete events occuring at a precise point
in time, their temporal relationship is not as easily specified as
surface appearances at first suggest. However, as the Case clearly
shows, O'Brien established the Triad (which later grew into the Quad-
riad) in August 1966, two to three months prior to the eruption of
the Chicago crisis. Of course, it is possible that O'Brien was aware
of the Chicago crisis while it was still in a developmental stage. If
this were the situation, coneivable, his perception of a potential
crisis could have been a factor which motivated him to establish the
Quadriad. However, I found no evidence to support such a thesis, and
common sense would argue that the Chicago breakdown would never have
reached crisis proportions if O'Brien had been aware of its develop-
ment at an early stage.
My conclusion is that the Triad was, in fact, established signi-
ficantly prior to and independent of the crisis syndrome generated by
the Chicago breakdown which peaked in urgency between October and
December 1966. Moreover, several of the individuals who were ulti-
mately involved in the Quadriad effort had been dealing informally
with many of the same issues months before even the Triad was formed.
Designation of the initial task-force added only a modicum of formality
to these informal, ongoing thought and search processes.
Nonetheless, the perceived crisis related to events in Chicago
undoubtedly acted as a stimulus and catalyst vis-a-vis the study task-
force. As the case data indicates, the Triad cum Quadriad initially
operated without any deadline and did not begin serious, systematic
work until late in the fall of 1966. By this time the situation in
Chicago reached crisis proportions, by any reasonable definition of
that term.
Thus, while I do not suggest that the Chicago crisis was cau-
sally related to establishment of the study team, the case data will
support my interpretation that the Chicago crisis intensified the
already emerging recognition of the need for major policy changes,
and it accelerated the timing of policymaking efforts by heightening
the sense of purpose and the urgency of the Quadriad effort.
Another time preference factor closely related to the foregoing
is the matter of O'Brien's strong desire to control the timing (and
other aspects) of any postal reform movement. The fact that, in
December 1966, he prevailed upon Congressman Udall to withhold intro-
duction of legislation which would have set up a congressional com-
mission to investigate the POD can readily be interpreted as a desire
to maintain control of the timing of any reform efforts. Similarly,
in December 1966, O'Brien convinced the Budget Bureau not push for
inclusion in the President's budget message of a statement advocating
a study of the possiblity of a corporate form of organization struc-
ture for the POD.*( 1 7)
It is clear that in both of these instances, O'Brien preferred
*Because he felt that such a move might jeopardize the success of
then planned postal rate increase legislation.
241
to delay overt reform action until he personally was sure of what to
do and how and when to do it. This situation highlights the existence
of both a theoretical and empirical inter-relationship between time
preferences as a strategic decision issue and policy analysis. O'Brien
felt that he needed the results of the Quadriad effort before he could
act. Yet, an adequate analysis required a considerable time invest-
ment. The decision to pay this "time cost" nccessitated delaying any
further strategic or tactical moves until the analysis could reason-
ably be completed.
O'Brien's pre-selection of the Magazine Publishers Association
Convention as the forum for public announcement of his reform proposals
represents a most significant expression of time preference. Since
this decision was made (at least tentatively) before the Quadriad
had completed its work, it, in effect, dictated the timing of the
preparation and presentation of the Quadriad Report. Furthermore,
the secrecy and surprise aspects of the Quadriad work and of the
April speech, served to pre-empt the response time of potential cri-
tics. O'Brien clearly knew how to use time to mold the policy for-
mation process.
Further evidence of O'Brien's keen sesitivity to the time dimen-
tion may be seen in his strategy for winning President Johnson's at
least tacit support for his historic speech. Having effectively de-
layed outside influences on the policy process until he was ready
and able to initiate overt action, O'Brien once again convinced the
President of the need for timely action so as not to lose the initiative.
At this point in the process, O'Brien perceived that postal reform was
5
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an idea whose time had come. Therefore, he argued convincingly that
the Johnson Administration had to act quickly before others (especial-
ly Republican Congressmen) came to the same realization and wrested
the option for policy initiation from the Democrats (and from O'Brien,
who played many roles besides that of a powerful figure in the. Dem-
ocratic Party).
The early months of 1967 proved to be quite eventful insofar
as the rapidity of significant policy formation actions vis-a-vis
postal reform. After seeing the somewhat surprising outpouring of
public support which followed his speech, O'Brien perceived both the
opportunity for further dramatic action, and the risks inherent in
the absence of timely action. He saw the opportunity to capitalize
on the high level of interest and drama which had been built up as
of the first week in April, but also realized that inaction could
result in a dissipation of the creative tension which had.energized
the attention of the policy system. In addition, delay would afford
opponents an opportunity to build an opposition coalition capable of
insuring the infant mortality of the reform concept.
Acting on his sense of the high degree of leverage that time
can exert on the policy formation process, O'Brien (assisted by Schultze
and Califano) moved to convince President Johnson of the need for fur-
ther timely dramatic action to sustain the momentum which had been
built up. Creation of the Presidential Commission was the operational
expression of the Johnson Administration's recognition of both the
political and the "good government" opportunities presented by the
situation they then faced. The fact -that the entire ten-man Commis-
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sion was formally appointed and publicly announced within five days
after O'Brien's speech again underscores the important influence of
time on the policy formation process.*
Time also influenced the method of appointment of the Commis-
sion (i.e., by Executive Order vice legislative action) and there-
fore its composition. It is quite likely that creation of the Com-
mission through legislative action would have taken considerably
longer and most certainly would have resulted in strong congressional
representation on the commission. It will serve no useful purpose
here to speculate on the possible impact of having had congressional
representation on the commission. I would only observe that, given
the strong congressional interest in the topic of postal reform, it
is highly probable that the outcome would have been quite different
from that which in fact obtained.
The close inter-relationship between time and other strategic
decisions should not be lost sight of. We have just seen how time
bactors influenced the method of creating the Commission and thereby
the composition of the Commission. From a closely related perspec-
tive, a prior strategic decision to exclude congressional represen-
*The extremely rapid action taken to formally establish the Presi-
dential Commission encouraged speculation that O'Brien had prearranged
the whole affair. Opponents of the reform concept seized upon and
extended this speculation to suggest that the recommendations of the
Kappel Commission were preordained as part of some Machiavellian plot.
Based on extensive cross-validation of interview data and documenta-
tion, I am convinced that no such preordering took place, at least
not consciously. In our interview with him, Mr. Califano explained
that from a technical, communications perspective, rapid response time
was no problem because the White House enjoys virtually immediate
access to any person the staff may wish to contact. Understandably,
the phase, "This is the White House calling", demands an immediate
response.
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tation, in turn influenced the timing of the establishment of the
Commission, a factor which had important ramifications for the en-
suing process. This mutuality of influence among key policy forma-
tion variables is a little understood aspect of the true complexity
of the policy formation process.
Thus far we have looked primarily at the various ways in which
time preferences influenced and were influenced by specific policy-
making actions in an ongoing policy formation process. A second major
dimension of interest here is the impact of target time preferences.
That is, the time frame(s) in which the main policymakers wish to have
the substantive results of the policy made manifest. Such time pre-
ferences regarding policy outcomes usually lack operationalized def-
initions. Nonetheless, this study suggests that this factor can have
a considerable impact on the policy formation process, especially in
its early, formative stages.
The Case Study demonstrates O'Brien's a priori preference for
drastic and early change.. In a sense, these two elements were mutually
inconsistent. As discussed in Chapter Four, both theory and practice
suggest that incremental, piecemeal, change can usually be effected
relatively rapidly. In contrast, drastic change can generally be
accomplished only over an extended time period. Thus, to seek drastic
and early change, simultaneously, would seem to be an incongruous goal.
O'Brien's expressed desire to accomplish drastic and rapid change
is best understood in terms of his behavior. Creation of the Quadriad
without assigning any deadline for the completion of their work can
be viewed as inconsistent with a desire for rapid change. It is, how-
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ever, wholly consistent with a desire for drastic change which typi-
cally requires study and planning. Similarly, despite the existence
of some fairly strong predispositions in favor of a corporate-type
alternative, and despite substantial environmental pressure for change,
O'Brien was apparently willing to wait approximately eight months for
the Quadriad to complete its work. Similarly, his agreement (or
acquiesence) to allow the Presidential Commission a full year to make
its recommendations was tantamount to an agreement to freeze the
system in a status-quo position for at least another year.*
None of the above behavioral actions is fully consistent with a
desire for rapid change. I would conclude, therefore, that O'Brien's
initial time preference regarding policy outcomes was modified some-
what as the policy process unfolded. More importantly, though, I would
suggest that O'Brien's early expressions of a desire to accomplish
rapid change was not really an expression of a time preference regard-
ing policy outcomes. More likely, it was an expression of a personal
and professional desire to initiate early policy action, i.e., to
mold the ongoing policy process as it evolved.
Viewed in this light, the establishment of the Quadriad (and
O'Brien's interaction with it), preparation and delivery of the public
speech, and the establishment of the Presidential Commission, can all
be seen as important action elements of a policy strategy which was
*This decision, of course, delayed concrete legislative action on postal
reform. However, strategically, it also minimized the likelihood that
O'Brien's policy initiative would be pre-empted through the immediate
introduction of a counter proposal either by opponents of reform or
by Republican advocates.
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initiated relatively early in the process and which served to activate
and sustain the policy process. Such an interpretation is also quite
consistent with the case portrayal of O'Brien as a man of action and
a political realist.
I conclude, therefore, that O'Brien was in fact much more inter-
ested in drastic change than in rapid change. His sensitivity to the
time dimension was more oriented towards the initiation and acceler-
ation of the policy formation process than towards the time phasing
of policy oucomes, per se. O'Brien's predisposition regarding the
scope of change was subsequently confirmed by the Quadriad Report,
but largely on subjective grounds. I found no evidence that the
Quadriad's assumption that drastic change would be no more costly
than peicemeal change was ever subjected to any rigorous analysis.
Instead, this premise seemed to arise from two sources. First, an
emotional, ideological belief that entrenched attitudes and patterns
of system behavior could only be changed through a dramatic, drastic
break with the past. And, secondly, from a deductive conclusion
that "enough" peicemeal change would be quite costly and time con-
suming, and a realization that anything less than drastic change
would risk not accomplishing the intended reform objectives while
dissipating the pro-reform momentum which had been built up.
What emerges from this discussion of the relationship between
time preferences and strategic decisions regarding the scope of change
is a potentially significant role for policy analysis. In the postal
reform case, such analysis was not performed. In a normative vein I
would suggest that in other cases, analysis could serve to clarify
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the policymaker's intentions (for himself and for other policy actors)
and could at least partially explicate the sensitive relationship
between target time preference and the scope of change. Such expli-
cation might reveal, for example, the inconsistency (or at least high
cost) involved in attempting to achieve drastic change rapidly. Anal-
ysis could therby lead to a reformulation of time preferences or could
facilitate the making of complex trade-off decisions between time pre-
ferences and other strategic decision issues.
I would also point out that the case data shows instances in
which a perception of crisis and estimations of policy feasibility
are two additional variables which mold time preferences; often re-
sulting in the creation of rigid time constraints. For example, the
extremely rapid creation of the Presidential Commission required that
significant action be taken under very rigid time constraints. There
was little time for analysis or deliberation; action was the governing
criteria. This point is all the more significant because the creation
of a Presidential commission was not a point addressed in the Quadriad
Report and I found no convincing evidence to suggest that this action
had in any sense been prearranged by prior agreement with the White
House. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, it seems likely that O'Brien
would have preferred a different choice of policy instrument; direct
legislative action, for example.
9Fl. Summary of the Analysis of Time Preferences. This analysis has
shown that time preferences was a critical strategic decision issue at
several key points in the Conception and Birth Phase. Furthermore,
2 4 8
this partial analysis has suggested (and subsequent analysis will
confirm) that early strategic decisions regarding time preferences
may serve as a powerful force which can exert a great deal of lever-
age on the ensuing policy formation process. Additionally, this anal-
ysis of this early phase of the case data has demonstrated the myriad
of inter-connections and mutual influences between time and other
strategic decision issues, highlighting the trade-offs necessary
between time and other dimensions. This case analysis has also dem-
onstrated the usefulness of distinguishing between time preferences
regarding policy outcomes, and the timing of discrete policy actions
which mold the ongoing policy process.
Several of the different roles of time, and a number of different
ways in which decisions about time affect the policy formation have
been demonstrated. For example, we saw O'Brien's use of time as a
control mechanism used to "pace" the operation of the policy process.
We saw how a perception of crisis may serve to accelerate policy ef-
forts, and we examined the strategic and tactical value of well timed
policy actions. Two major factors are suggested by this early and
partial analysis. The first of these is the importance of time as a
strategic decision issue, and the second is the fact that time acts as
both a dependent, and independent variable. Also suggested by this ana-
lysis is a close interconnection between time preferences for policy
action and the time necessary for analysis. In turn, the output from
analysis may result in a reformulation of other strategic decisions.
9G. System and Issue Boundary Delimitation
The conceptual framework suggests that a polciy actor's "defi-
nition of the situation", (namely, his selection and evaluation of
objects, events, symbols, and other actors, and his perception of
the inter-relatedness between the policy in question and other issues
and systems) molds his (explicit and implicit) decisions regarding
both issue and system boundary delimitation.
In the Conception and Birth Phase of the Postal Reform Case it
is clear that PMG O'Brien was politically astute enough to recognize
quite early that the historically determined scope and intensity of
the interface between the POD and the Congress rendered significant
postal reform practically impossible unless preceeded by a drastic
restructing of this institutional relationship.(18)
Such a "definition of the situation" led him to define the system
boundaries in a relatively broad eontext in terms of institutions
(including the Congress and most of the other institutions of the
Postal Complex(19) and also in terms of postal policy target areas
(including issues such as rate-making, labor-management relations,
financing and investment policies, ets.). Such a delimitation of system
and issue boundaries virtually excluded from further serious consider-
ation a policy alternative which would suggest improvements in postal
service through incremental changes to be made within the existing
structure of the postal system.
Of course, whatever early system boundaries are drawn, they will
of necessity be imprecise and flexible, and will have meaning only in
their broadest outline. Nonetheless, it is critical to note the great
tendency for the original (often intuitively defined) system boundaries
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to "stick". This has extremely important consequences for the nature
and direction of the ensuing policy formation process. Anything clearly
defined as being outside of the originally delimited system is, almost
definitionally, not worthy of further investment of scarce policy re-
sources. The difficulty, of course, is that the early, fundamental
decision as to system boundaries is seldom as analytically rigorous
as is the subsequent analysis of alternatives then "known" to lie
within the focal system.
Consider, for example, the differing "definitions of the situation",
as conceptualized by two Postmasters General. In broadest terms, PMG
O'Brien defined the situation as an anachronistic relationship between
the Congress and the POD. In contrast, former PMG J. Edward Day de-
fined the situation as one of inadequate resources due to the low
political leverage of the POD and the PMG. Without regard to the
merit of the two views, it seems quite clear that each would lead
to a different delimitation of both system and issue boundaries.
Except for areas of possible overlap between the two systems, the
likely result would be the analysis and advocacy of quite different
policy alternatives.
We have now examined O'Brien's early, largely intuitive, system
boundary definition. It is important that we also look at the system
boundaries as defined by the Quadriad, and the resultant influence on
O'Brien's thinking. The Quadriad mission, as defined by O'Brien, was
relatively broad, yet was focused. It was broad because it provided
an opportunity for a comprehensive, critical examination of the entire
postal system and its problems. At the same time, the mission had at
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least a partial focus because O'Brien had drawn specific attention
to the possibility of converting the POD into a government corporation.
As shown in the Case Study, the Quadriad had some difficulty in
internalizing and operationalizing this somewhat ambiguous mission.
In the early stages, the Quadriad used an almost infinite boundary
delimitaion and attempted to develop an ideal, utopian postal system
in a mythical constraint-free environment. In a later stage, the
Quadriad tentatively employed fairly narrow system boundaries and
searched for possible policy alternatives within the existing system
configuration.
Ndt satisfied with either the utopian or the narrow system ap-
proach, the Quadriad devised a simple yet effective classificatory
scheme which facilitated identification of yet a third set of system
boundaries. The Quadriad began to link together perceived problems
and possible remedies in a loose one-to-one relationship. Each prob-
lem/solution pair was then classified as to whether the authority and
power to accomplish the necessary remedy resided within or without
the POD.
The realization which emerged from this exercise was that most
individual remedies for individual problems necessitated legislative
action and that the POD had little or no control over that action.
This necessitated enlarging the system boundaries so as to include
the Congress. Next there followed an important, but largely subject-
ive, judgement that the list of individual legislative remedies was
so long and so cumbersome as to render it extremely costly (along
many dimensions) to accomplish. It was then reasoned that given
limited resources, the most likely outcome would be that only some
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partial list of remedies could be accomplished before costs exceeded
resources. Again, an important, but subjective, judgment was made
that any partial sub-set of legislative remedies could not and would
not fundamentally change or significantly improve the nature and
operatioon of the postal system.
The foregoing line of reasoning, largely inspired by the Quadriad
member with a legal background, ultimately led to the conclusion that
what was needed was a restructuring of basic institutional relationship
so as to drastically lessen the dependency of the POD on the Congress.
Thus, a consensus finally emerged over a system boundary delimitation
which included major institutional relationships, but focused parti-
cularly the Congressional POD interface.
Given that relatively broad and complex system within which to
search for policy alternatives, the efforts of the Quadriad became
more search-oriented, with system boundaries thereafter accepted as
given. Of course, these various decisions, conclusions, and shifts
of emphasis were not discrete, sequential-events which occurred at
finite points in time. Instead, -there were emergent patterns of be-
havior which were the result of a recursive, dynamic, deliberations
within the Quadriad.
It is of interest to note that the system boundaries originally
tentatively defined by PMS O'Brien on a very intuitive basis were
nearly identical with the boundary definition ultimately arrived at
by the Quadriad as the result of a considerably more analytical pro-
cess. While I do not accept the thesis that O'Brien in any sense
imposed his definition of the system boundaries on the Quadriad, it
is highly probable that, as is described in the Case, some mutual
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influence process became operative near the end of the Quadriad's
operations. This, however, was a complex and subtle relationship
which does not undermine the legitimacy of characterizing the
deliberations and conclusions of the Quadriad as being quite indepen-
dent and analytical. What is particularly important here is the fact
that through somewhat different processes, both O'Brien and the
Quadriad ultimately reached a very similar difinition of the bounda-
ries of the relevant policy system.
The operational effect of the Quadriad's work in this regard
was essentially to confirm O'Brien's early, intuitive "feel" for
the appropriate system boundary delimitation. The work of the Quadriad
resulted in a sophisticated articulation of the nature, scope, and
intensity of the Congressional/POD interface. Similarly, it produced
an elaboration of the main inter-connections among the principal policy
target areas. However, I found no evidence that the Quadriad, in fact,
discovered or even significantly reconceptualized any new relationships
or inter-connections among sub-systems in the postal system, or among
the major policy target areas.
Since the Quadriad Report itself focused primarily on the results
of the efforts of the task-force, most of the richness of the process
was not recorded. The Report does, however, contain at least one
significant indication of the difficulty experienced in resolving the
issue of system boundary delimitation. In an early section which sets
forth a number of the assumptions which limited the scope of the
investigation, the Report states:
"The governing idea was to produce a proposal that would
involve the least'possible dislocation of the nature and
traditions of the Post Office." (p. 1)
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In a leter section entitled, "What Needs to be Done", the Report
states:
"The establishment of an organization that will provide
the services now being rendered by the Post Office De-
partment without its present deficiencies will call for
a departure from postal tradition." (p. 13)
In summary, this portion of the analysis of the Case tends to
confirm the earlier theoretical suggestion that a policymakers's
"definition of the situation" molds his decision as to the boundaries
of the system he will deal with. Furthermore, the case data supports
the notion that the boundary delimitation decision circumscribes the
field of search for policy alternatives, and that the system and is-
sue boundaries set early in the process tend to influence the scope
and direction of latter activities and decisions.
9H. Policy Instruments
The framework suggests that another significant strategic decision
issue is the selection and utilization of policy instruments. For
purposes of this study, policy instruments were earlier defined as
mechanisms which facilitate the transformation of policy strategies
into policy plans and actions. In the Conception and Birth Phase
there were three strategic decisions regarding policy instruments.
These were:
1) the decision to establish the secret task-force (Quadiad).
2) the decision to deliver the public speech proposing postal
reform.
3) the decision to establish tLe Presidential Commission.
Let us examine each of these three strategic decisions individually.
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9H1. The Decision to Establish the Secret Task-Force. Use of the
task-force as a policy instrument is, of course, not a new phenomenon
in AmericanjGovernment.(20) Nathan Glaser has pointed out that the
task-force X)enomenon reflects the fact that there is no other insti-
tution the policymaker can call on that will give him what he needs:
1) fast enough.
2) cheaply enough.
3) with a fresh outlook not tied to existing vested interests.
4) without necessitating any return in terms of publicity.(21)
However, perhaps the most important feature of the task-force mechanism
is that it offers the policymaker the option of accepting, modifying,
or rejecting any resultant task-force proposal(s), with little expendi-
ture of policy resources.
In some circumstances, the policymaker may prefer not to publicize
even the existence of a task-force. This might be true whenever the
policymaker desired to:
1) maintain an open option regarding the initiation of policy.
2) preclude influence from pressure groups.
3) to maintain tight control over an embryonic situation.
Analysis of the case data strongly suggests that several of the
above factors influenced O'Brien's basic decision to establish the
Quadriad, as well as the subsidiary decisions regarding its composition
and mode of operation. For example, in our interview with him, O'Brien
made it quite clear that a central objective of his was to obtain a
fresh and independent look at postal problems and some potential
solutions.(22)
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The task-force mechanism was ideally suited to this purpose.
Especially so, when composed of competent, young, new and trusted ad-
visers who owed no allegiance to the existing order and whose thinking
could be forward-looking, unhampered by the norms and predispositions
of the present organization. The individuals whom O'Brien assigned
to the task-force owed their primary loyalty to him, not to the POD.
Therefore, they were relatively uninfluenced by the internal rewards
and sanctions system of the POD and could afford to be (indeed had to
be, to meet O'Brien's expectations) free and independent thinkers.
Their academic and professional competence compensated for their lack
of experience in postal affairs. This very "lack of experience" left
them open to reconceptualizations of the problem and to search for
innovative solutions.
Similarly, O'Brien's desires to maintain open options, to prevent
the influence of both internal and external special interest groups, and
to personally maintain overall control of a fluid, evolving situation,
were quite effectively met by imposing a mode of total secrecy on the
operations of the Quadriad. The isolation of the Quadriad from all
outside influences as well as from even the rest of the top management
team in the POD allowed the task-force an unusually high degree of
flexibility and freed it from many of the problems often associated
with such advisory groups.
The secrecy also gave O'Brien the option of wholly or partially
ignoring ultimate Quadriad recommendations. Their recommendations
could be modified or rejected without having to pay the political
and other costs usually associated with any such decision, when publicly
made. And perhaps most importantly, the secret mode allowed O'Brien to
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maintain complete control over the evolving policy process. Especially
significant in this case was his total freedom to decide on the method
and timing of any change proposals.
Of course, the virtually total isolation of the Quadriad, while
advantageous for some purposes, was at least potentially costly along
other dimensions. The secrecy mode minimized the degree of learning
feedback the Quadriad could benefit from, and it severely limited
opportunities for meaninful inputs from "outsiders". Thus, the isola-
tion forced the group to rely on a limited pool of resources and to
treat all issues virtually de novo.
In addition, the secret mode of operation had some dysfunctional
consequences in terms of lost opportunities for recruiting support
through participation and education, and it completely eliminated any
opportunity for cooptation of opposition forces. Finally, the secrecy
prevented the Quadriad from testing the validity or feasibility of
either tentative or final conclusions or recommendations through
exposure to any outside judgment.
To some extent, some of the above problems were offseL by the
multi-disciplinary backgrounds of the Quadriad members and by the
inter-disciplinary nature of their deliberations. However, over
time, the Quadriad became more homogeneous and shared group values
and norms emerged.
On balance, O'Brien's decision to utilize a secret task-force
was a strategic choice of a policy instrument quite well suited to
his needs and objectives. While it is doubtful that he was consciously
aware of all of the theoretical and practical ramifications discussed
here, I have concluded from all available data that most of the impor-
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tant aspects were at least intuitively sensed by O'Brien. This, of
course, highlights the potentially important influence of intuition
and trained judgment on the policy formation process.
9H2. The Decision to Deliver the Public Speech. The second strategic
decision regarding a choice of policy instruments was O'Brien's decision
to use a public speech as a "trial balloon" for the postal reform
concept.(23) Clearly, O'Brien perceived the need to test the policy
feasibility of the postal reform concept and a number of alternative
mechanisms were available to do this.- It would not be apprpriate
here to attempt to evaluate the goodness of the alternative chosen
by O'Brien. Rather, we will seek out some of the ramifications of
the particular policy instrument chosen in this instance and examine
the potential strategic importance of such choices in the more general
case.
In the Conception and Birth Phase, O'Brien's choice of a public
speech as a policy instrument had deep implications for the evolving
policy formation process. This choice offered an excellent feasibility
testing forum, one with minimum risk to the prestige and power of the
President. The particular audience (intentionally selected) provided
an opportunity for informed feedback, while simultaneously allowing
wide public exposure to the postalreform concept.
The public speech (as a policy instrument) triggered widespread
press reactions. This created an energy input which sustained the
policy process during the extremely fragile Conception and Birth Phase.
This energic input, in the form of an outpouring of public opinion,
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greatly enhanced the confidence of O'Brien and was instrumental in
his persuading both Califano and President Johnson of the need for
further strategic action. This same burst of energy served to suppress
potential criticism and to delay formation of any opposition coalition.
Thus, while it is completely uncertain what the remifications of
choosing any other policy instrument might have been, it is quite certain
that the particular choice made in the Postal Reform Case resulted in the
release of energy (conceptually analagous to the creation of negative
entrop3 which sustained the policy formation process during perhaps the
most critical phase of its life cycle and facilitated follow-on strategic
decisions which precluded an infant death.
Focusing on the choice of a public speech as a policy instrument
not only helps us to better understand the Postal Reform Case but also
underscores the general strategic importance of choices regarding policy
instruments.
9H3. The Decision to Establish the Presidential Commission. The final
strategic choice of policy instruments in the Conception and Birth Phase
was the Johnson Administration's decision to establish the Presidential
Commission. At this stage of the analysis it would be premature to
attempt to deal with the many ramifications of this important strategic
decision. A great deal of attention will be devoted to this issue in
the analysis of the Crystallization Phase. However, one point worthy
of note here is that the three policy instruments chosen during the!
Conception and Birth Phase were quite complementary with an apparently
cumulative impact. This need not be true in other cases. Too little
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is known about the impact of linkages among multiple policy instruments.
The Case does suggest that the establishment of the Presidential
Commission did several very important things in terms of influence upon
the subsequent development of the policy formation process. As a result
of this decision, the postal reform concept was legitimized and dignified;
sponsorship was implicitly escalated from O'Brien the politicain to the
Johnson Administration. Distinguished citizens publicly agreed that the
idea had high surface validity and was worthy of serious study. The
Commission provided a formal, systematic mechanism for serious, indepen-
dent analysis of O'Brien's proposals, for the search for other alterna-
tives, and an arena in which support and opposition could be voiced.
In any event, there is little doubt that this early strategic decision
regarding a choice of policy instruments had a profound influence upon
subsequent decisions and events. Once again, the general utility of
the examination of strategic choices of policy instruments as an aid to
policy analysis and policy research is strongly suggested by the circum-
stances of the Postal Reform Case.
9I. Policy Feasibility
A major dimension of the conceptual framework is the development
of the concept of policy feasibility. In Chapter Fivepolicy feasibi-
lity was defined in terms of three main components: economic feasibi-
lity; organizational feasibility; and political feasibility. Before
concluding this analysis of the Conception and Birth Phase we will
examine the degree to which the main policy actors attempted to explore
policy feasibility and the impact this had on their decisions and actions.
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911. Exploration of Policy Feasibility by the Quadriad. Although
O'Brien had instructed the Quadriad members not to let political
feasibility considerations constrain their thinking and deliberations,
the Case confirms that, especially in its later stages, the Quadriad
was, in fact, quite sensitive to the feasibility dimension. Tihe
Quadriad Report indicates that one aspect of the task was to deal with
the, "likely success of alternative solutions." Our interviews with
Quadriad members indicate that operationally this meant a consider-
ation of the feasibility of any recommended solutions. Thus it was
that the early consideration of the alternative of transferring the
postal system to private ownership was rejected primarily on the basis
of an assessment of low economic and plitical feasibility. Despite an
apparent sensitivity to the feasibility dimension, the exploration of
policy feasibility appears to have been a highly subjective matter
based primarily upon the intuitive perceptions of the individual actors.
I saw no evidence of any attempt to systematically assess policy feasi-
bility.
Organizational feasibility was not explicitly dealt with, but it
was implicit in one of the key decisions made by the Quadriad. For
example, one member indicated that he did not feel particularly well
qualified to render feasibility judgments and that he deferred to
others on this dimension.(2) However, this same member was the indivi-
dual who argued most strongly for a major change strategy (vice a piece-
meal approach) because he felt that piecemeal legislative relief would
do little or nothing to modify the attitudes and behavioral patterns of
the postal employees and managers who would have to implement whatever
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policy changes were mandated by the Congress.
This Quadriad member advocated both to his colleagues and to
O'Brien a change of strategy which would fundamentally alter the
historical pattern of relationshipa between sub-systems of the postal
system. He argued that only through creation of an autonomous postal
service would postal management achieve the managerial flexibility
to create an organizational system of rewardsand sanctions which would
provide the incentive and mechanism for attitudinal and behavioral
modification within the implementation system.
Other Quadriad members were not unsympathetic to this line of
argument and eventually a consensus evolved in support of this view.
The consensus emerged not only because of the arguments advanced in
favor of the major change strategy, but also because of the concomitant
assessment of the low political and economic feasibility of the incre-
mental change approach. Thus, the Quadriad Report concluded that "the
potential legislative success of the preferred recommendation is not
significantly less than that of any single meaningful change." (25)
The Quadriad was also sensitive to the role of public opinion
as an essential means of molding political feasibility. Thus, the
Report additionally concluded that;
"...the public interest would be captured by a bold, imagin-
ative and timely proposal, thus endowing the total program
with a greater likelihood of Congressional approval than any
single change..."(26)
This sensitivity to the role of public opinion and the general awareness
of policy feasibility evidenced in the work of the Quadriad is probably
best understood in terms of one member's explanation that the Quadriad
was well aware of O'Brien's public image, his special relationship with
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the Congress and with the President. In short, they implicitly recog-
nized that their Report to O'Brien was not so much a vehicle for con-
vincing him as it was a basis for him to deal with other external,
largely political, interests. This was an aspect that was not the
subject of great debate and discussion; it was something the Quadriad
members just "knew."(27)
912. Feasibility Consideraions from O'Brien's Perspective. Given
his reputation and background, it comes as no surprise that O'Brien
was acutely aware of policy feasibility dimensions. Except to the
extent that the establishment of the Quadriad may be considered as
an attempt on O'Brien's part to bring about a systematic exploration
of the policy feasibility of the corporate alternative, his many other
attempts to assess and mold feasibility were largely non-analytical,
intuitive, experience-based judgements on his part.
O'Brien's instructions to the Quadriad not to be constrained by
considerations of political feasibility appear to reflect his serious
intention to encourage the Quadriad to search for new alternatives,
unhampered by the conservative bias usually associated with consider-
ations of political feasibility, as well as by his understandable feel-
ing that he, personally, was much better qualified to assess the
political feasibility of any alternative proposed by the Quadriad.
O'Brien's keen awareness of the feasibility aspects of policy
formation is well demonstrated by his behavior inithe Conception and
Birth Phase. O'Brien's decisions regarding the establishment of the
Quadriad might usefully be interpreted as being at least partially
motivated by a desire on O'Brien's part to have an independent, syste-
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matic assessment of the economic and technical feasibility of the cor-
porate proposal. In addition, O'Brien's memorandum to the President,
his liaison with Califano and Schultze, his planning for the public
speech, and his role in the establishment of the Presidential Commis-
sion, can all be viewed as attempts to assess and mold the political
feasibility of his reform proposals. An important point suggested by
the pattern of O'Brien's actions, as well as by actions of the Quadriad,
is the close inter-relationship between strategic decision-making and
assessments of policy feasibility. Another important factor demonstra-
ted by the Conception and Birth Phase. of the Postal Reform Case is the
important role of public opinion in molding political feasibility. A
final significant point which emerges from this analysis of the Case
is that despite the overall sesitivity to the political (and to a
lesser extent the economic) aspect of policy feasibility, little ex-
plicit attention was paid to the organizational feasibility dimension.
Nonetheless, certain aspects of organizational feasibility appear to
have implicitly influenced the deliberations of the Quadriad. Any
consequences of not having paid more attention to the implications of
organizational feasibility are not likely to become obvious until the
implementation stage.
9J. Policy Actor's Motivations
Policy actors' motivations is included in the framework as a means
of focusing analysis and research attention on this potentially powerful
explanatory variable. Inclusion of this dimension is not intended to
suggest any detailed probing of the psychological and psychiatric deter-
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minants of individual behavior. Instead, this dimension was included
in order to establish a focal point for stimulating examination of the
policy actors' goals, objectives, roles, personal aspirations, competen-
cies, and idiosyncracies which have relevance to the particular policy
formation process under study.
In the Conception and Birth Phase, PMG Lawrence O'Brien was the
dominant policy actor. Therefore, in this section we will examine some
of the more important factors which appear to have influenced O'Brien's
behavior--especially those factors which influenced his strategic deci-
sions.
9J1. Policy Actor Capacity. First, we will want to look at some
dominant personal characteristics of O'Brien the man. O'Brien's descrip-
tion of himself, and the perceptions of him held by others, are remarkably
similar. They suggest a man of action, a master politician, and an indi-
vidual, who, once committed, is very capable of turning total commitment
into dramatic accomplishment. These characteristics are clearly discern-
ible in the following remarks made by O'Brien during our interview:
"I personally--in terms of my personal motivations--did not
want to become involved or become locked into a dead-end job.
And that is somewhat-the light in which I saw the traditional
PMG job, albeit it was a Cabinet level position, etc. But,
given my background and experience, I saw that if things were
to take their normal course, this would not be a particularly
exciting or challenging spot in which to come to rest.
I, too, would attempt to do something more with the job than
the historical expectations of the latest political hack.
I have always done things "whole hog" so to speak. I take
full charge of any particular job and I see it in its broadest
perspective. You might say, of course, that I was influenced
by my previous experience in the White House and my long-term
experience in dealing with Congress on many issues, but, by
nature, I was what might be called a "big picture" man."(28)
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Comapring these characteristics of the man with the historical
nature and scope of the PMG position, tends to suggest that the routine
job of PHM was "too small" for.O'Brien. -Applying the concept of "poliey
actor capacity", we can see that, based upon his competence, prior exper-
ience, and expectations, O'Brien's capacity far exceeded the rbutine
requirements of the position. Viewed from this perspective,. O'Brien's
policy initiatives vis-a-vis postal reform can be understood. s the
behavior of a man trying-to expand the scope and importance of his role
so as to closer fit his immense policy actor capacity.
9J2. Perception of Crisis Syndrome. As noted in the Case, a number of
O'Brien's critics charged that his postal reform policy initiatives were
primarily a crisis-response to serious operational problems in the POD
and a rising chorus of external criticism. Most of these criticisms were
in one way or another related to problems the Johnson Administration was
then having in its attempts to raise both postal wages and postal rates,
or to the so-called Chicago Crisis. The problems connected with the
legislative battle over rates and wages were perennial problems faced
by many of O'Brien's predecessors.- The Chicago Crisis, on the other
hand, was a more personal criticism of O'Brien; one pointed to by many
.as evidence of inept management on O'Brien's part. In reality, it was
a rather complex situation attributable to a number of different "causes".
Our interviews elicited numerous conflicting "explanations" for
the Chicago situation. However, the question of whether that breakdown
was an advance indicator of impending, widespread collapse of the entire
postal system, or whether it was more of a local, sporadic, and isolated
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episode, has never been satisfactorily answered. Despite these dif-
fering "explanations", there was fairly common agreement among those
we interviewed that whatever its cause or significance, the Chicago
Breakdown served to intensify already emerging perceptions of crisis
and to stimulate an awareness of a need for drastic systemic change.
The case data does not convincingly link causally the Chicago
Crisis and O'Brien's reform proposals. Thus, I cannot accept the
rather simplistic notion expressed by several participant observers
that the Chicago Crisis is the single or dominant explanatory variable
to be used in understanding O'Brien's behavior. Nonetheless, analysis
of the case leads me to the conclusion that the Chicago Breakdown
acted as a catalyst to stimulate further articulation of a general
crisis syndrome. The overall perception of this crisis syndrome no
doubt accelerated the timing of some of O'Brien's strategic decisions,
but is not sufficient alone to explain O'Brien's general pattern of
behavior regarding the postal reform policy initiatives.
9J3. Images of Political Utilities. Both friend and critic alike have
supported O'Brien's reputation as a master politician. Therefore, to
omit potential political gain as a possibly significant motivation
would be quite naive. Although the term "master politician" lacks any
precise definition, there was little doubt that it was meant to include
a capacity for recognizing opportunities for action. This is not to
suggest simple opportunism in the sense of ecploitation of a situation
for short-term political gain. Rather, it is meant to connote a
capacity to recognize, long before others did, that unfolding environ-
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mental forces were creating an opportunity to accomplish something
perceived to be worthwhile.
There is no doubt in my mind that O'Brien sincerely believed that
postal reform was a "good government" cause which would result in
widespread benefits to the United States. Beyond this, however, I
feel that O'Brien clearly perceived that postal reform was not intrin-
sically a partisan issue--it was one which could well fit the ideolog-
ical orientation of either political party. Therefore, O'Brien was
astute enough to realize that the policy initiative could as well come
from a Republican as from a Democratic- Administration. Timing of the
policy initiative thus became a critical motivating factor. O'Brien
vividly perceived that timely action was necessary if any political
credit was to be gained by the Democratic Party. This is well reflected
in his previously cited memorandum to President Johnson in which he
wrote:
"Thus I believe my suggestion that the department be removed
from the Cabinet and recast as an independent, public cor-
poration is right in logic, but it is also right politically.
It will pull the rug out from under the Republican critics,
for I am convinced from discreet soundings in Congress that
unless we take the initiative, the initiative will be taken
from us."
I conclude, therefore, that O'Brien's image of the potential
political utility of the postal reform proposal for the Democratic
Administration then in power was a significant motivating factor. How-
ever, there is no intent here to impute any pejorative implication to
such "political" motivation. Political here means a capacity for
sensing an opportunity to accomplish something perceived as being
worthwhile. This, of course, includes a desire to have the Democratic
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Administration claim credit for a presumably noteworthy accomplishment.
In essence, O'Brien's "selling points" to President Johnson were:
Postal reform should be done, it can be done, and it will be done by
somebody else if we (the Democrats) don't seize the opportunity to act.
9J4. Managerial Control. Some of the policy actors we interviewed
felt that O'Brien's main motivation was to achieve (or to re-establish)
a higher degree of managerial control over the vast postal system.(29)
This had particular reference to the historical relationships existing
between the POD and "outside" agencies such as the Congress, the Budget
Bureau, the General Accounting Office,and the Civil Service Commission.
There is no doubt that the governmental bureaucratic structure which
had evolved over many years allowed (and in some cases encouraged) a
high degree of fragmentation and diffusion in the actual management
control of postal affairs. From an operational perspective, this
highly fragmented control structure unquestionably added immensely to
the numerous frustrations which plagued PMG O'Brien (and most of his
predecessors).
Thus, there is little doubt but that a quest for a greater degree
of managerial autonomy and flexibility was one of the operational goals
of the postal reform proposal. However, this factor was a secondary
rather than primary motivator of O'Brien's behavior. O'Brien had no
wish to be a lifetime PMG; indeed, in his famous speech, he precluded
(30)
any possible personal role for himself in any future postal corporation.
But, perhaps more important is the fact that O'Brien knew that postal
reform could not command White House and public attention if the central
issue was "merely" a drive to increase the managerial flixibility of
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the PMG. From this perspective, the "no control" argument was a
second-level motivating factor and emphasis of it was a tactic to
enlist the support of businessmen who traditionally have prided them-
selves on protection of their managerial rights and prerogatives.
In summary, the dimension of policy actors' motivations seems to
be a very useful one for gaining insight into the actual operation of
a complex policy formation process. In the particular case, there is
no doubt that O'Brien was the dominant policy actor in the Conception
and Birth Phase. His policy-initiation behavior and his several stra-
tegic. decisions can be better understood through a network of over-
lapping motivational factors than it can be if one searches for some
single or dominant causal variable. It would be futile, naive, and
unrealistic to point to a single variable as the determinant of O'Brien's
complex behavior patterns. At best, we can obtain some potential
explanatory insight by examining.the mosaic of variables suggested here.
Of the several we have examined in this section, the dimension of
O'Brien's "capacity" as a policy actor is perhaps the most important
explanatory variable. However, the most meaningful explanation arises
out of the composite and cumulative impact of the several variables
which have been highlighted here.
9K. Summary and Conclusions
This section will highlight only the major points from this
extensive analysis which bear directly on the framework dimensions
concerned with policy strategies. First the experience gained in
applying the framework will be evaluated and then we will examine the
overall contribution to the policy formation process of the Quadriad
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effort and of O'Brien's role. The policy complications of the stra-
tegic decisions made regarding the scope and intensity of change will
also be reviewed.
9K1. Application of the Framework. We have applied the conceptual
framework for analysis to the Conception and Birth Phase of the Postal
Reform Case in considerable detail. In general, the framework has
proven to be quite useful in facilitating understanding of the oper-
ation of the policy formation process. This application demonstrated
the existence of a high degree of mutual influence among the major
dimensions of the framework. Thus, through application of these some-
times overlapping, multiple dimensions to the same body of data, we
obtained a significant measure of cross-validation of our interpreta-
tions and conclusions. The individual dimensions of the framework
appear to be quite useful in terms of focusing attention of those
aspects of a complex process which may prove to be the most productive
of insight into the nature and operation of that process.
9K2. Quadriad Contribution. This analysis has shown that the main
contribution of the Quadriad lie in its analytical validation of
O'Brien's largely intuitive Gestalt feelings as to the broad nature
of the problem and the general direction of possible solutions. The
Quadriad did not create any innovative breakthroughs in problem formu-
lation or solution generation. Rather, it served to validate, crystal-
lize, and elaborate already existing thoughts and to transform these
intuitive notions into a more operational policy plan through the
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creation of a concept package for postal reform. The analytical
work of the Quadriad served to increase O'Brien's confidence in
the feasibility of the reform proposals. Their effort also served to
enhance the external credibility of O'Brien's reconmmendations, and
to neutralize the stigma of "politics" which would apply to almost
any policy proposal advanced by a central political figure.
9K3. O'Brien's Role and Contribution. Diesing has suggested that
the possibilities of change are a combination of two variables,
"introducibility" and "acceptability".(31 ) O'Brien's multiple role
contribution to the Conception and Birth Phase was one of increasing
the possibilities of change by operating on these two variables.
O'Brien's change-agent role precisely fits Diesing's observation that
"a change is introducible if a role exists from which it can be intro-
duced and a person with sufficient skill to take the role is avail-
able." (32) In terms of acceptability, O'Brien's contribution lie
in his perception of the possibilities of opening the system to change
through application of a shock strategy. Furthermore, he coupled
introducibility and acceptability by "articulating options beyond
the realm of current practice, possible for use now,"(33) and by at
least tentative consensus-building and feasibility-enhancing action.
Viewed from another perspective, O'Brien's reform proposal was,
in essence, a restatement of earlier ideas, now articulated in an
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appealing language and set in a coherent and integrated framework.*
Utilizing the Quadriad output and his own political skills, O'Brien
(34)
fashioned and dramatically presented an "actionable policy package",
thus moving beyond the stage of mere suggestions, however innovative.
O'Brien's multiple roles lent political credibility to the reform idea.
Until O'Brien took the case, postal reform was considered to be politi-
cally untouchable.
O'Brien's behavior during this phase also demonstrated the impor-
tant role of individual variables in shaping the policy formation
process. O'Brien's personal motivation, commitment, intuition,
trained experience, overall Gestalt feel, and political judgment were
all critical in molding his policy-initiation behavior. This suggests
that extra-rational, heuristic processes may be an influential element
of the total policy formation process.
9K4. Scope and Intensity of Change. Possibly the most significant
strategic decision made furing the Conception and Birth Phase was
the definition by both the Quadriad and O'Brien of the scope and
intensity of change. An explicit decision was made by O'Brien to
utilize a radical vice incremental (or piecemeal) change strategy.
*This is a good demonstration of Richard Scammon's recent description
of national policymaking in America:
"...There really aren't any new solutions. There are modi-
fications and adjustments. Most good ideas have already been
thought of. You don't really come in...with a totally new
concept. You improve this, polish up that. You take a plan
that was discarded four years ago, and you pull it out and
look at it. And, maybe, you salvage points one, eleven, and
twenty-nine."(35)
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This critical decision was influenced by many factors, but O'Brien's
personal motivation and predeliction for major, dramatic moves, and
the Quadriad's conclusion that radical change would be no more (and
possibly less) costly than incremental change, were very important
determinants.
O'Brien's strategic preference for radical change, and the ration-
ale supporting it, tend to challenge existing theories about this
fundamental strategic choice, and especially the theories of incre-
mentalism expounded by Charles Lindblom. This Case suggests that
there may be circumstances under which policymakers do intentionally
choose the radical change strategy and where the theory of incremen-
talism is inadequate both descriptively and prescriptively.
9K5. Policy Implications. Overall then, we have seen that during the
Conception and Birth Phase, the policy process was energized by O'Brien's
policy initiatives which grew out of the analytical validation and
elaboration of opportunistically orientedintuition-based thinking
on the part of a skillful individual who was willing and able to "take"
a role which facilitated change introducibility and acceptability.
Analysis of this Phase also demonstrated the explicit choice of a
radical change stratedgy (vice an incremental strategy) and suggested
the high leverage of such a strategic decision in terms of its influence
on the nature and direction of the ensuing policy formation process.
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II
Chapter Ten
Selective Analysis of the Crystallization Phase
10 A. Introduction and Overview
The analysis of the Crystallization Phase of the Postal Reform
Case will generally follow the major dimensions of the conceptual
framework. However, in the interest of brevity, this and subsequent
portions of the analysis will be somewhat less detailed than was the
analysis of the Conception and Birth Phase. In this chapter, the
emphasis will be on those broad aspects of this Phase of the Case
which-have major implications in terms of the strategic dimensions of
the policy formation process.
The analysis will begin with an examination of the several
Strategy Types relevant to the behavior of the policy system. Next
the most important of the Strategic Decision Issues included in the
framework will be examined. A major focus will be on the decisions
of the Kappel Commission regarding the Scope and Intensity of Change.
Finally, the strategic implications of behavior related to the
exploration and molding of policy feasibility will be scrutinized.
10 B. Strategy Types
The framework suggests attention to three main sets of strategy
types: 1) Comprehensive vs. Narrow Focused Strategies; 2) Dis-
equilibrium vs. Balanced Strategies; and 3) Identical vs. Mixed
Strategies. This chapter will briefly examine these three strategy
sets within the context of the Crystallization Phase of the Postal
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Reform Case. During this Phase, the operation of the Kappel Commission
was the dominant activity influencing the policy formation process.
10 B1. Comprehensive Vs. Narrow-Focused Strategies. This strategic
dimension deals with the degree to which policy action will be focused
on a broad range of policy components or only on a few, or even on
a single component. As already pointed out in Chapter Three, "more
comprehensive" does not necessarily mean "more important" or "more
significant", because of the possibility of achieving critical mass
thresholds by focusing scarce policy formulation resources on only a
few strategic controlling variables.
Analysis of the deliberations of the Kappel Commission according
to the explicit and implicit strategies involved suggests that the
nzrmission utilized the comprehensive strategy regarding the analytical
phases of its work, while applying a more narrow, focused strategy
in its decisional processes, especially regarding the scope and
intensity of change and the choice of policy alternatives. The Commi-
ssion strategy regarding its analytical efforts was clearly a comp-
rehensive one, as was stressed in the definition of the mission of
analysis to be performed by the general contractor. This definition
included, inter alia, the analysis:
"...of all activites within the Postal Establishment
and all external considerations which significantly
affect Postal Operations..." (1)
While recognizing that it would be wasteful to delve into trivial
matters or attempts to be overly precise in lower level operational
problems, the Commission did recognize that it also needed a body of
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reference information larger than that needed for decision-making
purposes:
"...in order to be able to successfully meet the
arguments that are certain to be raised in public
debate by the numerous interest groups that will be
affected regardless of what the final recommendation
may be." (2)
In its basic decisional processes regarding the scope and
intensity of change and regarding a choice of policy alternatives,
the Commission finally adopted a rather narrow, focused strategy.
This means that the Commission decided to have the main line of
inquiry deal with a relatively narrow range of policy variables which
were considered to be critical by the Commissioners and the Staff.
The Commission strategy to emphasize structural variables as the
controlling variables for achieving a critical mass threshold for
opening the system to a future set of changes is explicitly stated
in a position paper presented by the Executive Director:
"The transfer to a governmental corporation will serve
as a vehicle accomplishing a series of reforms: replace-
ment of Civil Service by a modern system tailored to
postal needs; elimination of the inflexible and
special-interest oriented rate-setting process now used;
creation of a capital investment fund augmented by
broad financing and an operating account funded directly
by revenue, etc.." (3)
Careful examination of the Commission Report and our interview
data reveals that the corporation approach was primarily a vehicle
for overall system reorientation and the accomplishment of changes
in structure, decision-making modes, personnel and organizational
climate, etc. Rather than attempting to deal with particular
decisional issues (such as rate-making or labor-management relations).
the Commission chose to focus on structural variables. The objective
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was to create a decision structure within which the new management
would have the flexibility and authority to deal with discrete policies.
Thus, the Commission was well aware of the distinction drawn in the
early definition of policy (see Chapter Two) between decision-making
and policy-making. Thus, I conclude that adoption of the corporate
approach was perceived by the Commissioners and the Staff as a mechan-
ism for achieving a critical mass which would facilitate ultimate
system change.
10 B2. Disequilibrium vs. Balanced Strategies. Disequilibrium
strategies are seldom used because of the risks and costs involved.
When the main aim is to "shock the system" and open it to change,
rather than carefully controlling the direction of change in policy,
the disequilibrium strategy appears to be more appropriate. One
of the potential advantages of recommending changing the structure
of the Post Office into a governmental corporation lies not in the
likely results of those changes themselves, but rather in the shock
that has thereby been dealt to the postal system. Such a shock may
result in movement of the entire system out of its routine behavioral
patterns. Once so moved, it may not return to its original immutable
position, thus, at least potentially opening up the prospect for other
more important changes which were not feasible before the former
system equilibrium had been disrupted through the application of
sufficient shock power.
Although it is not clear that such a strategy was explicitly
considered by O'Brien , the Quadriad, and the Kappel Commission,
C4
283
there are strong indications which suggest that this was one of the
hidden objectives implicit in the Quadriad and the Commission recom-
mendations. O'Brien , the Quadriad, and the Kappel Commission saw
the corporation idea as a vehicle to shock the system, to bring about
a dramatic break with the past, and to open it to a set of syner-
getically related future changes in decisional and operating modes
(such as personnel, financing, rate-making, etc.). (4) Of major
theoretical significance here is the fact that intentions behind
behavioral actions in the policy formation process are rarely explicit.
A policymaker does not start his day by saying, "today I will take
certain actions which will shock the policy system and open it to
change." However, he may nonetheless take such actions, partly
intuitively, partly implicitly , and partly unknowingly. The value
of the conceptual framework is to focus policy analysis in a manner
which results in probing beneath surface "explanations" of policy
behavior, by searching for intentions, motivations, and objectives
not fully recognized by the policy actor himself. Frequently, such
(individual and institutional) behavior can only be understood
when it is contextualized and viewed from a holistic perspective which
is sensitive to linkages and inter-connections between various
strategic sub-decisions.
10 B3. Identical Vs. Mixed Strategies. As noted in the earlier
theoretical discussion of policy strategies (see Chapter Three),
strategy decisions may be monolithic or tailored to specific policy
areas. As noted above, the Commission did, to a minor degree, employ
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mixed strategies by using a comprehensive strategy in respect to
its analytical approach; a more focused-narrow strategy in regards
to its basic decisional processes; and a disequilibrium (shock)
strategy at the system level (explicitly or implicitly) in terms of
policy alternative selection. However, in the broadest perspective,
the overall patterns of behavior of the Commission reflect a tendency
towards use of identical strategies ( i.e., radical change). I
found no strong evidence to indicate explicit consideration by the
Commission of the potential benefits to be realized from pursuing
mixed strategies vis-a-vis different policy target areas.
10 C. The Decision to Make a Policy Decision
In the preceeding analysis of the Conception and Birth Phase
(see Chapter Nine), we noted that the strategic issue of the
"decision-to-make-a-policy-decision" was resolved in favor of not
making a decision. At least, a decision was made not to have
President Johnson publicly support PMG O'Brien's postal reform pro-
posals. Instead, the issue was hedged by substituting a subsidiary
sub-decision to create the Presidential Commission. This action
served to keep the reform idea alive, to capitalize on momentum
built up by the reaction to O'Brien's speech, and to raise the level
of implicit sponsorship from the PMG to the President of the United
States, while carefully leaving the White House open options regar-
ding policy initiation.
As the Case indicates, most of the Crystallization Phase was
dominated by the activity of the Kappel Commission which worked from
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April 1967 to June, 1968. During this time, there was no real
necessity for the policy system to directly deal with the strategic
dimension of a decision-to-make-a-policy-decision, and this was beyond
the scope of the mission of the Kappel Commission.
When the formal Commission Report was delivered to President
Johnson, his public response was non-committal. He directed that the
Budget Bureau and the new PMG review the Report and deliver their
recommendations to him. Thus, once again, the decision-to-make-a-
policy-decision was finessed and an extremely important "non-decision"
began to have its impact on the policy formation process.
Another important background factor discussed in the Case is
PMG O'Brien's resignation from president Johnson's Cabinet in April
of 1968, just a few months before the formal issuance of the Kappel
Commission's Report. As the Case demonstrates, O'Brien's successor,
Marvin Watson, was a close personal advisor to President Johnson and
had served in that capacity even when O'Brien was appointed to PMG.
Upon taking over the POD, Watson (for reasons explored later) chose
to oppose the postal refrom concept, at least in regards to the
structural alternative suggested by O'Brien and subsequently advo-
cated by the Kappel Report. Watson undertook an extended study of
the Kappel Report but meanwhile made public statements against its
central recommendations and indicated a strong personal preference
for a program of facilities modernization vice system redesign.
During this period , Watson remained a close confidant of the
President's, while O'Brien had left the policy stage, so to speak,
and had entered private life. During our interview with him,
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O'Brien ruefully recalled this period in the following words:
"...my leaving (resulted) in a sort of wearing away of
the momentum and focus and the drama of the things which
had been built up to that point in time. My successor
in office certainly did not share my or Califano's enthu-
siasm for postal reform. .. Watson's lack of enthusiasm for
the whole program certainly dampened the President's
ardor for the whole package."
"Well, the key moment, of course, and the key issue
which would decide the fate of things was the moment
that the Kappel Report was issued , and the question
of Presidential reaction had to be faced up to. Be-
cause of my contacts with Califano, I was aware that
President Johnson was cool* at best to the recommen-
dations of the Kappel Report. This would not have
happened had I continued to serve as PMG and kept alive
our original program..." (5)
In applying the framework to President Johnson's decision not
to make a decision regarding the main recommendations of the Kappel
Report, it would be helpful to probe behind the surface "reasons"
for Johnson's behavior. This is an extremely difficult task in any
situation, but obviously all the more so in the case of the Presi-
dent of the United States. Nonetheless, based on the case data and
supporting interviews with key policy actors, I have identified the
following three main explanatory clusters of variables regarding this
crucial "non-decision" on the part of President Johnson;
1) Watson's strong opposition to the essence of the Kappel
Report recommendations; namely, the creation of a governmental cor-
poration and removal of the PMG from the Cabinet. After O'Brien
left the Post Office, Califano was the only strong advocate for the
postal reform idea left within the White House inner-circle. He
* This is at odds with Mr. Kappel's comments during our interview to
the effect that President Johnson was pleased with the Report and
wanted its recommendations implemented.
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faced not only public opposition from the new PMG, but also the
existence of a very close working and personal relationship between
Watson and the President. Following this explanation, Watson's lack
of enthusiasm for the reform program recommended by the Kappel
Commission dampened the President's enthusiasm for the whole'package.
2) President Johnson's oversensitivity to potential negative
Congressional reaction. His long service in the Senate leadership
made Lyndon Johnson especially sensitive to the anticipated Congres-
sional reaction. As Seidman notes in his recent book:
"President Johnson saw the outside world through the
eyes of Congress, particularily the Senate. Congres-
sional reaction on major issues was for him the most
accurate and reliable expression of the national will.
As a result, his sensitivity to evolving trends in
public opinion and national concern was markedly
reduced..." (6)
"In essence, the Johnson system was a network of
loyal henchmen (who could be counted on to furnish
timely information and help when needed), bilateral
negotiation, and meticulous head counts before
action. You moved when you had the votes -- and
not before." (7)
Watson, in his interview with us, expressed the view that he, and
according to his best knowledge President Johnson, saw at that time
a very low possibility of getting a postal reform package through the
Congress. They judged the Kappel reform recommendations as having an
extremely low political feasibility.
3) The third potential explanation lies in Califano's justifica-
tion of the President's "non-committal" comment on the Report. Cal-
ifano said:
"The President expects the report to be examined on
the basis of what is right since it can't possibly
come before the Congress this year. The President can
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"decide later whether it would be wise or helpful
for him to take a stand," (8)
In addition to the above factors, it seems to us that to
explain President Johnson's decision "not-to-decide" we must look
further into his personal mode of operation. Johnson's management
strategy was based on the assumption that the Executive Branch would
work within a policy consensus which the President expected his insti-
tutional staff to develop. This strategy often found the President
witholding his own view until a consensus had developed.(9) Watson's
strong opposition to the Kappel recommendations and the disappear-
ance of reform proponents from the White House and Post Office scene
made development of consensus on the Postal Reform issue a virtually
impossible task, even with Califano's personal sympathies. There is
common agreement that President Johnson's decision "not-to-decide"
considerably weakened the reform case, and that his last-moment
public endorsement was not enough to break the resistance to the
reform idea which had by then begun to coalesce. Once again, the
important mutual relationship between time and other strategic deci-
sions becomes clearer.
10 Cl. Watson's Motivation. Given his background as a successful
Texas steel executive, one might have expected PMG Marvin Watson to
highly favor proposals for applying a business orientation to the POD,
as recommended by the Kappel Commission. Because he behaved contrary
to these expectations, we are left with the question of why he so
stongly opposed the reform idea and why he changed his mind at the
very end of the Johnson Administration. Several potential answers to
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these questions have been suggested:
1) One sort of explanation attributes Watson's opposition to the
Kappel Report to a lack of broad political vision. According to
this view he decided relatively very quickly that the Congress was
not in any mood to embrace the Kappel recommendations and, therefore,
he viewed the reform proposal, as recommended by the Commission, as
quite unrealistic ( 0 ) This explanation attempts to portray Watson
as a political realist, as opposed to a reformer type of personality
(e.g., O'Brien or Blount). Setting aside the evaluative comments
about Watson's political vision, this explanation seems to have some
empirical basis, at least by reflecting clearly his argumentation
against the reform proposal (1")but it is my impression that this
cannot by itself provide a full explanation of Watson's behavior.
2) A second explanation suggests that Watson truly believed that
postal reform could be accomplished by more incremental changes,
mainly by a comprehensive modernization plan within the existing
Departmental structure. According to this explanation, Watson
simply did not see any magic in the corporate form and also opposed
complete removal of the Postal Service from Congressional control.
This approach is consistent with his public statements (12) and
with the results of an examination of the POD internal material
related to the Watson Task Force study of the Kappel Report.(13)
The main problem with this explanation lies in the fact that it was
suggested only by Watson himself and by his close aides. Most of the
other policy actors involved in this Phase suggested quite different
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motivational variables.
3) The third explanation suggested was that Watson rejected the
reform proposal for strictly personal reasons; namely, a strong
desire to maintain his position in the President's Cabinet and a
strong ambition to map the Departmental future in terms of a long-
range "Watson (modernization) Plan," (14) not an O'Brien or Kappel
Plan. This explanation was suggested by sources closely involved
in the internal workings of the White House during the Johnson
Administration. In our interview with Watson, he strongly denied
any such motivations, arguing that he really preferred a moderniza-
tion plan on a purely pragmatic basis. Furthermore, the explanation
regarding his desire to keep his position in the Cabinet is a prob-
lematic one because when Watson became PMG (4/29/68) , President
Johnson's decision not to run for re-election was already public
knowledge. Thus, Watson was really in an admirable position to
advance the cause of removing the PMG from the Cabinet, because he
knew that he was going out of office on January 28th with the end of
the Johnson Administration. The fact that he did not use this
option may suggest that other important reasons were motivating him.
Therefore, it seems to me that the explanation provided by Watson
himself is the most plausible of the several we have explored.
Watson's last minute strong endorsement of the Kappel recommen-
dations can hardly be characterized as his own initiative, On the
contrary, the endorsement came only after a critical White House
session during which Califano and to a lesser extent, BOB Director
Zwick were successful in getting President Johnson to over-rule
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Watson's opposition . As a result of this White House session, the
outgoing Administration did, belatedly, publicly endorse the central
recommendations of the Kappel Commission. This accounts for the brief,
but favorable, comments about postal reform contained in President
Johnson's final State-of-the-Union Message. Although Watson joined
the President in this last minute endorsement, there seems to be
little doubt that his "change of heart" did not reflect any deep-
seated support for postal reform. Rather, it is most likely that
Watson was acting out of loyalty to President Johnson.
Despite the fact that there were many differing opinions regarding
Watson's motivation among the policymakers we interviewed, there was
near unanimous agreement that his early and strong opposition to the
reform idea is an important reason why postal reform was near
infant death at the close of the Johnson Administration.
In summary, the above analysis suggests that personalities play
an often significant and very decisive roles in policy formation,
and that policy decisions may often depend on idiosyncratic and person-
al as well as situational variables. In addition, it has highlighted
the critical importance of the decision-to-make-a-decision, even when
it is made only implicitly, or, as in the Postal Reform Case, is
not made at all. This tends to confirm the value of examining the
circumstances surrounding such a decision ( or non-decision) as an
heuristic aid to understanding the policy formation process.
10 D. Time Preferences
The problem of the target time, i.e., when the policy actors wish
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the main results of policy decisions to be produced, and the timing
of discrete policy-making actions have both been suggested in the
framework as another important strategy dimension which may shape
the overall policy formation process and the nature of the policy
alternatives selected. Time, as a strategy dimension, includes both
present decisions on action in the future (the planning mode of policy
formation), thus establishing target times for achievement of policy
outputs; and decisions on the timing of the policy formation process
itself.
In terms of the target time when the main results of the policy
are to be produced, the Commission Report used tentative language;
"several years." (15) In the Memorandum forwarding the Report to
the President, a more operational definition was made and a time span
of 4 - 7 years was indicated. (16) This target time referred to
the achievement of a self-supporting postal system. The Commission
pointed out carefully that adoption of its recommendations "will
produce no overnight miracles" (17) and stressed that postal improve-
ment would be a long endeavor.
In this context, the Commission strategy was directed more
toward building capabilities for the future than towards achieving
fast results in a short time period. In terms of the timing of the
policy itself, the Commission strategy was for rapid system redesign.
This strategy had considerable impact on the overall Commission
decision-making process and on the nature of the alternative selected
for action by the policy system.
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10 D1. The Private Enterprise Alternative. Thus, the alternative to
transfer the entire operation of the Post Office into private enter-
prise was discarded mainly because of the time preference factor.
Commission deliberations reveal clearly that at least some of the
Commissioners saw privately-owned and regulated enterprise as the
optimal solution , but that such a solution at that time was considered
infeasible in the forseeable future. (18)
Although the Commission Report used very tentative language to
indicate that in the future there remained the possibility of pri-
vate ownership, the internal deliberations of the Commission showed
more precisely the Commission views and the impact of the time
preferences. In his comments on one of the Report drafts, Mr.
Kappel stated:
"The extensive discussion of the governmental corpor-
ation in the report gives the misleading impression
that the Commission thinks they are the greatest thing
that ever happened.....this is the closest that govern-
ment can come to the private business at this time." (19)
(emphasis added)
This comment makes clear that the feasibility consideration within
relatively rigid time constraints had an important impact on the nature
of the alternative adopted.
This decision was reached in the light of detailed analysis which
came to the conclusion that "conversion of the Post Office into a
private-owned corporation at this time appears to be outside the realm
of possibility." (20) This is a very important point because it
highlights the interrelation between the strategic decisions and
policy analysis, in the sense that input from analysis led to a re-
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evaluation of what had been perceived as a "second best" solution of
the time preference factor.
10 D2. Incremental Change. Time preference considerations consti-
tuted an important (but not the only) factor in the decision to
reject the incremental change strategy. There was a fear that if
the incremental strategy was adopted:
"It would be impossible a year or two later to
resurrect the issue and move on to the next incre-
ment. Public and other interests would be waned--
the dramatic element would be lost and getting on
with the next step of the reform at a later date
just would never happen." (21)
The above definition of the situation, given by one of the actors
involved, is supported by other interviews and suggests that in
certain circumstances external variables, e.g., crisis, political
feasibility, etc., often may establish rigid time constraints which
may have an important impact on the nature of the strategy adopted.
10 D3. Time for Analysis. From a broader perspective, time to do
analysis is a most critical factor here. Had the perception of
crisis or O'Brien's strong desire for rapid action prevailed, the
very existence of the Commission would have been in jeopardy. As
noted elsewhere, O'Brien would have preferred more rapid action and
only somewhat reluctantly agreed to the creation of the Presidential
Commission with an extended life. (22) As it turned out, the
Commission was hard-pressed to complete its task and its life had
to be extended. What is important here from a strategic point of
I
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view is the mutual influence between time preferences, strategy, and
analysis.
10 E. System and Issue Boundary Delimitation
The conceptual framework suggests some value in examining the
setting and awareness of system and issue boundary delimitation. Let
us now focus on such in examination relative to the Crystallization
Phase.
10 El. The Formal Mission of the Commission. The Executive Order
which established the Presidential Commission constituted a formal
delimitation of the issue and system boundaries. However, the mission
definition included therein is stated in such a broad context that
the Commission enjoyed considerable flexibility in operationalizing
its mission. This freedom enabled the Commission to extend its
system boundaries to encompass additional issues and institutional
relationships as its investigation proceeded.
10 E2. Commissioner's Perceptions. There is no doubt that the
Commissioners perceived their mission in considerably broader terms
than "merely" the evaluation of PMG O'Brien's proposal. This point
is well substantiated in the Commission's own records in which a
broad range of potential issues was identified for possible explor-
ation. (23) Furthermore, the records of the internal deliberations
of the Commission, the Commission's own actions, and our interview
data, all confirm that the Commission began its work with a broad,
.:
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flexible charter which in no way constrained its future operations.
On numerous occasions, the Commission took pains to stress its
broad mission and its independence. For example, Chairman Kappel
stated:
"You can see that the Commission is charged with
doing much more than simply study the possible
transfer of the Post Office to a government cor-
poration." (24)
In addition, during our interview with him, Mr. Kappel emphasized
that before he accepted the Chairmanship of the Commission, he had
a clear understanding with President Johnson as to the broad scope
of the mission of the Commission and its independence. Furthermore,
Kappel told us that his objective for the Commission was "to deter-
mine how to bring about the most efficient/effective postal service--
and to leave the politics to the politicians." (25)
10 E2-1. PMG O'Brien's Input. From a different perspective, this
same theme was echoed in a confidential memo sent by PMG O'Brien to
the President and to members of the Cabinet, in which O'Brien
summarized his initial briefing of the Kappel Commission, made at
Mr. Kappel's request. The PMG stated in his memo:
"In my opening statement to the Commission, I
emphasized that my proposal for converting the
postal service to a government corporation, pre-
sented before the Magazine Publishers Association
on April 3, was my personal view and that the
Commission was directed by the President to look
into any and all proposals to provide superlative
mail service." (26)
During the briefing mentioned above, PMG O'Brien's presentation
identified the following as basic problems confronting the postal
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The above list of alternatives, which in itself is quite all-
encompassing, implicitly suggested several structural arrangements
as the "universe of alternatives" facing the Commission. (30)
10 E2-2.. Input From the Conception and Birth Phase. The preceeding
discussion may erroneously suggest that the Commission's "definition
of the situation" was formed without influence from the earlier work
of the Quadriad and the resultant reform proposals made by PMG
O'Brien. Although the Case demonstrates overt efforts on the part of
both O'Brien and the Commission to portray a formal "arm's length"
relationship, it would be naive to assume that the O'Brien proposals
did not affect the Commission's deliberations. It should be remembered
that individuals from the POD, Budget Bureau, and White House who
were staunch supporters of O'Brien's reform proposal were instrumen-
tal in drafting the mission statement for the Presidentail Commission.
That statement, and even the title of the Commission itself, strongly
suggest a concern with structural considerations. Thus, the Commission
was not starting out in a "tabula rasa" state.
Not only did POD officials cooperate fully with the Commission ,
but in several important instances, individuals sympathetic to
O'Brien's ideas provided important policy-shaping inputs to the
Commission. (31) Furthermore, several pro-reform individuals
occupied key roles insofar as being in a position to influence the
boundary setting as well as other deliberations which took place.
For example, the person serving as official POD liaison to the Com-
mission was a former member of the Quadriad, (3) and other Quadriad
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system: (27)
1. Funding Pressure-Problems relating to continual
deficit.
2. Employee-Employer Relations-General lack of flexi-
bility,
3. Legislation-Restrictions imposed by Congress,
4. Congressional Pressure-Relating to rates, personnel, etc.
5. Lack of Management Continuity-Political influences on
key staffing decisions.
In addition, in a personal twelve-page memorandum for Mr. Kappel,
PMG O'Brien outlined a wide-ranging array of specific issues which
he indicated were for Kappel's information and the possible use of
the Commission "in approaching the problem of how the management
and organization of the Post Office might be made more effective than
(28)it is today." Many of these issues were later considered by
Arthur D. Little, Inc., the contractor hired to provide general
management consultant services to the Commission. The first real
focus to the extremely "open" system boundary delimitation of the
Commission is suggested in the initial thinking of the contractor
which envisioned the following seven organizational alternatives
for the POD. (29)
1. A service department like the Pentagon.
2. A cabinet department as presently organized.
3. A public corporation.
4. A regulated utility.
5. A semi-private corporation like COMSAT.
6. A private corporation.
7. A regional licensed corporation.
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members provided significant inputs to the Commission. The Assis-
tant Executive Director of the Commission was formerly a highly-
placed POD employee known to be sympathetic to the reform mevement.(33)
Another Commission staff member was the BOB analyst who had, a few
months prior to joining the Commission, prepared an independent
analysis of the POD which led him to conclusions paralleling those of
the Quadriad. (34)
None of these facts are pointed out to impugn the motives or
integrity of any of these individuals. Rather, they are highlighted
to demonstrate that subtle influences sympathetic to the O'Brien
proposals were persistently present and could not be ignored by the
Commission, despite its attempts to publicly emphasize its indepen-
dence. It should be remembered that the output of the Conception and
Birth Phase was not simply the identification of a problem, but more
importantly, was the strong advocacy of a particular problem formu-
lation and a particular policy alternative. Thus, the existence of
the "policy package" formulated by O'Brien was an environmental fact
the Commission could not ignore.
10 E2-3. The Extended Search for Focus. Nonetheless, operationally,
the Commission did not really reduce its broad system and issue
boundaries until about January 1968. At a mid-December 1967 Commission
meeting the Commissioners directed that the staff prepare a series
of briefing papers on a still broad range of topics, including organi-
zational structure, labor-management relations, rates, finances,
and a series of miscellaneous topics (including the issues of
300
monopoly, tax status, and the economic value of the POD to the
economy as a whole). (35) The preparation and subsequent discussion
of these "Issue Papers" ultimately led to a more focused "definition
of the situation" during the early part of 1968.
10 E2-4. The Implicit Focus on Structure. However, there is evi-
dence to suggest that by late 1967, an intuitive, implicit feeling
was emerging among the Commission members that the fundamental
problem plaguing the POD was the nature of its political relationships
with the Congress and with the Administration.(36) This implicit
concern with institutional relationships led the Commission to make
structure* its main focus of inquiry, while at the same time examin-
ing many other closely related issues. (3 7 ) During ensuing delibera-
tions, the early, intuitive concern with institutional relationships
became focused and operationalized and eventually led to a conviction
that the main problem "was the political nature of the Post Office." (38)
However, it should be noted that this concern for system configura-
*The term "structure", as used by the Commission, refers to al-
ternative organizational forms for managing the postal system, ranging
from the existing Departmental status to private ownership and inclu-
ding many "in between" variants. The Commission's usage connotes a
concern with systems design configuration, including patterns of
decision-making, modes of operation relating to personnel, funding
and rate-making policies, and the interfaces with other systems with-
in the postal complex. The decision to focus on structural variables
was not an explicit one which was reached as of a point in time. In-
stead, it emerged out of a series of Commission deliberations. Im-
plicitly, structural change was viewed as a vehicle for accomplishing
the reform goals.
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tion and institutional relationships was largely confined to the ex-
isting system and its recognized institutional subsystems. There was
not a serious attempt to extend the level of system under considera-
tion so as to focus the main line of inquiry on macro level system re-
design aimed at bringing about basic change in the relationships
among the POD, the relevant congressional committees, and the affected
Executive Branch agencies (Budget Bureau, General Services Administra-
tion, Civil Service Commission, Treasury Department, etc.). Thus, the
system and issue boundary delimitation resulted in a primary focus on
the institutional relationship between the Congress and the POD, and
some subsidiary attention to the creation of a new structure which would
be as nearly wholly independent of other agencies as possible.
10 F. The Scope and Intensity of Change
One of the main characteristics of the Kappel Commission work was
an explicit strategic decision regarding the scope and intensity of
policy change. This decision was made after an extensive scanning
process, but still in the relatively earlier stages of the Commission
work. At this stage, a decision was made that piecemeal (or incre-
mental) change would be insufficient for achieving an acceptable level
of improvements and that fundamental change was needed. The exact na-
ture of the fundamental changeand its structural configurationhad not
There was an attempt to introduce a concern for what one staff mem-
ber called "Macro-Thinking", defined as the widest ranging knowledge
available concerning all respects of society and its future evolution.
However, there is also evidence that some Commissioners had an only
slightly veiled antipathy against "egghead" thinking going into the
study. These notions are suggested in a Staff Memorandum of July 13,
1967, prepared by Professor Richard Willey, and were implicitly raised
in our interview with Chairman Kappel.
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been crystallized, but Kappel and other Commissioners became convinced
that a break with the past was essential and that some variation of cor-
porate style of organization would be an appropriate mechanism to do
this. 9 )
This strategic decision had an important impact on the overall
mode of operation of the Commission in the sense of providing a frame-
work and guidelines for discrete decisions regarding the organization-
al structure, rate-making policy, finance policy, labor-management
relations policy, etc.,which were made subsequently. The decision to
employ a strategy of radical change also shaped the patterns and dir-
ection of analysis by specifying the degree of penetration, direction
of search, and the nature of the alternatives contemplated.
A valid concern would be the degree to which the timing of this
early strategic decision paralyzed the search for alternatives. The
answer to this question is definitely negative. On the contrary, as is
shown in the Case, relatively extensive search processes took place.
Several alternatives (which are not reflected in the Commission Re-
port for tactical reasons) were generated, analyzed, and discussed in
(40)
Commission deliberations. The absence of premature closure may be
partly attributed to the broad, undefined, and relatively abstract na-
ture of this strategic decision at this point of time. The decision
was limited to a stipulation that fundamental reform was needed and that
peicemeal change in policy was perceived as being insufficient. Thus,
this early strategic decision was broad enough to provide a general
guide for action, but was flexible enough so as to facilitate the search
for a wide range of alternatives.
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10 Fl. Dissatisfaction With the Effects of Past Postal Policies. A
dissatisfaction with the performance effect of past policies, and a
perception of crisis are two of the main suggestive explanatory varia-
bles as to why a radical change strategy was adopted. The dissatis-
faction with past policies and the resultant inadequate performance of
the Postal System was clearly expressed in all our interviews with the
Commissioners, the Staff, in Commission deliberations, and finally in
the Report itself,(4 1 ) which states:
"The United States Post Office faces a crisis. Each year
it slips further behind the rest of the economy in service,
in efficiency and in meeting its responsibilities as an
employer. Each year it operates at a huge financial loss.
No one realizes the magnitude of this crisis more than
postal managers and employees who daily bear the stagger-
ing burden of moving the nation's mail."
Even Commissioner Meany, who had reservations about taking the Post
Office out of the Cabinet and the creation of a governmental corpora-
tion, acknowledged in his testimony:
"We agree with the Kappel Commission's documented descrip-
tion of low wages, poor working conditions, and inefficient
operations in the Post Office. There is no disagreement
on the need for substantial reform." (43)
The fact that most of the Commissioners came from major business organ-
izations in the United States presumably stimulated the perception of a
performance gap and contributed to the articulation of acute dissatis-
faction with past policies.
10 F2. Perception of Crisis. Although the Commission did not fully
confirm PMG O'Brien's "race with catastrophy" thesis, it did state that
the Post Office "faces a crisis" and it clearly pointed out the serious-
ness of the situation in the following statement:
n
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"The United States Postal System is in serious trouble to-
day because of decades of low priorities assigned in modern-
ization and management needs. Years of lagging productivi-
ty have created a gap between postal performance and that
of other industries a gap which represents at the same time
hazard and opportunity." (44)
10 F3. Analysis and Public Opinion. Additional factors contributing
to the articulation of dissatisfaction with the effects of past poli-
cies include the impact of analytical inputs and of public opinion in-
puts. Analytical inputs included the earlier work of the Quadriad
which had emphasized the existence of numerous system deficiencies.
This was reinforced by numerous studies, analyses, and research efforts
conducted by the Commission itself. There was no serious contention
that "all was well" in the postal system.
Public opinion also played a key role in affecting the Commis-
sion's behavior. This was a major environmental factor influencing
the Commission's decision processes. It was manifested mainly in
opinions forcefully expressed in the Nation's press. A review of a
compilation of newspaper editorials which appeared in 1967, has convinced
me of strong negative sentiments on the part of influential editorial
writers. While there is no reasonable way of statistically determining
whether these editorials were reflecting or leading public opinion,
their appearance in numerous newspapers representing all varieties of
political and economic thought suggests that this was a fair represen-
tation of public opinion. In any event, it is clear that this was one
more factor stimulating the Commission's perception of dissatisfac-
tion and crisis. The dissatisfaction with the performance of the Pos-
tal System expressed by the Commission and Staff in our interviews is
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also consistent with the information presented to President Johnson by
Joseph Califano:
"The Commission is critical of postal service and postal
efficiency and forecasts serious service and financial
problems if things are left as they are. Productivity in
the private sector went up 32% in the last ten years in
the Post Office rose only 2%. If present trends continue,
the POD will have a million employees in ten years (there
are now 716,000). More mail service breakdowns, like
Chicago 1966 are likely unless both management and plant
are overhauled." (45)
10 F4. Perception of Non-equifinality of Alternative Strategies. An
additional variable which may facilitate understanding of the Commis-
sion decision to recommend a radical vice incremental change in policy
lies in the existence of a perception of non-equifinality about various
strategies, on the part of the Commissioners and the Staff. A percep-
tion of non-equifinality means that different strategies (in this case,
incremental vs. radical change in policy) were perceived as not being
clearly equifinal;that is, that they would not lead to the same or
equivalent results. This perception, which was clearly brought out
in our interviews and in an extensive review of records of the Commis-
sion,is perhaps best summarized in the Commission Report itself:
"Piecemeal corrections such as changing the methods of
selecting postmasters, granting authority to borrow funds -
for capital needs and other long overdue steps could be
taken, but each alone, or all together, cannot produce
the break with the past we have concluded is essential." (46)
This is a very important point because it raises for explicit
examination the widely accepted notion that the main difference between
the radical and incremental strategies is only the intensity of change;
namely, the view that an accumulation of small incremental changes may
have an impact similar to one comprehensive and rapid radical change
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action. Radical change as perceived by the Commission was associated
with a basic systems reorientation, or in the Conummission's words,
"basic change in direction". 7 ) The feeling was that such a basic
change in direction was unattainable through utilization of an incre-
mental strategy.
An additional factor which presumably contributed to the articu-
lation of the perception of non-equifinality was an apparent fear that
an incremental change strategy, if accepted, would jeopardize future
changes necessary for achievement of the reform goals in the future.
This was expressed by one staff member in the following manner:
'More important was Kappel's fear that once piecemeal
change started, true reform would never come back. The
passage of any quasi-reform bill, for example,will dissa-
pate all the focus of energy for reform and would allow
the opposition to claim that reform had taken place when
only a few surface changes has been made. Further it
will be impossible a year or two later to resurrect the
issue and move to the next increment. Public and other
interest would have waned--the dramatic elements would be
lost and getting on with the next steps of reform at later
date just would never happen." (48)
Thus, the combined effect of strategic and tactical considerations
provide a partial explanaton for the existence of a perception of non-
equifinality regarding strategy alternatives.
10 F5. Actors' Capacities and Political Leverage. Actors' capacities
and political leverage are additional explanatory variables regarding
the Kappel Commission decision to adopt the radical change strategy.
The fact that the Kappel Commission's composition reflected leading
personalities who came from top level organizational positions had a
considerable impact how the problem was approached, how solutions
were sought, and the overall modus operandi of the Commission. These
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top management officials looked at the picture "as a whole" and from a-
bove, focusing on the basic features and not the details of sub-issues
and processes. They consistently rejected all attempts to overwhelm
them with secondary problems and with operational details.
The participation of these prominent citizens on the Commission
entailed various personal costs, including political costs, These
knowledgeable figures were sensitive to the protection of their reputa-
tions and were understandably reluctant to be associated (personally,
or as a team) with anything perceived by them as being a secondary
issue or a "half way" solution to postal problem. These tendencies were
reinforced by a strong predisposition toward radical change on the part
of the very influential Executive Director and the Staff. This over-
all picture, which emerged from our extensive interviews with the
policy actors involved, is consistent with argumentation presented in
various position papers prepared by the Commission Staff, An illustra-
tive example is given below:
". . Even after piecemeal removal of specific constraints,
the atmosphere in the Post Office would still be that of
a conventional Government agency in which caution and account-
ability are more prized than innovation and risk taking.
Most of the statutory changes noted above are likely to
come about in present political framework, within the next
five to ten years."
'We believe the energies of this Commission would be large-
ly wasted, therefore, if its work results merely in advanc-
ing by a few years these piecemeal, although worthwhile
improvements. It is rare that postal service or any govern-
ment body, receives such a comprehensive examination as it
is now getting. The Staff urges the Commission take the
opportunity its report offers to recommend a major change
in the direction for the postal service. A change which
will reshape the attitude of workers, managers, and the
public toward the business of operating of the U. S.
mails." (49)
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The fact that the major change in this instance was perceived as isomor-
phic with the corporate structure proposal and with the general business
orientation of the Commissioners, and because it fit well into the
normative/instrumental values and managerial orientation of most of the
Commissioners (George Meany is a distinguished exception), also' facili-
tated both a predisposition toward and the final decision to adopt a
strategy of radical change.
10 F6. Policy Costs. In the earlier theoretical discussion of the
incremental and radical change strategies (See Chapter Three) it was
suggested that risk-taking propensity is one of the main variables
affecting a policy actor's preference for one strategy or the other.
The incremental change strategy is usually associated in the litera-
ture with low risk, while high risk is normally associated with a rad-
ical change strategy. In both instances, the risks involved may be
viewed in terms of policy costs, including both direct and indirect
costs. By direct costs is meant the resources needed for policy (or
system) transformation from one state to another. These costs are usual-
ly more susceptible to quantitative estimation, and therefore, are dealt
with more in concrete situations. Alternatively, as used here, indirect
costs refers to the opportunity costs for using policy resources; coali-
tion maintenance, support recruitment, and potential side effects from
policy change. Experience and available research indicates that less
attention is usually paid to these indirect costs, possibly because they
are less susceptible to quantification, estimation, and control.
Examination of the proceedings and recommendations of the Kappel
Commission indicates that the Commission paid unequal attention to these
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cost categories. The Commission Report reflects the fact that some
attention was paid to the direct cost category, including factors such
as modernization, funding, pension liabilities, etc., but even here,
the issue was treated in a fragmented way and consideration was limited
to a single dimension of the policy under investigation.(50) No seri-
ous attempt is reflected in the various studies, in the minutes of
Commission deliberations, or in the Report itself, to estimate (even in
probabilistic terms) the total direct cost of the reform proposal.
In the absence of such cost estimations (even only direct
costs) and given the extreme difficulty of calculating the long-run
benefits, there was no serious basis for treatment of the various
alternatives within a cost-benefit framework, although this is implied
in the Report. Although the Commission states clearly that "the true
long-range benefits" from postal reform "are incalculable", it estimates
at least a 20% potential overall saving in yearly costs. (5 1 ) There
seems to be little doubt that this was done not as the result of any
systematic analysis or deep conviction, but primarily for "selling"
purposes, i.e., it was a strategy of maximizing the potential benefits
of the preferred alternative.
Commissioner Miller's comments on this subject during the Report
drafting process appear to reflect more accurately the realistic situa-
tion:
"Reference is made repeatedly to an annual saving of $1
billion or more under reorganization. This figure is
going to be a major selling point (particularly with the
press), and some parts of the document are "hung" around
it. I frankly distrust the figure and do not believe
it will occur because "savings" are generally swallowed
r
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up by normal business growth and inflation. Reorganiza-
tion helps by equipping the post office to handle future
demands, not in instituting great savings." (52)
Mr. Miller's observation perhaps did not go far enough. The alleged
$1 billion saving was a major selling point not only for the press, but
for the President of the U. S. as well. Thus, it is clear that there
are critical strategic and tactical considerations inherent in the treat-
ment of the direct costs of any policy change proposed.
In terms of indirect costs, the Commission approached the issue
within a "definition of the situation" that perceived the political
costs of the incremental change strategy as being equal to or even more
costly than those associated with a radical strategy. This definition
of the situation was based more on experience and trained intuition
than on systematic analysis. Similarly, there is no cost estimation
based-on an assumption that the system would continue to operate in
the existing mode (i.e., a no-change alternative), although in the
previously cited "definition of the mission of the contractors," this
was one of the expected outputs.(53)
The relative lack of an in-depth treatment of the reform cost
dimension, despite its critical importance, may be understood in terms
of the following two main clusters of reasons. First, the existence
of a perception that the risk of maintaining the present situation may,
over the long-range, be equal to or even higher than the possible risks
of radical reform. This perception was presumably shaped by dissatis-
faction with the effects of past policies and by strong feelings as to
the existence of a performance gap. Therefore, a clean and total break
with the past, disregarding cost considerations, was perceived as being
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preferable to perpetuation of the status quo. Secondly, the above
perception was reinforced by a feeling that the political costs of
the incremental change strategy would be equal to or even more cost-
ly than those associated with a radical change strategy. In the words
of one policy actor:
"Kappel became convinced that the political and other costs
of each segment of piecemeal strategy would be at least as
high as the way of going all the way at once." (54)
Neither of these two clusters of reasons is, by itself, sufficient
to explain the relative absence of systematic efforts to deal with cost
factors. Taken together, however, these two major factors reinforce one
another and constitute a plausible explanation of Commission behavior.
10 F7. Summary. Thus, we have seen that the Commissions strategic
decisions regarding the scope and intensity of policy change was influenced
by a number of related variables. These included 1) dissatisfaction
with the effects of past policics: 2) a perception of at least potential
crisis; 3) inputs from analysis and expressions of public opinion;
4) a perception of non-equifinality regarding the recognized and avail-
able alternatives; 5) the influence policy actors' capacities and politi-
cal leverage; and 6) a relative lack of in-depth treatment of the policy
cost dimension, occasioned by a desire to bring about a clean and total
break with the past. Together, these variables interacted so as to
mold the Commissions at first implicit, and eventually explicit, pre-
ferences for major (or radical) vice piecemeal (or incremental) change.
This strategic decision had important ramifications in terms of the
nature and direction of the on-going policy formation process.
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10 G. Policy Feasibility
The conceptual framework suggests that policy feasibility may
be an extremely important dimension of the policy formation process.
This suggestion will be tested by examination of the degree of explora-
tion of policy feasibility, and the nature of feasibility creation and
molding actions which took place during the crystallization phase.
The Executive Order which created the Presidential Commission
directed an assessment of the "feasibility and desirability" of various
organizational alternatives.(
5 5 ) The specific intent of this direc-
tion is not at all clear. However, a review of this document suggests
that this language is better characterized as "standard appointing
order nomenclature" rather than as representing any unusually keen
White House concern with the policy feasibility dimension of the postal
reform proposal.
Obviously, any Commission would be remiss if it failed to "check
out" the feasibility dimension. However, just what this means in opera-
tional terms is not at all obvious--in fact, it is quite obscure and
confusing. As noted in Dolenga's work on the Concept of Analysis(56)
there is a great need for a reconceptualization of terms and concepts
such as feasibility (especially, political feasibility) in a policy
context. The following analysis of the Policy Feasibility dimension
of the Crystallization Phase bears out this need.
One of the basic anomolies of the Crystallization Phase is the
distinction between words and deeds relating to policy feasibility. Dur-
ing our interview with Chairman Kappel, he stated:
"My objective for the Commission was to determine what
would bring about the most efficient/effective postal
313
service. My policy was to leave politics to the
politicians." (57)
While I have absolutely no reason to doubt the sincerity and accuracy
of this statement, Kappel's comments stand in contrast to the case
data which portrays the extensive attention paid by the Commission to
the policy feasibility dimension.
As suggested in the framework, it is useful to examine policy
feasibility in terms of its three main dimensions: political feasi-
bility; organizational feasibility; and economic feasibility. Analy-
sis of the Case along these dimensions suggests that the Commission
paid unequal attention to these three dimensions, for reasons that will
become clearer as this analysis progresses.
10 G1. The Exploration of Policy Feasibility. From a policy formation
perspective, two aspects of policy feasibility should be examined. These
are, first, the exploration, and, secondly, the shaping of policy feasi-
bility. The exploration aspect will be examined first.
10 Gi-l. Exploration of Political Feasibility. The Commission devoted
intensive attention to the exploration of the political feasibility of
different alternatives and of critical decision issues (e.g., the right
to strike, collective bargaining, rate-making, etc.). A number of
different instruments were employed to do this, including press surveys;
interviews with Congressmen,(
5 8 )
union leaders,(
5 9 )
and various interest
groups; opinion polls;(
6 0 )
and the canvassing of expert opinion. These,
of course, were in addition to the individual judgmental assessments
by the Commissioners and Staff members. More important than the in-
struments employed, however, is the fact that this analytically-oriented
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Commission decided to devote resources to the systematic exploration
of political feasibility. This runs counter to the wisdom literature
suggestions that there is some basic antipathy between systematic
analysis and "political" considerations.
10 G1-2. Exploration of Economic Feasibility. The economic'feasibi-
lity of various alternatives was quite extensively explored, and the out-
put of such exploration became input into critical Commission delibera-
tions. For instance, one of the main reasons for the Commission's
rejection of the "private enterprise" alternative was the conclusion
that this alternative was economically infeasible. (61) Similarly, in
the final Report, the (perceived) high economic feasibility of the cor-
porate alternative was heavily stressed and was extensively used to
justify the final recommendations. (62)
10 G1-3. Exploration of Organizational Feasibility. This complex dimen-
sion of policy feasibility must be examined along its main components;
technological; behavioral; and structural elements. The Commission
was not unaware of the technological component, and did examine it
somewhat (primarily through a subcontractor study). However, because
of a reduction in the Appropriation financing the Commission's work, this
component did not receive comprehensive attention. The structural
component received extensive examination and evaluation. This was a
key factor in much of the Commission's deliberations. The high degree
of attention paid to this component can be explained in terms of the
emphasis on structure in the Commission's definition of the situation
and formulation of the problem. As the final Report explained:
315
"Although the Commission studied five major areas of
postal operations. e. it gave greatest attention to the
general problem of organizing and managing the postal
establishment." (63)
In contrast to the other two components of organizational feasi-
bility, the behavioral component received very little attention. In
Chapter Five, behavioral feasibility was defined in terms of the like-
lihood that the focal organization would accept and implement a select-
ed policy alternative in a manner consistent with the intentions of
the policymaker. This implies an early concern with the main implemen-
tations aspects of any alternatives seriously considered. One reason
for the minimal attention devoted to this component is the Commission's
overall strategy of attempting to concentrate on the main strategic po-
licy issues, leaving broad and flexible options to be exercised by the
new management charged with the responsibility for implementing any
policy changes resulting from the Commission's work.
Additionally, a second major focus of the Commission was on
those activities perceived to be important factors in obtaining ap-
proval of any recommended policy change. Thus, there was a concern with
implementation issues only to the extent that these issues appeared
to be relevant to obtaining support and approval from the policy system.
There was no explicit or extensive concern for implementation in terms
of the capacity and willingness of a focal organization to implement
change.
It should be recognized here that the present emphasis on the organi-
zational behavior aspects of the various policy alternatives (as this
term has been defined in Chapter Five) is not intended to over-shadow
the fact that the behavioral aspects of operating postal systems were
extensively treated in various Commission studies and in the final
Report.
316
The emphasis on approval of policy proposals helps to further
explain the relatively greater attention paid to political feasibility.
Even most organizational feasibility considerations were taken in the
context of political (i.e., approval) variables.
10 G1-4. Summary of the Exploration of Policy Feasibility. This analy-
sis has shown that the Kappel Commission was quite sensitive to the
systematic exploration of policy feasibility, as indicated by the sign-
ificant resources devoted to this dimension of policy formation. The
Case has well demonstrated that the exploration of technological feasi-
bility was minimal due to a shortage of resources. Furthermore, we
noted that there was fairly extensive, systematic exploration of econo-
mic and political feasibility and that this directly affected the deci-
sions regarding several alternatives. Finally, this analysis has
shown that the Commission did very little in terms of exploration of
the behavioral component of organizational feasibility. This analysis
has suggested that this relative neglect of the behavioral component
was at least partly due to particular strategic focus of the Commission
which diverted attention from implementation issues.
10 G2. The Shaping of Political Feasibility. In the Postal Reform Case,
and especially in this Phase, actions taken to shape policy feasibility
were almost all directed at the political component. In fact, a some-
what unique characteristic of the Kappel Commission is its strong em-
phasis on and determined efforts at the shaping of political feasibili-
ty. This is doubly interesting in this situation; first, simply because
it occurred, and secondly, because, in our interviews, key policy actors
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were reluctant to admit that it had occurred.(64) These two dimensions
of interest will be addressed separately. In the preceeding section it
was concluded that the Commission quite systematically explored po-
licy feasibility (with an emphasis on the political dimension). Now,
we must examine the behavioral consequences of such exploration.
In his incisive discussion of policy-making, Vicker's has noted
that:
"Sometimes decision-making proves to be no more than the
painful process of discovering that there is only one
thing to do or even nothing to be done. On the other hand,
experience also recognizes situations in which the decision
maker can in some degree impose a pattern on the future
course of affairs. . ." (65)
As the Case demonstrates, it is clear that the Kappel Commission per-
ceived the postal reform situation to be the latter type of situation,
because numerous and intensive efforts were aimed at an attempt to
"impose a pattern on the future course of affairs".
It is interesting that the Commission's behavior over time reflects
a repetition of another pattern evident in the behavior of the Quadriad.
Although it is not my purpose to explore this distinction at length,
and despite the lack of any hard substantiating evidence, it is my
strong impression that Mr. Murray Comarrow, the Commission's Executive
Director, was the prime mover in the "Commission's" attempts to mold
political feasibility. This interpretation is consistent with the
specifications for the position of Executive Director which were
agreed upon at the first Commission meeting (4/28/67). This agreement
called for "a senior person, preferably with knowledge of the govern-
ment and the political forces therein." It is my assessment that Mr.
Comarow ideally filled that specification. Furthermore, I see Comarow's
role as complementing that of Chairman Kappel, whom I would characterize
as apolitical, especially in terms of overt actions to mold political
feasibility. Fredrick Kappel would probably personally prefer to let
policy proposals succeed or fail "on their intrinsic merit." (See min-
utes of the April 28, 1967 meeting of the President's Commission with
Post Office Personnel, and interviews with Messrs. Kappel and Comarow.)
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That is, over the relatively extended life of the Commission, there
occurred a gradual shift from analysis to the advocacy of a specific
policy alternative. As was the case with the Quadriad, this shift in
orientation was very gradual and evolved out of a dynamic interplay
between search processes, value systems, perceptions of role specifi-
cations, and other extra-rational processes. For whatever mix of reasons,
the Commissioner's and Staff became personally committed to the corporate
structure alternative.
This is by no means intended to imply that this was a strong a
priori committment.Rather, it was an emergent conviction which grew
over time as intuition and judgment were played against analysis in a
context characterized by a high degree of affective and cognitive inter-
action. In the initial stages, the work of the Commission can be fair-
ly characterized as clinical, analytical and detached. In the latter
stages the behavioral patterns become more personal and emotional. The
committed analyst became a dedicated change agent. As change agents,
the policy actors became interested in molding policy (especially poli-
tical) feasibility.
10 G2-1. Specific Political Feasibility Shaping Actions. Efforts aimed
at molding political feasibility emerged in these latter stages, but
may be seen as an extension of the earlier activity aimed at exploring
political feasibility. Specific feasibility molding behavior took
many forms, including the following important examples:
1) Intense efforts were conducted by some Commissioners
and by the Executive Director to "educate" the Congress,
unions, and various interest groups. (66)
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2) There was close involvement of several Commission members
in the formation of a grass roots citizens' group (CIPSCO)
an organization headed by Mr. Walter J. Humann, a former
Commission staff member. Later, eight out of ten of the
Commissioners joined the Citizens Committee for Postal
Reform, the successor to CIPSCO. (67)
3) The Commission developed close connections with pro-
reform groups within the Post Office Department, both dur-
ing O'Brien's tenure as PMG, and perhaps more importantly
during the term of O'Brien's successor, Marvin Watson, a
strong anti-reform policy actor.
4) The Commission made systematic efforts to encourage
favorable endorsement of its Report by the press, unions,
various interest groups, influential-personalities, and even
some governmental agencies. These efforts went beyond
formal, arm's-length relationships, and the need for more
aggressive action was explicitly highlighted by the then
former Executive Director in a letter to the then former
Commission Chairman. Comarow said:
"A resolution favoring the Report is simply not enough,
regardless of how skillfully it may be worded and how
much publicity or coverage it may receive. What we need
is a sustained, well organized, and well financed effort
to bring to bear the weight of public opinion upon the
Congress. Make no mistake about it the big postal unions
. will resist this with all their considerable
strength. The opposition is well sustained, well organized,
and well financed. It cannot be effectively countered
by a part-time Walter Humann working out of a post office
box in Dallas or a part-time Murray Comarow working part
time out of the Federal Power Commission in Washington." (68)
These aggressive efforts were operationalized in the form of
personal appearances of Staff members (especially Mro
Comarow) and certain.Commissioners at various meetings, speech-
es at Conventions, appearances in the mass media, and a
strong editorial campaign at both the local and national
levels. The personal reputation of the Commissioners, and
their high institutional and political leverage, of course,
facilitated these efforts.
5) Efforts were made to "plank" the postal reform issue
into the 1968 election platforms of both political parties. (69)
6) Efforts were made to influence the incoming Republican
Administration after the 1968 elections. *
This point is explored in more detail in Chapter Eleven.
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In addition to the foregoing "extra-curricular" activities of
both Commission and Staff members other rather strong efforts at
shaping political feasibility can be discerned in various internal
Commission position papers, deliberations, and during the report-
drafting process. For example, early drafts of the Report were sent
for review to Califano at the White House(70) and to other prominent,
high-leverage individuals such as the Director of the General Account-
ing Office and the current and former Budget Bureau Directors.(71)
10 G2-2. Preparation of the Commission Report. The sensitivity to
the political feasibility dimension, and a perception that that feasibi-
lity could be molded, is most evident in the Commission's report-pre-
paration process. By that stage, the Commission was acting as an insti-
tutional advocate of the corporate-structure policy alternative. The
main strategy in the presentation of the Commission findings was an
intentional over-dramatization of the issue as a means of drawing pub-
lic and Congressional attention to postal problems and the need for a
radical solution.
The degree of over-dramatization is well reflected in the discrel
pancy between the thinking of the Commission as contained in informal
status reports to the White House and the "spirit" and implications of
some parts of the formal Report. For example, in a letter to Mr.
Califano, Camarow stated:
"The Commission and the Staff seem to have come
around to Larry O'Brien's viewpoint that major
It should be noted that many of these activities were carried on after
the Commission's formal life had terminated. They were frequently
initiated and were usually coordinated by Mr. Comarow.
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change in the direction is needed but there are two signi-
ficant differences between where he left and in where we
find ourselves. The "race with catastrophe" seems to be
a false alarm, however useful it may have been for draw-
ing attention to the need for change. . ." (72)
It is my considered judgment that the above description fairly re-
flects the thinking of the Commission, and is consistent with the find-
(73)ings of the contractors hired as consultants. However, this
tone is highly exaggerated (over-dramatized) in the final Report.
This careful attention to the enhancement of political feasibili-
ty is also evident in the format of the Report (discussed separately)
and in the decisions regarding the timing of its release, the special
arrangements for press coverage, etc. It is obvious, of course, that
no one can "prove" the existence of any causal relationship between the
Commission's efforts aimed at molding political feasibility and the
resultant extremely favorable public and press reaction to the Report.
Nonetheless, based on my detailed familiarity with the entire process,
I feel quite confident in concluding that these efforts were, in fact,
very instrumental in generating the overwhelmingly favorable response.
10 G3. Commitment: a Two-Edged Sword. In both a theoretical and prag-
matic context, the behavior of the Kappel Commission members (individual-
ly and collectively) highlights the existence of a most serious dilema.
As Dolenga's paper on the Concept of Analysis illustrates, the issue of
the intensity of the commitment of analysts and advisors to a particu-
lar policy alternative creates complex trade-offs between a desire
(approaching an evangelical commitment) to achieve concrete policy
action (get the legislation passed!), and possible distortions in object-
ivity. ( 7 4 ) The sense of missionary commitment on the part of the
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Commission was, no doubt, instrumental in enhancing the quality of the
analysis and in the sensitizing of the frame-of-appreciation of key
policymakers and the education of the public as a whole.
On the other hand, such a strong sense of personal involvement
and commitment can produce unintentional and dysfunctional consequences
in terms of impaired judgment, distorted objectivity, and a decreased
acceptability of the policy recommendations on the part of some policy-
makers who are aware of these potential pathologies in the process and
its outcome. Furthermore, serious questions may be raised regarding the
complex role relationships existing between the analyst, advisor, and
policymaker. These kinds of ramifications are examined in Dolenga's
previously cited work, both in his theoretical papers and more directly
in his treatment of the analysis of the Postal Reform Case.
10 G 4. Summary. This portion of the analysis has shown that the
Kappel Commission recognized the importance of and, therefore, invested
rather heavily in both the exploration and shaping of policy feasibility.
Of the three main components of policy feasibility (political, economic,
and organizational), the Commission devoted primary attention to the
dimension of political feasibility. This action is perhaps best under-
stood in terms of the Commission's emphasis on policy approval, i.e.,
obtaining what was perceived to be primarily political approval by the
policy system of the postal reform proposals. We saw that the Commission
members took specific (largely voluntary, extra-curricular) actions aimed
at enhancing (shaping) the political feasibility of the preferred policy
alternative (i.e., the corporate restructuring alternative). Curiously
though, despite considerable, sophisticated efforts in this regard,
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there was a definite reluctance on the part of the key policy actors
to admit or even to discuss their involvement in such matters.
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Chapter Eleven
Selective Analysis of the Transition Phase
llA. Introduction and Overview
The Postal Reform Case has described how the basic reform propo-
sals just narrowly avoided an infant death at the end of the Johnson
Administration. Given this status in the life cycle of postal reform,
we might expect that a change in political administrations would have
a fatal effect on the entire idea. The main purpose of the selective
analyisis of the Transition Phase contained in this chapter is to
examine the policy-relevant strategic implications of this major
environmental change. ':
1B. The Transition Background
In discussing efforts of federal bureaucrats to advance their
favorite proposals, Dr. James Schlesinger has noted that:
'Periods of transition are uniquely suited to the trot-
ting out of old proposals, most of them previously re--
jected for good reason, on the expectation that they may
catch somebody's fancy2.l)
From another perspective, Frank Popper, in his study of Presidential
Commissions, has observed that although there is a tradition of one
Administration not acting on Commission reports which get issued during
the ambiguous transition period between Administration, President
Nixon, in proposing postal, draft, and welfare legislation to a Dem-
ocratic Congress drew on the work of Presidential Commissions which
spanned Presidencies.(2)
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Here, we are particularly interested in the impact of the transi-
tion between the Democratic (Johnson) and Republican (Nixon) Admini-
strations on the postal reform policy formation process. As the Case
shows, the transition situation described by Schlesinger does not fit
the postal experience. In this instance, although President-elect
Nixon received recommendations regarding postal reform from a number
of sources,* it is clear that he personally initiated the action which
resulted in an early decision to adopt Postal reform as a major goal
of the new Republican Administration.(3)
Popper's recognition that Presiden Nixon proposed several major
pieces of legislation to the Democratic Congress which were based on
programs initiated under the Johnson Administration confirms :the
assessment of Robert Mayo (Nixon's first Budget Bureau Director) that
Nixon was less inhibited than some of his predecessors about taking
(4)
action on policies initiated under the prior Administration. With
further relevance here, Mayo also observed that President Nixon felt
that he had a greater flexibility for taking bolder (or at least more
controversial) policy initiatives during the first year of his term in
office than he would have in subsequent years.
To review, very briefly, the case data regarding the status of
the postal reform issue at the end of the Johnson Administration,
the following points stand out:
-After a cool reaction to the Kappel Commission Report
and after a strong negative reaction on the part of his
new PMG (Marvin Watson), President Johnson finally con-
vinced by Califano, Budget Director Zwick, and Chairman
*For example, the Burns Presidential Transition Task-Force, the Budget
Bureau, the Citizens Committee, and others.
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Kappe4) included a brief endorsement of postal reform in
his January, 1969, State-of-the-Union Message.
-The key reform proponents had left office (e.g.; O'Brien,
Califano, Schultze).
-Although the Kappel Commission had been officially term-
inated, a number of former Commissioners and staff members
took independent actions to draw attention to the recommen-
dations of the Kappel Commission and to recruit grass-roots
support for the reform idea.
-Some minor efforts at keeping postal reform alive were
being exerted by the Citizens Committee for Postal Reform,
and by a small pro-reform group within the POD.
Given the existence of this near hiatus in support for the postal
reform idea; it is somewhat surprising that one of President Nixon's
first policy initiatives upon assuming office was a strong, public
commitment to work for postal reform. In this section we will be
analyzing the major forces behind the Nixon strategic decision to
adopt postal reform as a major goal of his new Administration. This
strategic decision is worthy of close examination because it guided
and directed numberous subsidiary decisions made during the next two
years, regarding postal reform.
llC. The Nixon Decision to Adopt Postal Reform as a Major Goal
The main focus of inquiry here is on the reasons why a reform
idea originated under the Democratic (Johnson) Administration was so
quickly adopted (at least in principle) by the incoming Republican
Administration (under President Nixon). After all, there were many
other domestic issues competing for Presidential attention, and there
is common agreement among all the policy actors interviewed that
postal reform at that time was not a top priority national issue
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which required intense Presidential attention immediately after the
Innauguration. Furthermore, it is not an unusual phenomenon in Amer-
ican politics for a incoming Administration to react cooly to domestic
programs created by their predecessors.
It is never easy to clearly identify policy actors' motivations,
and the task becomes considerably more complicated when one of the
subjects of the inquiry is the President of the United States. A
further complication here is the fact that the policy formation pro-
cess of interest encompassed a complex issue which was dealt with in
a multi-goal, multi-actor context, in which different actors approached
the decisional issues with different sets of goals, values, assumptions,
etc. Therefore, the analysis which follows is necessarily based on
second order, but nonetheless valuable, sources of information.* I
have abstracted from this rich data the following highly plausible
explanations, each of which will be discussed separately below:
-Nixon's prior commitment to the reform idea during the
1968 campaign.
-The existence of a perception of a "can't lose" political
strategy.
-The desire of the new Administration to quickly identify
relatively worked-out programs having a high degree of
achievement potential. .
-Nixon's organization and management orientation.
*The reconstruction of the strategic and tactical decisions made by
the Nixon Administration regarding postal reform is based primarily
on our interviews with knowledgeable participants such as: Dr. Arthur
Burns; Mr. John Ehrlichman; Mr. George Shultz; Dr. Martin Anderson;
Mr. Richard Burris; Mr. Frederick Kappel; Mr. Robert Mayo; Mr. Wm. Usery,
et aL; Mr. Bryce Harlow; and on limited documentation as demonstrated
in the Case.
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-The ideological and instrumental beliefs of the President
and his close advisors.
llCl. Nixon's Prior Commitment to the Reform Idea During the 1968
Presidential Campaign. During the 1968 election campaign, President
Nixon made several relatively strong public statements regarding
postal reform. The following remarks are typical:
"The postal service has deteriorated terribly. Part of the
problem is the great increase in traffic, but part of it
is pure politics. . . . In instance after instance the
efficiency of the Post Office Department is down. The
Post Office needs to be run like a first-class business.
I can assure you that one of the top priorities I have on
my agenda is to get a Postmaster General who will not be
just a political man, but who will be able to institute
the reforms. . . . I think we need a new system in order
to do it, and if we have to move toward more business
practices, get private enterprise into it on a proper
basis, that is what we will do. . . . We must give full
consideration to the President's Commission on Postal
Orgnaization's recommendations for improvements.in the
nation's postal service and the extension of the merit
principle of postmasters and rural carriers'.'(5)
The existence of this prior commitment, although important, is
not alone sufficient to explain the Nixon Administrations' early
decision to endorse postal reform and to adopt the Kappel Report's
recommendations as the basis for its program. After all, in January
1968, postal reform was only one of a relatively large number of issues
competing for immediate Presidential attention, and it was a relatively
low priority issue, as compared to the war in Vietnam, unemployment,
and the many other issues on which candidate Nixon had made campaign
"commitments". Therefore, additional variables are needed to provide
a more complete explanation. For example, the furation and intensity
of Nixon's pre-election commitment are relevant here and will be
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examined in connection with the ideological and instrmental beliefs
of the new President.
11C2. The Perception of a "Sure-Win" Political Strategy. Some policy
actors advanced the proposition that Nixon's decision to endorse
postal reform was a "sure-win" strategy with great political advan-
tages for the Republican Administration, in the sense that politically
the Nixon Administration couldn't lose, ro matter what action Congress
might take in response to the President's reform proposals. According
to this view, if the postal reform proposal was defeated in Congress,
the Republican Administration could blame the Democratic-controlled
Congress. Alternatively, if the program passed in Congress,:there
would be positive advantages for the Nixon Administration. Surpris-
ingly, although this proposition was advanced by an influential Repub-
lican in Congress who was deeply involved in the postal reform issue
in the Congressional arena,(6) it was flatly rejected by the Chairman
of the Democratic Party,* who concluded after a personal meeting with
Nixon:
"-...that the President was solidly committed to the idea
politcally.'(7)
Similarly Arthur Burns (in our interview with him) strongly re-
jected the notion that such a purely political strategy had ever been
considered (explicitly or implicitly) regarding postal reform: (8)
"No, I can say that I never heard such purely political
thinking expressed on this issue. I feel quite sure that
*Former Postmaster General Lawrence O'Brien.
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I would have been aware of it were it being seriously
considered. . . . Of course, I was well aware of this
kind of politically motivated strategy-making on other
issues, but I don't think it seriously took place re-
garding the postal question. . . . Of course we wanted
to gain credit with the public for this new Administra-
tion and our thinking was that the patronage issue would
have wide-spread appeal in this direction." (p. 2)
Of course, the opinions of Burns and other Nixon advisors on that
issue do not by themselves provide a basis for rejection of this
thesis. However, there are additional reasons which seriously im-
pair the validity of this attractive, but simplistic and problematic
thesis.
The main weakness of this thesis lies in the fact that the re-
sistance in Congress to the postal reform proposal had little to do
with party affiliation.( Moreover, there is strong evidence that
it was Nixon's personal initiative to move on a program of bipartisan
(10)
support. This was well reflected in the Bryce Harlow proposal to
establish a bi-partisan Citizens Committee for Postal Reform,(ll)
co-chaired by O'Brien and by Senator Thurston Morton.
Examination of Administration behavior clearly indicates that
Nixon, Blount, and others consistently and unhesitantly stuck with
the postal reform idea even at times when its political feasibility
and potential pay-off were low and the costs became very high. This
strategic decision entailed considerable political costs in terms of
consensus maintenance among the Republican members of Congress, especially
(12)
regarding the timing of the abolishment of postal patronage. And
finally, during this time, there were many good reasons for the Repub-
lican Administration to give up the reform idea, a move which would
have significant embarassment to the Democratic Congress. Represen-
E
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tative of these reasons are the already noted unexpectedly high costs
of the reform program, the inevitable necessity to again raise postal
rates and postal pay, severe inflation-induced economic problems, and
pressing problems in the international relations sphere.
The above analysis leads me to the conclusion that although some
political considerations undoubtedly were present in the President's
strategic decision, there is little evidence that this was a dominant
or even significant motivating factor. A clearer understanding of
Nixon's strategic decision to strongly endorse postal reform requires
that we search further and in other directions.
11C3. The New Administration's Search for At Least Partially Developed
Programs With "Achievable" Goals. Another explanation advanced by
Presidential Councilor Bryce Harlow,(l3) and supported by Mayo,
Ehrlichman, and others, is that any newly elected President "must
accomplish something" during the first few months in office. This
is a variant of the "First One Hundred Days" syndrome in American
politics. Dr. Arthur Burns who directed the Task-Force efforts during
the transition between administrations recalled:(1 4)
"He (Nixon) knew, and we knew, that there was a necessity
to put together an action program to start with. The
immediate task was to rather quickly throw together a
basis for a new program on which he (Nixon) could survive
during the first weeks of his administration. (p. 4)
The postal reform proposal, according to this view, was a relatively
"well-worked-out" issue with a high possibility of near-term "achieve-
ment". As such, it partially filled the Administration's need for a
major new program offering at least potentially achievable goals.
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Postal reform was also a natural issue that could encourage bi-partisan
support. This was quite important, given the fact that Nixon was the
first President since Zachary Taylor to commence his term with both
Houses of Congress in control of the opposition party.
These pragmatic considerations, which were suggested in several
interviews, suggest one plausible, but partial, explanation of the
Nixon Administration's early strategic decision to endorse postal
reform.
llC4. President Nixon's Organization and Management Orientation.
Another variable, frequently mentioned by various policy actors in
the course of this study, is the general tendency of the Nixon Admin-
istration to focus more on organization and management reform, as
contrasted to the "program orientation" of the previous Administration.
As one White House adviser noted:
The present (Nixon) Administration is very much organiza-
tion and management reform oriented. President Johnson's
Administration, by contrast, pursued the opposite fallacy,
believing all that was needed was to construct a good
program and let organization matters take care of them-
selves.(15)
The above observation is especially important, given the absence of
any systematic study of this issue, and in view of the fact that it
was made by Charles Schultze, former Budget Bureau Director in the
Johnson Administration. This assessment is consistent with the views
expressed by other policy actors, including, Arthur Burns, Robert
Mayo, John Ehrlichman, and Robert Mayo.
President Nixon has evidenced a long-standing interest in efforts
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to reform and organize the federal government. While serving as
Vice-President under President Eisenhower, Nixon devoted much effort
to devising a list of activities which, in one way or another could
be removed from direct federal control and turned over to private
industry or converted to publicly owned utilities.(16 ) There is ample
evidence in both the prior and subsequent behavior of Richard Nixon to
support the proposition regarding a general tendency of his Administa-
tion to focus attention and resources on organization and management
issues. This is manifested in several current policy proposals such
as Nixon's federal government reorganization plan. Thus, Nixon's
personal organization and management orientation appears to be another
plausible, partial explanatory variable.
llC5. Ideological and Instrumental Beliefs of the President. Perhaps
one of the most important explanatory variables regarding the strategic
decision to endorse postal reform lies in the ideological and instru-
mental beliefs held by President Nixon and by his key advisors, regard-
ing the role of government in society. The whole corporate reform idea,
as proposed in the Kappel Report, fits well with Nixon's publicly recog-
nized philosophy of government and is compatible with the conservative
Republican value system usually ascribed to him and to his Administra-
tion. President Nixon's main motivation may have been no more than
recognition of this factor.
These conclusions emerged from extensive interviews with key
policy actors (Harlow, Burns, Ehrlichman, Blount, and Mayo) who served
in sensitive advisory roles to the President and who were personally
instrumental in influencing Nixon's decisions. All of them indepen-
dently suggested this factor as crucial for understanding the essence
of Nixon's strategic decision. In Burns' words:
"Basically, it (Postal Reform) was one President's concept
of good government . . . . President Nixon has long had
an orientation in that direction and the Kappel Report
presented him with an opportunity which just naturally
fit with his personal outlook on government . . . . the
Kappel Report had a lot of appeal to the President and
to a number of us in advisory roles'.'(l7)
In conclusion, any attempt to explain the factors motivating the
Nixon Administration's strategic decision-making on a uni-dimensional
scale will be highly unrealistic. As pointed out by Ehrlichman, many
different considerations entered into the basic, early decision to
adopt postal reform as a major goal. My analysis suggests that the
strategic decision-making behavior of the Nixon Administration in
regards to postal reform can best be understood in terms of a mix of
two main factors. First, ideological and instrumental beliefs regard-
ing governmental operation; and, secondly, the existence of postal
reform as a relatively well-developed program consistent with those
beliefs and potentially amenable to rapid transformation into a legis-
lative program deserving of bi-partisan support. It is my belief that
the role of ideological and instrumental beliefs regarding the "proper"
role of government and the "proper" activities in which the federal
government should be involved, was a dominant variable in this mix.
llD. The Nixon Administration's Postal Reform Strategy
In contrast with the previous Administration, the Nixon team
very quickly developed an overall strategy for achieving postal reform.
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Reconstruction of the emergence of this strategy, based on interviews
with key Presidential advisors involved in the process, indicates
that this was an iterative, loosely structured, open ended, and non-
sequential process that was never formalized in any comprehensive,
written plan. One of the President's close advisors who was deeply
involved in the process told us that:(l8 )
". .. the strategy must be interpreted in a loose open
way, keeping in mind that government is not an orderly
process. It is erroneous to impose upon it any formal
sequential, rigid set of steps. It does not work that
way . . . The strategy was a loose, flexible thing, re-
flected mostly in the heads of a few key people."(p. 3)
The above comment, made by Dr. Arthur Burns, is consistent with asses-
sments made by other key policy actors. It is extremely important
because of the wide-spread tendency in research, analysis, and model
building to impose a more ordered impression about such processes,
including an attempt to associate particular strategies with a "master
plan", including all, or at least many, possible contingencies etc.
The postal policy formation experience suggests that such a simplistic
notion reflects a very low degree of descriptive reality.
Conceptually, the Nixon Administration adopted the Kappel Com-
mission's recommendations, suggesting a fundamental change in direc-
tion, as a framework and a set of guidelines for achieving postal reform.
Our interview data suggests that this strategic decision was reached
after a relatively quick consensus emerged within a small policy
formation group. This basic decidion was never seriously challenged
by advocates of different alternatives.*
*This indicates an absence of the "multiple advocacy" mode of decision-
making advocated by George. See Dolenga (1972), Chapter Four.
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All of the key policy actors interviewed by us attributed this readily
achieved consensus to shared ideological and instrumental beliefs, and
to the appealing nature of the proposed policy measures, given those
beliefs. These shared instrumental and ideological beliefs may also
explain other factors such as the lack of any independent analysis,
an insensitivity to the cost dimension, and to some extent, an under-
estimation of the policy resources required to obtain Congressional
approval of postal reform.
llD1. Lack of Independent Analysis. The decision to adopt postal
reform as a major goal was made despite the fact that the Kappel
Report was never subjected to the systematic scrutiny of independent
analysis by the Nixon Administration, neither at the White House level
nor by the Post Office Department. Arthur Burns gave a succinct,
authoritative description about the prevailing atmosphere at the
White House:
"We were convinced that it (postal reform) was the right
thing to do. Our concern than was with strategy for the
best way of'doing it!.(19)
This description is supported by data obtained in our interviews
with Kappel, Ehrlichman, Mayo, Blount, and others. Mr. Kappel, for
example, told us that in a meeting with the then President-Elect,
Nixon told him that although he had not had a chance to thoroughly
study the Kappel Report during the busy campaign, he had browsed
through it and "had a feeling it was worth doing".( 2 0 ) Thus, it
appears that a strong sense of a priori commitment to the postal
reform proposal served to pre-empt any serious challenge to the pre-
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vailing view, through independent Analysis.
The POD itself was not the source of any such challenge through
analysis, because Nixon had not yet decided who his PMG would be.
Later in the process, Nixon did direct Winton Blount, his new PMG,
to conduct a review of the Kappel Reportjand such a review was indeed
made within the POD. Our interviews with top postal management and
our examination of voluminous internal POD files convinced me that the
POD study Cid in fact, devote considerable attention to the manifold
issues raised in the Kappel Report. However, the basic orientation
of the POD study was one of concern with tactical and operational
decisions aimed at obtaining Congressional approval of the Commission's
basic recommencdation, (i.e., implementation of strategic decisions
previously reached at the White House level). This "implementation
orientation" is obvious in the following remarks of PMG Blount:*
The concept of converting the Post Office Department into
a government-owned corporation originated, as you know,
with former Postmaster General Larry O'Brien. After in-
tensive study of this problem he made this recommendation
two or three years ago. Following that recommendation
President Johnson appointed a Presidential Commission
composed of outstanding Americans with a very fine staff
that validated this concept after studying the problems
of this department for a year and spending over a million
dollars to do it. And now we are asking for the oppor-
tunity to implement this concept.(21)
The basic concern of the POD was with translating the recommendations
of the Kappel Commission into legislative proposals, and with support
*This analysis should not be mis-interpreted to mean that such a con-
cern with implementation factors was in any sense "wrong" or unimpor-
tant. The point here is that such an implementation focus served to
block any re-examination of the basic commitment to postal reform.
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recruitment and other legislative tactics. As a result, the basic
strategic patterns originally suggested by the Presidential Commis-
sion, and later adopted by the Nixon Administration early in its
tenure, were never seriously challenged by the analysis done in the
P)D.
llD2. Insensitivity to Reform Costs. A second finding which emerges
from analysis of the Nixon Administration's strategic decisions re-
garding postal reform, is an insensitivity to the reform costs, both
direct and indirect. This finding holds for the initial decision to
reform the Post Office along the lines suggested in the Kappel Report,
as well as for the subsequent patterns of behavior prevalent until
the strike phase. During the strike phase (which ocurred very late in
the policy formation process) the Nixon Administration became intensely
aware of cost ramifications, at least insofar as the actual dollar costs
involved in pending pay raise legislation and to a lesser degree to the
political costs of coalition and consensus building. The financial con-
cern was largely due to an overall anti-inflation strategy to which the
Administration had become committed. Thus, even this later interest
in the cost dimension cannot really be characterized as a concern with
the reform costs, per se. Rather, this concern was generated by an
unexpected conflict with another strategy; i.e., the anti-inflation
drive.
Examination of several Budget Bureau documents regarding postal
reform, sent to the White House during various stages of the policy
formation process, brought out clearly that while the Bureau had
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reservations about various issues (e.g., Presidential prerogatives,
budgetary control, capital funding, etc.) the issue of reform costs
apparently was never considered to be of major concern.(22) Mr.
Robert Mayo, Director of the Budget Bureau during the period under
investigation, independently confirmed that he was never asked and was
not aware of any other attempts to assess the potential reform costs.(23)
In our interview with him, he stated:
No, I can't say that anyone ever asked me for such an
assessment, and if they had, I am not quite sure how or
if it could be done. There was this commitment, I think,
to do generally what was necessary. Of course, some of
the later things were unforeseen, in terms of the strike,
etc., but there was certainly not to my knowledge any
formal or even semi-formal attempt to deal explicitly
with some ceiling costs--most likely costs, or anything
of that nature'! (p. 18)
The lack of any systematic assessment of reform costs was also con-
firmed by Arthur Burns(24 ) who gave this explanation for the state
of affairs described above:
There was no systematic assessment of costs, per se.
We were convinced it (reform) was the right thing to do.
Our concern then was with a strategy for the best way of
doing it. (p. 3)
Similarly the issue of the reform costs (direct and indirect) received
very little attention within the Post Office Department, except to the
extent that there was continuing concern over the huge deficit under
the existing system, and immediate concern over the issue of costs
as it related to POD efforts to simultaneously control somewhat con-
flicting pending legislation regarding postal reform, postal pay, and
postal rates.(25)
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11D3. Under-estimation of Policy Resources Required to Obtain Con-
gressional Approval of Postal Reform. A third basic issue which arises
from an examination of the various strategic decision made in the
early stages of the Nixon Adminstration is an under-estimation of the
policy resources required (time, energy, commitments in other policy
areas, economic resources, etc.) to obtain Congessional approval for
postal reform. After the basic strategic decision was made at the
White House level, control of the postal reform issue was left entirely
to the Post Office Department, Only after the 13:13 tie vote in the
House Post Office Committee and the ensuing pay/reform deadlock de-
scribed in the Case, did control of the issue move back to the White
House. When it became clear to the White House Staff that the Admin-
istration could not "afford" what were judged to be inflationary postal
pay demands, and that postal unions had the power to "veto" any further
action of the postal reform package, there emerged an unspoken feeling
that the battle for postal reform had essentially been lost because
(26)
the price of victory had become unacceptably high. At this point,
as the Case shows, the fortuitous and opportunistic intervention of
White House Staff Aide Charles Colson became a force which served to
unlock the stalemate,albeit at an ultimately high direct cost to the
Administration.*
*This reconstruction of events is based primarily on information provi-
ded by Colson and Ehrlichman during our interviews with them. Both de-
scribed PMG Blount as being quite upset over what he saw as "meddling" on
the part of White House Staffers. PMG Blount took exception (during our
interview) to the notion that the POD had in any sense "lost control" of
the reform situation or that he had called upon the White House for help.
Furthermore, he minimized the impact of Colson's intervention and vigor-
ously objected to the suggestion that postal reformn was "dead" until
Colson's initiative "revived" it.
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Several of President Nixon's top advisors told us that, in look-
ing back on the history of postal reform, they were surprised at the
high magnitude of policy resources which ultimately became committed
to the reform issue as PMG Blount carried ou the implementation of the
early White House strategic decisions. They referred not only to eco-
nomic costs, but also to time, energy, and other intangible political
costs.(27) One highly placed White House Aide(28 ) colorfully charac-
terized the unexpected nature and magnitude of the policy resources
expended, in this manner:
"As things unfolded, I think you found both sides engaged
in a battle of dimensions never envisioned. Both sides were
pushing in more chips than anyone had ever planned to put
into the game. Anyone's ability to guage these stakes in
advance was very, very limited. At the start, nobody really
anticipated that opposition would be so severe or diverse,
or that the stakes and costs would escalate that high. In
some games, once things escalate, it is good judgement to
pull out. However, if you've made a particular objective
the cornerstone of your package of objectives, you're sort
of committed to stay in the game, even if you have to put
up more chips than you ever planned on."(p. 9)
Undoubtedly, there were numerous factors which influenced this
under-estimation of the nature and magnitude of the policy resourees
which would eventually be expended in pursuit of postal reform. Based
on our interviews and overall knowledge of the situation, it is my in-
terpretation that the following three factors exerted a significant
influence:
1) An over-estimation of the effectiveness of public support
as a policy instrument.
2) An under-estimation of the power and the strength of the
objections of the postal unions.
3) A lack of appreciation of the possible unanticipated
consequences of PMG Blount's "crusade" for postal reform.
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1) Over-estimation of the Effectiveness of Public Support as a Policy
Instrument. The Nixon Administration placed a high value on the wide-
spread public support for postal reform which had been emanating from
the press, atleast some parts of the business community, various spe-
cial interest groups, Congressmen from both parties,etc. The likely
impact of this public support on the policy formation process appears
to have been exaggerated. This over-estimation created unrealistic
expectations that were impossible to meet when exposed to the tests
of the Congressional arena. Dr. Martin Anderson,(29) Director of
Research during Nixon's 1968 campaign, and later chief staff aide for
the Presidential Transition Task-Force directed by Arthur Burns, pro-
vided a succinct description of the atmosphere prevailing at:the time
these over-estimates were made, in these words:
'. . . everyone thought that postal reform was necessary
and was a 'good' program. We were never aware of any ob-
jection to the idea within the Republican 'family' involved
in the search, or in the other contact we made." (p. 2)
Obviously, not everyone thought that postal reform was a good and
necessary program. While it is true that there was widespread public
support for the idea, it is not at all clear that this support could
readily be converted into favorable Congressional votes.* Beyond the
erroneous assuption of isomorphism between public support and Congres-
sional action, Anderson's remarks are quite significant because they
tend to indicate not only the limited scope and direction of search,
but also some lack of sensitivity to the "learning feedback" dimension.
In this situation, the Kappel Report, and other widely published
material, gave clear evidence of the various sources of potential
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opposition to postal reform (especially the corporation plan). It
seems to me to be clear that systematic attention to learning feedback
would have highlighted this and other information which could have
severely challenged the "everyone supports postal reform" thesis.
Of course, in some situations, an over-dependency on learning feed-
back might introduce a conservative bias strong enough to undermine
progressive reform efforts. To the best of my knowledge, this was
not a relevant factor in this situation.
2) Under-Estimation of the Power and the Strength of the Objections
of the Postal Unions. The Kappel Report (and other public material)
well documented the opposition of the postal unions to the corporate
reform idea. Nonetheless, in the euphoria evidenced by Anderson's
remarks (quoted above) the Nixon Administration discounted the likely
union opposition as a major stumbling block in the path to postal re-
form. This seeming lack of political realism may be explained in one
of two ways. First, it is possible that the Republican Administration
simply perceived no open options for dealing with the union opposition,
and,therefore,chose to ignore it and to operate on other variables.
More realistic, I think, is a second explanation, which has to do with
the subjective "images" of the postal unions held by key Administration
policy actors. This image portrayed the postal unions as a fragmented,
self-serving alliance of lobbyists not deserving of being characterized
as "real" unions or as a potent part of the American labor union move-
ment. This "image" may well have inclined the policymakers to make
distorted judgements regarding the strength and depth of the postal
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unions' opposition to the corporate reform proposal, and their (in)-
ability to mount any coordinated, effective anti-reform campaign.
During the latter phases of the postal reform policy formation
process, the "image" was shown to be incorrect, or at least outdated,
and the potency of the union power and the seriousness of their ob-
jections became all too obvious to the Administration. However, by
that time, the dynamics of the ongoing conflict had already pushed
both sides into rigid postures. Also, it seems likely that as the
degree of intensity of the Administration's commitment to postal reform
became clearer, it precipitated stronger union opposition, and vice
versa.
3) Unanticipated Consequences of Blount's Crusade for Postal Reform.
As the Case well demonstrates, Winton Blount was ideally suited to
lead the crusade for postal reform. He was totally committed, per-
sonally, as to the "righteousness" of his cause. He was agressive,
competent, and unyielding, even in the face of the entrenched opposi-
tion, and despite the low policy feasibility ascribed to the postal
(30)
reform proposal by veteran observers of the Washington scene.
However, crusades can be costly affairs, especially when pursued with
missionary zeal and a rigid approach which seemingly preferred to
forcibly penetrate, rather than to avoid or to go around barriers.
Blount's tactics in pursuing the Holy Grail of postal reform were
criticized from various sources (friend and foe alike) as being in-
sensitive, unduly aggressive, sometimes abrasive, and always inflex-
ible. The essence of these criticisms is captured in these colorful
352
remarks of a highly-placed member of the White House Staff:(31)
"We expected some destruction and we knew we would have
to do some rebuilding, but at certain points we were ask-
ing ourselves, 'Did he (Blount) have to knock over that
Cathedral? "(p. 7)
I pass no judgements on these criticisms, but point them out as the
source of many real and imagined irritations to sensitive political
egos. This situation does suggest, however, that even the "right"
man for the change-agent role may well behave in a manner which pro-
duces costly and/or unanticipated consequences.
It is my strong impression that at least some of Blount's tactics
led to more rigid opposition, which, in turn, served to increase the
magnitude of the overall policy resources necessary to achieve passage
of the postal reform legislation. In making this observation, I feel
compelled to recognize Blount's dominant role as the driving force
behind the reform movement during the Nixon Administration, and I by
no means intend to detract from his critical, positive contribution to
the policy formation process.
llE. Nomination of Bount as Postmaster General
The nomination of Winton Bount as PMG can be viewed as the first
tactical decision within the overall postal reform strategy on the part
of the newly elected Republican Administration. President Nixon's
preconceived notion that the Post Office Department should be run as a
business* although not necessarily in the form advocated by the Kappel
*This notion is clear from Nixon's campaign remarks in which he addressed
the need for reform of the POD and stated: "I think we need a new system
in order to do it, and if we have to move toward more business practices,
get private enterprise into it on a proper basis, that is what we will do."
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Commission, influenced his decision about the kind of personality
he chose as PMG. As the Case describes, some of those considerations
were discussed during the meeting held by Nixon with Fredrick Kappel
a few days after the 1968 elections. In that meeting, Kappel told
Nixon that the ideal PMG appointee should be a "non-political person
with strong leadership qualities, lots of savvy, organizational ex-
perience, recognized management capability--but above all, should be
a hard-headed organizer; a man who could cut through the barriers."
The above observation clearly shows that personal characteristics and
institutional base constituted the main selection criteria for the
new PMG. This suggests that the image of the problem held by the
policymaker may have had considerable impact on the specifications
of the search for recruitment. As was noted in the earlier analysis
of the Conception and Birth Phase, a similar phenomenon appeared to
influence the formation of the Kappel Commission.
Blount, in a relatively short time, became a believer in the
postal reform idea as advocated by the Kappel Report. The recommen-
dations of the Report appear to have fit well with Blount's own ideol-
ogy and managerial orientation. A short time after Nixon offered him
the position of PMG, Blount met with former PMG O'Brien to discuss the
postal reform issue. O'Brien's observation on that meeting may shed
some light on the nature and degree of Blount's prior commitment and
orientation:
"Well, of course Red Blount did come to see me soon after
he was appointed Postmaster General; I don't know for
sure, but I presume, and he didn't say anything to the
contrary, that he had some prior commitment from President
Nixon on this, and had formed some opinion of his own. As
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I recall, when he did come to see me the first time, he
didn't really initially reveal his position on the whole
matter, but he was sort of probing me and getting my reac-
tion and opinions, and I can say that I exhibited to him
my very deep concern and deep commitment for the whole
idea. Not in any partisan sense, but in terms of actions
that were necessary to save the department in terms of giv-
ing the public the best service at the level it deserved
and the necessity to take care of a whole host of really
tragic situations that I sensed, as I said earlier, when
I sat in that chair only for a few months as Postmaster
General. When I made my position very clear to Blount,
he at that time made clear also his position that he was
quite sympathetic with the Kappel recommendations, and
intended to do all he could to move in that direction. Of
course, as you know, once a guy like Red Blount is commit-
ted and decides to move in a certain direction, that's a
pretty powerful motivationS (33)
Thus, it is clear that any analysis of the implementation of the Nixon
Administration's postal reform strategy would be incomplete without
taking into account Blount's critical role. Bount more than Nixon
became committed to a specific solution; one which he strongly ad-
vocated within the Administration. He accepted the job of PMG on the
condition that Nixon would fully support him in working for Congres-
sional approval of postal reform.(34 ) This description of events, as
(35)provided by Blount, was also confirmed by President Nixon. Al-
though it would be simplistic to attempt to explain President Nixon's
strategic decision-making solely on the basis of Blount's high degree
of commitment and strong advocacy; it seems to me that Blount's per-
sistence can be viewed not only as a factor tending to confirm the
early thinking with the Nixon Administration, but also as a catalyst
which precipitated the continuing support of the White House even in
the face of unexpectedly high costs.
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llF. The Decision to Abolish Postal Patronage
In January 1969, President Nixon surprised both Republicans and
Democrats alike by announcing that he had decided to end the long-
standing practice of staffing the postal system with political ap-
poirtees. This unusual and difficult decision for the Nixon Admin-
istration to abolish postal patronage and to voluntarily relinquish
so many jobs for its politically deserving (about 1800 postmasters
and 1600 rural carriers') should be viewed as an integral part of an
overall strategy aimed at establishing credibility in the Congress
and with the public regarding the new Administration's intentions
vis-a-vis postal reform. In a broader context, the plan to abolish
postal patronage fit well into the new Administration's objective of
re-establishing public confidence in government.
In Burn's words:(36)
"One important thing here is the fact that a number of us
felt a real need for this Administration to do something
which would re-establish public confidence in government.
It was obvious that the confidence had been severely test-
ed. We looked for programs which would help restore it.
Taking the Post Office out of politics especially the pat-
ronage part--was viewed as fairly important and dramatic
move which would have positive appeal. . ." (p. 2)
This strategic decision, taken less than three weeks after Nixon's
entrance into the White House, created serious resentment in Congress,
on both sides of the aisle. The resentment, especially among the Rep-
publiman Congressmen, was more about the timing of the decision and the
lack of prior consultation, than about any essential opposition to the
idea. Although Bryce Harlow, President Nixon's aide for Congressional
liason, tried to explain to the angry Senators and Congressmen that
356
there was not any conscious effort on the part of the White House to
shai-circuit Congress,( 3 7 ) there exists evidence that this action was
an intentional move designed to avoid potential pressure from Re-
publican Congressmen to delay the decision until the vacant jobs could
be filled by Republicans. Knowing that the Administration would not
gain favor with "professional Republican politicians" by abolishing
postal patronage, the main strategy was to work toward a much broader
public appeal with a rather dramatic move which undeniably was a large
first step in removing the PCD from politics.( 3 8 )
PMG Blount, in our interview with him, defined this tactical move
as the cornerstone of the future Administration victory.( 3 9 ) Even if
Blount's assessment about the impact of this decision is somewhat over-
estimated, other closely-involved actors interviewed by us (Burns,
Ehrlichman, Harlow, Derwinski, and others) expressed the view that
this decision was certainly effective in terms of increasing the
credibility of Nixon's determined efforts aimed at achieving Congres-
sional approval of his postal reform proposal. Therefore, it put the
Administration in a stronger tactical position in the subsequent leg-
islative maneuvering over postal reform. Thus, the costly (at least
in the near term) decision to abolish postal patronage again reveals
Nixon's strong commitment to postal reform. It is also another indi-
cation of the Administration's explicit, broad strategy for achieving
postal reform., even though that strategy was apparently a rather in-
formal one which emerged out of the tacit consensus of key White House
advisors. Arthur Burns described the patronage decision in this man-
ner(40)ner :
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". .. it would be fair to say that our overall strategy
was, first, moving on the patronage issue as a means of
establishing public confidence in government and of esta-
blishing our credibility and seriousness. Reorganization
(of the postal system) followed as the next logical step.
Both were part of a package which we were convinced was the
right thing to do."(p. 3)
11G. Summary
In this selective analysis of the Transition Phase, we have ex-
amined the impact of a change in political Administrations on the
postal policy formation process. This analysis showed that a complete
hiatus in the process was precluded by several factors. The major
explanatory variable was the early strategic decision flowing from
President Nixon's initiative, resulting in his endorsement of postal
reform and the decision to make its legislative achievement a major
goal of his Republican Administration. We have seen that this key
decision was largely the result of the "match" between Nixon's ide-
ological and instrumental beliefs about government, and the "avail-
ability" of the postal reform idea as an at least partially developed
"policy package" which could be relatively easily converted into an
operational legislative package. This analysis also highlighted the
crucial role of strategic choices in providing a framework for sub-
sequent decisions and actions. It also brought out the important role
of analysis in molding the degree of personal commitment which key
policy actors may initially hold intuitively.
In addition, this analysis also served to increase our under-
standing of the role and impact of a highly committed policy actor
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who operates in a crusading role to accomplish change thought to be
very unlikely to occur. The costly nature and unanticipated conse-
quences of such a leadership style were also examined.
Finally, the impact of a strong a priori commitment, in terms
of surpressing additional analysis and diverting attention away from
the policy cost dimension, was explored.
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Chapter Twelve
Selective Analysis of the Realization Phase
12A. Introduction and Overview
This analysis of the Realization Phase will be much less detailed
than was the earlier analysis of the preceeding Phases. This is so,
because, when viewed from a perspective of the strategic aspects of the
overall policy formation process, much of the activity in this Phase
represents tactical legislative maneuvering aimed at implementation of
strategic decisions taken in earlier Phases. By this time, the policy
formation process had matured to a state wherein the policy system had
become preoccupied with a concern over legislative approval of earlier
reform efforts.
During this Phase, most of the policy actors operated through poli-
tical channels. This mode of operation was, in large measure, pre-
determined by the following factors:
1) earlier strategic choices regarding the scope and intensity
of policy change now required political ratification.
2) activity in the Phase was basically legislative in nature,
thus requiring that it be played-out in a Congressional context.
3) this Phase was dominated by the rather intense interactions
of a relatively small number of policymakers.
Thus, political variables were the most active and influential ones
during the Realization Phase. However, as Dolenga points out( 1 ), analy-
tical inputs from prior Phases (especially the Kappel Commission Report)
had a distinct influence on the operation of the policy formation pro-
cess in this Phase.
The specific analysis of the Realization Phase will focus on those
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components of the conceptual framework which encompass the many aspects
of policy strategies. In particular, we will be concerned with the
following dimensions:
1) the need for change
2) varying perceptions of reform
3) Administration Strategy (in terms of political sensitivity
and strategy flexibility)
4) the impact of crisis on the policy formation process
5) the motivation and role of key policy actors
12B. Legislative Proceedings and the Need for Change
As already noted, legislative activity in a congressional context
dominated this Phase of the Postal Reform Case. Examination of the ex-
tended Congressional proceedings during the long Hearings and the Commit-
tee deliberations clearly revealed a high degree of dissatisfaction with
the existing state of the postal system. There was common agreement on
the need for policy change, but disagreement on the appropriate inten-
sity and scope of change.
This conclusion, reached first on the basis of our interviews, is
also consistent with the House Committee Report which states:
There is unusual agreement among postal officials and indepen-
dent authorities on the need for sweeping reforms in the postal
policies and operations. Not a single witness who appeared
before the Committee argued that the Post Office should be con-
tinued without change. This is all the more remarkable in the
light of the fact that the record of Committee Hearings, ex-
tending now over 1500 pages, reflects every interest viewpoint
and was open to witnesses holding widely differing positions.
Although this record contains disagreement about the precise
form that postal modernization should take, there is virtual
unanimity of dissatisfaction with the present state of the Pos-
tal system. (2)
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12C. Varying Perceptions of Reform
Although the Kappel Commission Report uses the term "sweeping re-
forms", analysis of the Congressional Hearings shows that the various
actors held quite different perceptions of the meaning of sweeping re-
forms or fundamental change. Chairman Dulski perceived, for instance,
that his H. R. 4 Bill constituted a radical change and represented ma-
jor reform. As Dulski commented at one Committee Hearing:
"I certainly agree that major change, possibly even radical
change, are needed in our postal policy. .. . . Don't
you think that H. R. 4 and other bills that do not enhance the
corporate idea have postal reform?" (3)
PMG O'Brien revealed his perception of reform when he said:
"I believed that piecemeal solutions will not affect the under-
lying problem which is to place the postal service in a total-
ly non-political context." (4)
Varying perceptions of the term "reform" were shaped: partly by ac-
tors intentions; partly by images of potential utilities and disutili-
ties; and partly by actors' estimations of the likely results of different
alternatives. Behind the incremental vs. radical (or fundamental) fa-
cade the issue under decision involved changes in deeply rooted rules-
of-the-game, and touched upon very strong vested interests.
The postal reform proposal, as presented in various Administration
Bills, was, in effect, directed at changing the "division of labor" be-
tween the Congress and the Post Office Department. The objective, of
course, was to strengthen the policy influence of the POD. From this
point of view, the Nixon Administration's goals and strategy were consis-
tant. Although the reform proposals appeared for tactical reasons under
different names, sometimes being sponsored by different Congressmen, the
main strategic patterns were the same. These were aimed at changing the
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distribution of power between the Post Office Department and the Con-
gress. Such a significant transfer of power is nearly always resisted,
especially where there exists a traditional coalition between powerful
vested interests (here, the postal unions and the House Committee).
Although the arguments for and against the postal reform proposal
suggested by the Administration included a wide spectrum of discrete
postal issues, the justification given by the opponents and proponents
in the course of the Hearings was hardly new. They included the tradi-
tional arguments for and against incremental changes, tailored to the
postal situation. Congressional Hearings reflected that different
actors in inter-organizational decision-making situations approach the
problem with a different set of goals, values, etc. While the Adminis-
tration saw postal reform mainly in terms of efficiency and effective-
ness, some Congressmen saw it as a dilution of their direct influence
over the Post Office, and a decrease in the Executive sensitivity to
particular interests.
12D. Administration Strategy
As already noted, most significant strategic decisions were made in
earlier Phases of the Postal Reform Case. Here we will view the imple-
mentations of the prior strategic decisions, along two dimensions; poli-
tical sensitivity and strategy flexibility.
12D1. Lack of Political Sensitivity. One striking characteristic of
the Nixon Administration's behavior during the legislative process was
a lack of political sensitivity. This lack of political sensitivity
carried with it some advantages and disadvantages.
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The advantages of this lack of political sensitivity are seen in
the determined efforts to strive to overcome apparently insurmountable
barriers and to achieve not only the improbable but the nearly impossi-
ble. There exists nearly complete agreement among reform proponents and
opponents alike that BMG Blount's political insensitivity and.strong de-
dication were among the main explanatory variables of why this "politi-
cal miracle" ( 5 ) materialized. This observation goes along with the
criticism that Blount's inflexibility and lack of political sensitivity
created some unnecessary problems with the Congress and the postal
unions which probably could have been avoided or at least considerably
reduced.
The disadvantages resulting from a lack of political sensitivity are
not difficult to identify. They include:
1) the creation of unnecessary tension with the Republican
members of Congress by the surprise strategic decision to abo-
lish the postal patronage for which they had not been pre-
pared in advance;
2) the almost complete absence of communication with the union
leaders during the first months in office which created "ill
feelings" among some of them and presumably did not contribute
to the establishment of better understanding. PMG Blount, him-
self, admitted in our interview that this was a mistake on his
part;
3) the White House (Colson's) strategy to keep Congress and the
union leaders out of the picture during the Colson-Rademacher
negotiations.
12D2. Strategy Flexibility. The rigidity and inelasticity of the Admin-
istration strategy to tie the pay bill with reform, and Congressional
maneuvering, are the main suggestive variables which unintentionally
contributed to an accumulation of frustration among postal rank and file,
which finally led to the postal strike. This strategy, and especially
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its inelastic implementation, was expensive in terms of missing options
and irreversible facts while the policy formation was proceeding. Al-
though during the postal strike Blount declared that the President
had never made the pay increase a hostage for reform,(6 ) there is clear
evidence that this was in fact, the Administration strategy, at least
after the Rademacher-Colson agreement.(7)
Our interview responses on this issue can be categorized into three
groups:
One group, composed mainly of Congressmen and union leaders who
opposed the Administration reform proposal, challenged the validity of
the strategy of tying the pay increase with reform, arguing that this
strategy led to the unnecessary postal strike.
The second group, composed mainly of Post Office top officials,
including Postmaster General Blount, expressed the view that in the
particular circumstances of power distribution this was the only strate-
gy to get the reform through Congress. Consistent implementation of this
strategy, according to this view, made postal reform possible.
The third group, which includes many reform proponents within and
outside the Administration, did not challenge the essence of this strate-
gy, but criticized its rigidity and inelastic implementation. This kind
of criticism is well reflected in Labor Secretary Shultz's statement:
"To link the justifiable demands of postal employees with reform
and to leave the thing pending seems to be a colossal error
for which we now pay a great penalty." (8)
This frequently voiced criticism of rigid implementation seems to have
considerable validity.
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12E. The Impact of Crisis on the Policy Formation Process
A central issue of major theoretical and pragmatic importance is
the impact of the postal strike on the postal reform policy formation
process. We will deal with this issue by examining the following dimen-
sions:
1) The strike-crisis: systems behavior and general character-
istics
2) Strike-crisis as a critical mass
3) Feasibility and consensus building
4) Crisis and policy feasibility
5) Attitudinal changes
6) Search behavior
1) The Strike Crisis: Systems Behavior and General Characteristics
Despite persistent reports(9 ) of serious unrest among the rank and
file, postal officials operated under the theory that a strike wouldn't
occur. The postal officials told Congressional leaders and reporters that
the strike talk by unions was "just talk" and that the postal unions
would "run like turkeys" if a strike situation came up.(lO)
Our interviews with postal officials,(ll) the Assistant Secretary
of Labor., ( 2) and well-known labor reporters in Washington,(13) clearly
show that the strike (and especially its rapid spread) was an unexpected
shock for the Post Office Department. Case data and interviews(l)
show that the Post Office Department was not prepared for strategic
crisis management of such a scope.
This thesis is also supported by a Kappel Commission internal study
entitled, "Impact of Strike on the POD". This study clearly points
out that the Post Office had no contingency plan( 1 5) in the event of
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strike, and gives this explanation:
"The Post Office Department has no contingency plan in the
event of strike or slow down in the postal system. A request
for information from POD officials as to the impact of the
postal strike was met with the observation that the possibility
of a strike was almost unworthy of serious consideration be-
cause of the legal prohibition against postal strikes."(16)
Although this source of information may have some limitation because of
the time lag between the observation made and the timing of the postal
strike, its main value lies in the potential explanation of why antici-
patory measures were not undertaken.
In addition to the explanation given above, case data suggests that
the main explanatory variable of Post Office behavior lies in the
images held by top postal management of the unions as lobbyists and low
risk-takers. The tendency of the Administration, and especially the
Post Office top management, to perceive the unions' risk-acceptance be-
havior from the stand point of their own approach, inclined them to
make distorted jusgements about the unions' intentions regarding strike
action.
Not only was the strike a shock to the Post Office Department, it
also surprised postal union leaders. Although James Rademacher, Presi-
dent of the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) himself
predicted a strike if there were no solution to the pay/reform impasse,(7)
even he was surprised at the suddenness with which it came. Moreover,
the work stoppage caught the AFL-CIO, with which NALC is affiliated, com-
(18)pletely off-guard. A top AFL-CIO official admitted:
"It came from out of nowhere. We were aware of rumblings, but
we did not know they were immediate arid urgent." (19)
The Postal Unions, like the Post Office Department, were not experienced
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and not prepared to manage a crisis of such proportions.
Creation of Artificial Crisis. Some actors on the union side repeatedly
accused the POD, and FMG Blount personally, of creating an artificial
catastrophe to make the postal reform idea more palatable to the public
and to Congress. A more restricted "tone" of this charge may be heard
even in the Congressional Hearings:
"Sometimes I am inclined to think that the present postal admin-
istration is deliberately trying to run the postal service into
the ground--to create an artificial catastrophe in the mail--
simply to make the corporation idea more palatable to the pub-
lic and the Congress." (20)
L could not find any supporting evidence for such a charge. On the
contrary, the data supports the thesis that the strike came as a surprise
for the Post Office Department and the Administration. Of course, the
reaction of the POD and the Administration once the strike had begun is
another matter. As the Case demonstrates, the Administration did attempt
to make strategic use of the strike, once it had started.
Summary. Examination of the postal strike-crisis leads us to the conclu-
sion that neither the Administration nor the postal unions were prepared
to manage a labor crisis of Federal employees of such a scope. Particu-
larly striking are the following:
-lack of strategies to deal with the issue
-lack of contigency plans
-lack of mechanisms, doctrines, etc.
The strike situation clearly demonstrated the inability of both the
Post Office and the unions to react appropriately to the new and the un-
familiar. Furthermore, the charges that the POD wanted to (or did) create
372
an artificial crisis in order to increase the political feasibility of
the postal reform legislation could not be supported.
2) Strike-Crisis as a Critical Mass
During the period from the Conception and Birth Phase until the
postal strike, the readiness of the policy system for radical change,
increased in a step-level function as a result of dissatisfaction with
the effects of past policies and recognition of a performance gap. How-
ever, this increase was not sufficient to overcome the strong resistance
to the Administration's reform proposal on the part of certain unions
and certain members of Congress. The strike-crisis event can be viewed
as a critical mass which facilitated the acceptance of radical change
on the part of the policy system, even though there were varying percep-
tions of just what radical change meant operationally.
The Postal Reform experience may suggest the proposition that crisis
situations reduce the value sensitivity of various actors and often pro-
vide impetus for reconsideration of values which are usually beyond the
domain of decisions. This is well demonstrated in the Republican Admin-
istration's advocacy of an agreement that would have made the union shop
issue a matter of collective bargaining, in apparent violation of the
right to work plank of the 1968 Republican platform. It is also evidenced
by the Unions' tacit acceptance of the right-to-work amendment, although
Meany had previously stated that the "right to work is basically anti-
labor in purpose and effect." ( 21)
To put this in the proper perspective, we must remember that the
union shop, or more precisely compulsory unionism, and the right-to-work
issue, were value-laden issues for both the Republican Administration
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and for labor.
3) Crisis-Feasibility and Consensus Building
The postal strike experience tends to suggest that in crisis situa-
tions it is relatively easy to crystallize consensus on radical departures
in policy among actors with diverse goals, values, and interests. The
existence of imminent danger to actors' high priority goals, of percep-
tions of urgance, of short decision time, and of a narrow range of open
options, may produce consensus that would be difficult to achieve in non-
crisis situations.
The conditions of imminent danger to actors' high priority goals
(22)
were well reflected in White House internal deliberations and in Presi-
dent Nixon's declaration of a national emergency, wherein he stated that
"the issue is survival of government based on law". (23) For the NALC and
for other unions, the issue was union survival.(2)
The perception of urgency and short decision time were reflected
in the Union-Administration strike settlement negotiations and in the
Congressional rush to pass Phase I. The legislative proposals regard-
ing Phase I of the total postal reform legislative package were sent to
the Congress on April 3, 1970, was signed by President Nixon less than
two weeks later, and became a law on April 15, 1970.(25)
The differences between crisis and non-crisis situations are well
reflected by Congressional behavior in Phase II of the postal reform
legislation. The relative absence of urgency and stress, which produced
Phase I- Pay raise legislation.
Phase II - Postal Reorganization legislation.
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momentary fluctuation in the stable incremental Congressional legislative
process in Phase I, made the task of consensus building in Phase II more
difficult( 2 6 ) and the tendencies of the incremental processes to reassert
themselves became more visible.(27) This situation is well illustrated
in FMG Blount's urgent memo to President Nixon asking his "intervention"
to obtain an "unequivocable commitment" from Congressman Corbett (the rank-
ing minority leader in the House Post Office and Civil Service Commit-
tee) to support Administrative strategy. Blount wrote:
"The Committee added 10 admendments to IR 17070 during its
deliberations in executive sessions. Several of these amend-
ments would seriously jeopardize the objective of achieving
meaningful postal reform. . "
"It is absolutely critical that the Administration obtain a
firm and unequivocable commitment from Congressman Corbett
that he will actively support this Administration's strate-
gy." (28)
4) Crisis and Policy Feasibility
Closely related to consensus-building is the issue of policy feasi-
bility. The intensity of the interface between the Post Office and the
Congress, and the existence of strong coalitions between the Congressional
Post Office and Civil Service Committees and the unions, made the Admin-
istration reform proposal practically impossible unless accompanied by
some changes in the political rules-of-the-game. Such changes were not
regarded as forthcoming; Postal reform was, accordingly, deemed unat-
tainable by many of those who had recognized the need for a fundamental
reform and were ready for it.
The view that postal reform was infeasible, even a few months before
the enactment of the legislation, was clearly confirmed by all policy
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actors interviewed, including reform proponents and opponents alike.
(29)
Review of the voluminous press coverage, editorials, etc., related
to the period of investigation, leads to the same conclusion. Similar
responses were recorded in our interviews with several prominent Washing-
ton journalists(30) knowledgeable in this field. Perhaps the most typi-
cal estimation of reform feasibility reflected in the press is summarized
in the New York Times:(31 )
"Outlook: proponents of reform believe it may be several
years before sufficient Congressional support can be mustered
to enact the corporate idea."
This estimation is especially important, since it had been published
less than two weeks before the basic strike-settlement agreement was
reached. Bryce Harlow, Presidential Counselor, and an experienced poli-
tician, told us in our interview that the passage of postal reform was
a "political miracle" and that any reasonable politician would have
given up long before its passage.(32) President Nixon himself admitted:
"I know you are aware of the fact that when he (PMG Blount)
assumed this office the chances of this postal reform being
approved, and now being signed today, were considered to be
very, very small." (33)
The postal reform experience clearly reflects both the value of
and the difficulties involved in an estimation of political feasibility.
This may suggest normative implications to the effect that any political
feasibility estimate, however carefully derived and however correct at
its time, must be regarded as provisional, sometimes to be taken up as
a challenge rather than accepted as an absolute constraint.
The postal strike situation demonstrates that policy feasibility is
FMG Winton Blount was, of course, a distinguished exception.
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often a time sensitive endeavor, but the relationship between time and
policy feasibility may be neither linear, nor fixed in direction, nor
continuous. In this situation, feasibility increased in jumps as a con-
sequence of crisis. The postal reform experience further suggests the
importance and potential usefulness of preparing in advance suggestions
for policy improvement, even at a time when their political feasibility
is low. Such suggestions may become feasible due to crisis, missionary
commitment of leadership, or pressure of new problems.
5) Crisis and Change of Existing Attitudes
One of the issues which emerged in this study was, to what extent
the postal strike-crisis situation changed the existing attitudes of
the actors involved in the situation. The results of interviews with
union leaders, Congressmen , and Executive Branch top officials suggest
that crisis interface did not change the existing attitudes.
The postal strike-crisis situation created a context that led ac-
tors to behave in certain ways which facilitated consensus. However,
earlier patterns of behavior tended to quickly reassert themselves after
the danger of imminent crisis was over. For example, in describing the
post-strike negotiations with the Post Office Department, the head of
the largest postal union said:
"It is my contention that management never intended to bargain
with us in good faith. Negotiation, after all, is the art of
give and take. Management was more than willing to take any-
thing it could lay its hands on, but it was absolutely adamant
about giving--even on the smallest and most inconsequential
points. Their proposals were merely insulting--designed only
to take away some rights we already possess, and not to embel-
lish existing rights. We sat around the table during a per-
iod of 90 gruelling days and never once did management show
the slightest indication of reason or compassion." (34)
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This suggests that what really happened was that crisis created a shift
in the priority of goals, but produced no lasting attitudinal changes.
6) Search Behavior
The postal strike crisis clearly demonstrates that in crisis sit-
uations the systematic search for alternatives is considerable reduced
and there exists a tendency to consider fewer alternative solutions, as
compared with other phases of policy formation. A short decision time
imposed rigid restrictions on the scope and duration of the search that
could be undertaken. This does not mean that an extensive, less syste-
matic search process did not take place. The strike-crisis phase in-
volved an increased search for definitional information, but this
search can hardly be characterized as systematic. It was carried out
through very limited channels (mainly by top officials of the Labor De-
partment) and it was focused on "putting-out-fires", rather than pre-
venting conflagration.
Although an absence of longer range and systematic search was temper-
ed somewhat by Labor Secretary Shultz's innovative and unconventional
approach to the problem, very limited systematic search and ad hoc response
to the problem was still the dominant mode of operation. Shultz's be-
havior during the strike crisis may suggest that imaginative policy makers
are able to conceive a number of possible responses without engaging
in systematic search. This is consistent with the suggestion in the
framework about the important role of extra-rational processes in policy
formation.
12F. The Motivation and Role of Key Policy Actors
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The conceptual framework suggests that policy actors' motivations
and intentions depend on the images of the potential utilities and dis-
utilities associated with discrete policy alternatives. The images of
potential utilities may depend in part on the goals of each actor and
his estimation of the results of the different alternatives. We will
apply this concept to the behavior of two of the main policy actors
who influenced the Realization Phase.
12F1. Chairman Dulski. Before applying the above concept to an analy-
sis of Chairman Dulski's motivations, we must first try to identify
Dulski's goals and his estimation of the potential impact of different
alternatives.
Our interview data and an extensive examination of archival material
strongly suggests that Dulski's ultimate goal was to maintain the status
quo in the distribution of power between the Post Office Department and
the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee which he chaired. The
postal reform proposals were directed at changing the "division of power"
between the POD and the Congress (in this instance the House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee) in the direction of increasing the autonomy
of the Post Office and strengthening its influence on policy. Such a
transfer of power is nearly always resisted by the "losing" party.
Dulski's motivations can be explained in both institutional and per-
sonal dimensions:
a) On the institutional dimension, the ieform proposal if
accepted would considerably reduce the power of the Post Office
and Civil Service Committee (which was not considered to be
one of the most attractive Committees in Congress).
The annual oversight function and responsibility of the Congress included
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in the reform proposal, which in practice could be an ample opportunity
for the Committee to focus its attention on important policy issues, was
not perceived as equal to the existing opportunity to have a subject to
gr§apple with that appeared familiar and easily comprehensible:
b) On a more personal dimension, even though other C6nmittee
members saw the Post Office and Civil Service Committee as a
stepping stone to other positions in Congress, for Dulski it
was probably the peak of his Congressional career and naturally
he was sensitive about seeing his base of power swept away.
Dulski soon realized that both the very favorable public response
to O'Brien's proposal and the establishment of the Presidential
Commission created changes in the situation which required some kind
of response. In this light we should view Dulski's initiative to open
Congressional Hearings, his testimony before his own committee (an un-
precedented move by a Committee Chairman), and finally the introduction
of his H. R. 4 Bill as countermeasures to the Kappel Report. Dulski
understood that some changes were necessary in order to improve the
Post Office operation and he was even ready to transfer some of the pow-
er vested in the Congress to the Post Office, but without changing radi-
cally the distribution of power between these tow institutions.
Dulski's intentions were verbally rationalized by these well-known
arguments in favor of incremental strategy:
a) Maximization of Security in Making Change. This arguwnent, exten-
sively used by Dulski during the Congressional Hearings, is perhaps
best reflected in his letter to the Editorial Chief of Life Magazine,
where he states:
"The step of (change) is easy but the step back would be
something else." (36)
b) Intensity of Change. Preferring slow incremental change over
C)-
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relative long-time period. It was suggested by a staff member( 3 7 ) that
Dulski had in mind that after five years there would be the possibility
of moving toward the governmental corporation structure.
c) Uncertainty Cause. The argument that the radical change as pro-
posed by the Administration would be associated with the new and the
unfamiliar, causing unnecessary problems is well reflected in Dulski's
letter to President Nixon, where he states:
".. The arguments presented in favor of a corporate structure
for the postal service, in my opinion, are not necessarily so
restricted. These recommendations can be adopted to the de-
partment as it is now constituted.
In this way we will not be additionally burdened with the many
new problems that would emanate from a completely new entity."(38)
d) Simultaneous Accommodation of Old and New. Finally, Chairman Dul-
ski's intentions are fairly reflected in his H. R. 4 Bill which clearly
demonstrated that incremental change has the advantage of accommodating
old interests even while attempting to develop new patterns.
One generalization that seems evident from the study of Dulski's
behavior is that few policy actors give up power willingly.. If external
expectations begin to threaten the traditional power of those holding
it, their reaction is to temper it and adjust, while preserving the forms
of power by accommodating old interests and attempting to develop new
patterns.
12F2. Mr. George Meany. At the signing ceremony which formalized appro-
val of the postal reform legislation, President Nixon remarked that "with-
out the personal support of Mr. Meany and his organization, this reform
could not have been accomplished." (39) Nixon's remark well summarizes
George Meany's dominant role during the strike settlement phase. As the
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Case shows, Meany played a critical role in facilitating the historic
agreement reached between the unions and the Nixon Administration which
ultimately led to enactment of the postal reform legislation.
The Case clearly portrays Meany's consistent opposition during the
early stages of the policy formation process to the basic idea of a
governmental corporation. He opposed removal of the PMG position from
the Cabinet and the severing of Congressional control over postal opera-
tions. His position is well reflected in his footnote in the Kappel
Report(4 0 ) and in his remarks before the Post Office and Civil Service
Committee. (4 1 ) His early public sentiments are summarized in the 1969
AFL/CIO Convention Resolution, which states in part:
"Needed reforms and modernization of the Postal Service can be
made within the framework of the existing departmental struc-
ture." (42)
Later, as the Case well portrays, Meany supported the Administration's
postal reform bill before the Congress. Our interest here will be in
examining some of the possible reasons behind Meany's change in position.
During our interviews with them, several AFL/CIO officials suggested
that Meany's early public opposition to the corporate reform proposal
was mainly based upon the request of the postal unions affiliated with
the AFL/CIO.( 4 3) My best reconstruction of these events is that Meany
honored such a request without devoting too much attention to the postal
situation, because of the loose relationship then existing between the
AFL/CIO and the postal unions. This would partially explain Meany's
*
A union official who wished to ramian anonymous suggested that, at that
time, Meany did not consider the postal unions to be a legitimate part
of the U. S. labor movement and that their relations with the AFL/CIO
were strained, at best.
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nominal particiaption in the Kappel Commission and his one-time request
to be removed from the Commission.(4 4 ) Based upon his more recent behavior
vis-a-vis the Pay Board, I would speculate that Meany's real motivation
for not wanting to become involved in the ongoing work of the Kappel
Commission was a desire to avoid co-optation by what he perceived to be
a business/management dominated Commission.
When the postal strike reached crisis proportaions, Meany's partici-
pation was requested both by the White House and by the postal unions.
Based on my best knowledge of Meany's role and motivation, I interpret
his behavior in the postal strike situation as being related to his much
broader objective of institutionalizingc ollective bargaining in the
public sector. It seems plausible that he saw in the postal strike an
opportunity to make a precedent-setting settlement that would advance a
long term objective which he had long advocated.( 4 5) This interpreta-
tion is supported by Meany's own remarks at the press conference held
immediately after the strike settlement agreement was reached. On that
accasion he said:
"However the most significant thing about this agreement from
my point of view is the agreement of the Post Office Depart-
ment representing the President of the United States, represent-
..... ing the executive branch of the government, that collective
bargaining procedures should be established to cover every
single phase of collective bargaining which now prevails in the
private sector." (46)
Beyond these pragmatic considerations, two theoretical considerations
are worhty of note. First, the above interpretation of Meany's motiva-
tion highlights the potential value of examining the spillover effects
from other policies as a means of facilitating understanding of proximate
behavior. Secondly, the mechanism Meany utilized to coalesce the
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fragmented postal unions into a more monolithic bargaining unit seemed
to greatly facilitate the strike settlement negotiations, especially
since it was matched by a similar arrangement on the government side.
The strike settlement negotiations, therefore, provide empirical support
for Diesing's hypothesis that "bargaining structures are most effective
when they are differentiated into a few, ideally two, clearly defined
groups (47)
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Chapter Thirteen
Summary and Conclusions
13A. Introduction and Overview
It is always extremely difficult to summarize a study of this
length and complexity. A brief summary tends to lose the richness of
the points in question, while a lengthy summary begins to repeat the
main body of the test and to make the overall length intolerable.
Keeping these problems in mind, this summary chapter will attempt to
extract from the preceeding comprehensive study the most salient points,
from a policy analysis and research perspective.
The chapter will be in two parts. In the first part, major
points from the case analysis will be summarized and integrated. In
the second and final part, we will briefly review the utlility of the
conceptual framework for its intended purposes.
13B. The Significance of Strategic Decisions
Examination of the postal reform policy formation process clearly
reveals that strategic decisions had a significant impact on the' over-
all decisional processes in the sense of providing a framework and guide-
lines for more discrete decisions made later in the process. In my
earlier theoretical work I identified five strategic decision issues:
1) the decision to make a decision to make a decision; 2) time pre-
ferences; 3) scope and intensity of change; 4) boundary delimitation;
and 5) policy instruments. Although all five of these proved to be
important strategic issues in the Postal Reform Case, the first three
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had a relatively greater impact on the ensuing process. The Case and
the analysis of it demonstrated a high degree of inter-relatedness
between and among these issues.
Basic strategic decision also had a considerable impact in
shaping the patterns and direction of analysis, in the sense of de-
limiting the direction and degree of penetration of search and in
molding the nature of policy alternatives contemplated. That is, they
defined "acceptable scenarios" for the analytical effort.
These points were illustrated by O'Brien's decision to propose
Postal Reform, the Quadriad and Kappel Commission decisions to advocate
radical change, and finally, the Nixon Administration decision to pro-
pose and support Postal Reform legislation.
13C. The Nature of the Strategic Decision Process
Reconstruction of the emergence of various strategic decisions
(except in the strike-crisis phase) indicates that this was an iterative,
loosely structured, open-ended, and non-sequential process. This find-
ing is important because of the widely accepted conceptions which attempt
to impose a more ordered impression about such processes than can be
empirically justified. Frequently this imputed sense of orderliness and
sequential nature results from attempts to associate strategies with
pre-conceived "master plans" including all, or at least many, possible
contingencies. The postal policy formation experience suggests that a
simplistic notion to be more myth than reality. The empirical data
vividly and repeatedly portrayed the ill-structured, diffuse nature of
the strategic decision process themselves, as well as the structure
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(context) in which these decisions are taken.
13D. The Role of Extra-rational Processes and Ideological Predispo-
sitions in Strategic Decision-Making
Analysis of the main strategic decisions taken in the postal
policy formation process pointed out the crucial role of the extra-
rational processes in such decision-making. The role of introspec-
tion, overall Gestalt impressions, trained experience and intuitive
understanding of the broad situation was clearly demonstrated in the
specific decision under investigation. The behavior of O'Brien, the
Kappel Commissioners, Blount, and other policy actors demonstrated
that tacit knowledge and experienced intuition may provide a feeling
for the overall Gestalt of problem configuration and the direction of
potential solutions.
Most of the key policymakers had a good (intuitive) understanding
as to the basic nature of the problem and at least some vague notion
about the general direction of potential solution, even in the early
stages of the process. But these preconceived notions required stronger
conceptualization, more elaboration, further crystalization, validation,
and translation into more operational "policy packages". This was of
the main roles and contributions of analysis to the decision-making
processes. The heuristic interplay between extra-rational processes
and more systematic, analytical processes was a consistent and major
finding of this study. This finding challenges the widespread assump-
tion in much of the decision theory and policy literature that there
is some intrinsic antipathy between extra-rational process and analytical
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process. Although this finding suggests that analysis can, at best,
become an additional component in an aggregative, multi-dimensional.
policy process--contributing to that process a framework for system-
atic thought, the creation of novel ideas, and the interjection of
a futuristic orientation--in the instant case, the main contribution
was along the first dimension.
13E. The Role of Ideological and Instrumental Beliefs
Another important conclusion which emerges from the analysis of
various strategic decisions taken in the Postal Reform Case is related
to the role of ideological and instrumental beliefs in such processes.
Present findings suggest that a sophisticated understanding of policy
formation processes requires taking into account those ideological
and instrumental beliefs which in fact determined the images of pro-
blems held by the policymakers and at least partially predisposed them
to accept or reject certain problem formulations and certain policy
alternatives.
The crucial role of the ideological and instrumental beliefs as
a driving force behind the policy formation process is vividly demon-
strated in the Case and in the analysis: of strategic decisions taken
by O'Brien, by the Quadriad, and by.the Kappel Commission. Perhaps
the most striking example worthy of brief elaboration here is the
Nixon Administration's decision regarding postal reform. As we have
already pointed out, it is nearly impossible to understand this deci-
sion without penetration into the a prior ideological and instrumental
beliefs held by President Nixon and by his key advisors about the role
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of government in society, or more precisely, what has been labelled
by Dr. Burns as Nixon's concept of "good government". The fact that
the Kappel Commission recommendations were consistent with those in-
tensely held beliefs provides the beginning of an explanation as to
why President Nixon personally became committed to the postal reform
idea and why he publicly made an almost irrevocable commitment to
implementation of these recommendation.
A crucial factor to be noted here is that those ideological
and instrumental beliefs were never seriously challenged or subjected
to either self examination, or independent analysis, although the
case material demonstrates that considerable attention was paid to
value explication in analysis related to various strategic decisions.
This suggests that under conditions where the policymaking group (pol-
icymakers and analysts) share the same ideological and instrumental
beliefs, simple explication of values in analysis as originally sug-
gested in the framework is not enough to bring those beliefs under
examination by the policy system. This finding has important normative
implications which will be addressed separately.
The findings which emerge from the analysis of the strategic
decisions taken during the crisis period of the postal strike suggest
that crisis situations tend to reduce the ideological and value sensi-
tivity of the policymakers and may provide an impetus for reconsider-
ation of various ideological beliefs which previously were beyond the
domain of decision options now available.
The important role played by ideological and instrumental beliefs,
especially at the level of policy level decisionr-makers whose actions
may affect t.c enire policy procs:: conrnot i; ;-;tr::;::cd i;oo :;irolgly.
394
This finding, while not new, is dramatically confirmed by the rich
empirical case data. It suggests a significant role for policy anal-
ysis in not only explicating, but also inducing critical independent
and self examination of these beliefs and their consequences.
A second important dimension to our finding is that the case
analysis demonstrated clearly that differing (implicit) idealogical
and instrumental beliefs was a major source of inter-personal and
inter-organizational conflict. This was particularly evident in the
extended debate over the public service versus efficiency arguments
underlying the opposing factions in the Postal Reform Case.
13F. Strategy Regarding Scope and Intensity of Change
One of the main characteristics of the postal policy formation
process composed of several separate and partly independent decisions,
taken by different actors, and located at different points on the time
stream, is that each of them includes an explicit strategic decision
regarding the scope and intensity of change in policy.
Examination of this network of strategic decisions from this
perspective allowed enumeration of a few suggestive, interrelated,
conditions under which the policy actors may tend to adopt a strategy
of radical policy change. These conditions include the following:
a) Dissatisfaction with the present state of the system
and with existing policies.
b) The existence of a perception of non-equifinality
regarding the various strategic alternatives (i.e., their
perceived likelihood of achieving desired system reorienta-
tion.
c) The existence of a perception of crisis or involvement
in immediate crisis.
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d) The capacities, intentions, and policy leverage of the
main policy actors.
We will briefly elaborate on each of these conditions.
a) Dissatisfaction with the Present State of the System and With
Existing Policies. Dissatisfaction with the existing policies and a
recognition of a performance gap were clearly brought out in the anal-
ysis of O'Brien's decision, of the Quadriad deliberations and Report,
of the Kappel Commission proceedings and recommendations, and finally,
of the Nixon Administration's decisions regarding postal reform policy
initiation. This suggests that when the results of present or past
policies are unsatisfactory to the policymakers and to the social
strata on which they depend (either because the initial course of
action was perceived as wrong, or because of the accelerated transfor-
mation of conditions) an incremental change strategy is likely to be
perceived as insufficient for achieving an acceptable rate and scope
of improvement in policy outcome.
Under such conditions, incremental change becomes less attractive,
and a radical deprture in policy is more likly to be adopted. This is
so because radical change is then perceived as at least offering a way
out from intolerable situations, which, even though its outcome may
be unpredictable, it offers the possibility of significant improvement.
Such a "definition of the situation" lay behind the approach of O'Brien,
Blount, and others in the Postal Reform Case. O'Brien succeeded in
capturing and articulating this notion in a memo to Kappel in which he
states:
". . a primary question is whether it is worth risking
abandonment of unsatisfactory certainty for possible sat-
isfactory uncertaintly."
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The answer of O'Brien, of the Quadriad, of the Kappel Commission, and
of Blount, was definitely positive. This fact provides one of the
explanatory variables regarding the preference of several key policy
actors for adoption of a strategy of radical change.
b) Perception of Non-Equifinality Regarding Various Strategic Alterna-
tives to Achieve System Reorientation. A second suggestive variable
which emerges from the analysis of the decisions regarding postal
reform is related to the concept of non-equifinality. O'Brien, the
Quadriad, the Kappel Commission, and finally Bount and the new Post
Office management did not perceive the two recognized strategic options
(radical change and incremental change in policy) as being clearly
equifinal; that is, leading to the same or equivalent results.
This is a very important theoretical point be cause it challenges
the widely accepted notion that the main difference between the radical
and incremental change strategy lied in the intensity of change. That
is, the belief that an accumulation of small incremental changes over
a long time period may have an impact equivalent to that produced by
comprehensive and rapid radical change.
In the strategic decisions in the postal case, radical or funda-
mental change was perceived in terms of a basic systems reorientation
and a change in direction which requires the breaking of relationships
with the past. There existed a general feeling that this goal was
unattainable through utilization of an incremental change strategy.
This finding suggests that when the goal of policy actors is the acieve-
ment of a basic system reorientation and change of direction, the tend-
ency will be to adopt a strategy of radical vice incremental change.
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c) Existence of a Perception of Crisis or Involvement in Immediate
Crisis. The existence of a perception of crisis or the involvement
in immediate crisis is an addtitional condition under which policy-
makers may tend to adopt a radical departure from existing policies.
Both of these conditions existed relative to the postal policy forma-
tion process in the period under investigation.
The existence of a perception of crisis characterizes the be-
havior of O'Brien, of the Quadriad, of the Kappel Commission, and of
Blount. Although there existed differences in the weight attributed
to the "imminent catastrophe thesis" in various decisional processes,
the perception of crisis was still one of the main characteristics
of the postal policy formation process. While O'Brien and Blount
perceived crisis more in terms of an ultimate danger of system collapse,
the Kappel Commission did not confirm the imminent catastrophe thesis.
Instead, the Kappel Report stated clearly that the Post Office was in
serious crisis. In the Kappel Commission deliberations, the crisis
was perceived more in terms of a crisis of management (i.e., the lack
of), rather than in terms of imminent system collapse.
An instance of involvement in immediate crisis is reflected in
the postal strike phase. Examination of the postal policy formation
process during the strike phase suggested that the role of crisis
was significant in influencing strategic decisions. Crisis served to
facilitate consensus-building in favor of a radical departure from
existing policies; a situation which had been considered only a few
weeks before as being outside of the realm of political feasibility.
The conditions of an existence of imminent danger to the policymaker's
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high priority goals, a perception of urgency, a short decision time,
and a narrow range of open options, produced a consensus regarding the
necessity for a radical change of direction. Such a consensus was
extremely difficult to achieve in a non-crisis environment.
This suggests that under conditions of an existence of'a percep-
tion of crisis or the involvement in immediate crisis, policymakers
will tend to adopt a strategy of radical policy change.
d) Capacities, Intentions, and Policy Leverage of the Main Policy
Actors. Actor's capacities, intentions, and policy leverage is sug-
gested as an additional cluster variable helping explain the prefer-
ence for a strategy of radical change. The analysis of the behavior
of O'Brien, of the Kappel Commission, and of Blount led us to the
conclusion that actors' capacities, intentions, and policy leverage
had a considerable impact on strategy preference. This study revealed
that the composition of the policy formation system, with leading
personalities who came from top political (O'Brien) and other policy-
level organizational positions, had a considerable impact on how the
problem was approached, on the direction of search, and finally on the
strategy preferences of the policymaker.
Involvement in the postal policy formation process entailed
various costs (including political costs) for the key policy actors.
These actors were very sensitive about the protection of their reputa-
tion and, therefore, were reluctant to be associated personally (O'Brien,
Kappel, and other Commissioners, Blount) or as a team (Quadriad, Kappel
Commission) with what they perceived to be any secondary issues or "half-
way solutions".
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Thus, it becomes clear that it is nearly impossible to understand
the dynamics of postal policy formation without recognizing the crucial
role played by certain individuals, and without an analysis of actors'
intentions and capacities. The postal policy formation process was
dominated in certain phases by individual actors displaying a mission-
ary type of leadership with strong pro-change predispositions. For
example, the Conception and Birth Phase was dominated by O'Brien, the
Crystalization Phase by Kappel (and other Commission personalities), the
Transition Phase by Burns, and the Legislative Phase by Bount and Schultz.
The results of this study concur with Norman's observation that
the ability for direction and the capacity to ensure commitment are
very important for what he has termed "reorientation" (roughly identical
with our definition of radical change); while it is relatively less
important for the type of change termed by Norman as "variation" (incre-
mental change).*
The postal experience suggests that the availability of an excep-
tional person or group with strong pro-change predispositions, willing
and able to transform a potential policy issue into actual policy issues
through the political process is another condition under which policy
actors will tend to adopt a strategy of radical (vice incremental) change.
In the Postal Reform Case, all four of the major conditions iden-
tified and elaborated on above were present. In other cases in which
*R. NORMAN, "Organizational Innovations: Product Variations and Re-
orientation", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16, 2 (June 1971).
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all of these conditions were present, I would predict that the policy-
makers would be more likely to adopt a strategy of radical vice incre-
mental change. However, it is quite obvious that the occurrence of all
four of these conditions is a relatively rare situation. Therefore,
radical change may be thought of as an atypical situation occurring
only under certain conditions.
I would not, however, agree with Schoettle's characterization of
radical change as "random disurbances in the otherwise stable and incre-
mental policymaking process, only momentarily producing a fluction in
the old patterns of policymaking which quickly reassert themselves".*
Our disagreement is substantive, not merely semantical. The study of
the conditions under which "random disturbances" are likely to occur is
a fool's errand. Furthermore, Schoettles term implies a system "aber-
ration" which is somehow abnormal and ought to be surpressed or ignored.
Much more empirical work is necessary before the issue is well
enough understood to debate it. This research tends to support the
position that there are identifiable conditions under which radical
change may occur (or at least may be attempted). Therefore, at this
point there is little value in any dogmatic statements which imply that
the occurrence of radical change is either a random or an abnormal
phenomenon. The obvious importance and necessity of better understanding
these conditions lies in the fact that, even though radical change may
*Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, "The State of the Art in Policy Studies",
in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, The Study of Policy Forma-
tion; op. cit., p. 179.
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occur relatively infrequently, policies pursued under a radical change
strategyare likely to have far-reaching and long-standing consequences
and, therefore, seem to be deserving of attention and scarce research
resources. Furthermore, it may be that some policy changes simply
are not attainable unless pursued through a strategy of radical change--
thus, the very decision as to scope and intensity of change may itself
affect the policy feasibility, a situation that was apparent in the
Postal Reform Case.
13G. Identical vs. Mixed Strategies
Examination of various decisions regarding postal reform in terms
of their explicit or implicit strategies clearly revealed a tendency
toward reliance on identical strategies. The possibility of using
mixed strategies (e.g., pursuing radical (or major) change in one policy
target area and incremental change in others) was not seriously expored
by policy actors in the Postal Reform Case. There exists some evidence
of utilization of a shock or disequilibrium strategy aimed at opening
the system to change. However, this was an implicit strategy and was
primarily considered as one of the potential outputs of the radical
change strategy.
This lack of attention to the possibility of following mixed
strategies was characteristic of decisions made by O'Brien, by the
Quadriad, and by the Kappel Commission. Later, it also applied to
the Nixon Administration's decision to endorese postal reform. The
main explanation of the lack of attention to such a possibility lies
in the relative insensitivity of the policymakers to reform costs.
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Two clusters of reasons may provide plausible explanations for
this lack of sensitivity to reform costs. These include:
1) the existence of a perception that the risk of maintaining
the present situation, in the long-run (some actors, e.g., O'Brien and
Blount, perceived this in the short-run) may be equal or even higher
than the risks associated with radical reform. This perception was
shaped by a dissatisfaction with the effects of past policies and by
a recognition of a performance gap. Thus, a break with the past (dis-
regarding the cost) was perceived as being preferable to a perpetuation
of the status quo. Such a perception-was reinforced by a feeling that
the political costs of the incremental change strategy would be equal
to, or even more costly than, the costs of a radical strategy. Both
of these perceptions were mainly based on intuition and rich, trained
experience; and none of them were seriously challenged by analysis.
2) The existence of strong ideological and instrumental beliefs
may predispose the policymakers to certain policy options which are
consistent with those beliefs, with little explicit attention to the
costs involved. This conclusion emerges from the analysis of the Nixon
Administration's strategic decision regarding postal reform. This
analysis clearly demonstrated that the appealing nature of the pro-
posed policy alternative (the corporate structure) relative to certain
ideological and instrumental beliefs held by the policymakers, resulted
in a de-emphasis of cost considerations.
Each of these two clusters is, by itself, insufficient to explain
the lack of attention to the possibility of utilizing mixed strategies.
Taken together, those factors reinforce one another and constitute a
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plausible explanation of the policy actors' behavior. This may suggest
that in conditions of high dissatisfaction, a dramatic break with the
past (disregarding the cost) may be perceived as preferable to the
perpetuation of the status quo. Similarly, the existence of strong
ideological and instrumental beliefs may result in a preference for
certain policy options and a concomitant disregard of policy costs. In
such situations, there is little probability that mixed strategies will
be seriously considered in policy formation. Apart from the non-utili-
zation of mixed strategies, the insensitivity to policy costs had an
important impact on other modes of policy formation. For example, it
resulted in a lack of any efforts to-balance the radical change strategy
with risk-reducing mechanisms such as experimentation or sequential
decision-making.
13H. Strategy and Structure
In the earlier analysis, we pointed out that the data in the Postal
Reform Case represented a situation in which structural change was advo-
cated as a means of achieving strategic ends. Through system redesign
(i.e., structural change) the policymakers hoped to create a situation
conducive to attainment of their strategic goals--greater managerial
flexibility and autonomy. This explicit concern with structure, on the
part of macro-level policymakers, as a mechanism for the operational
expression of strategy, may contribute some empirical enlightment on
the long-standing strategy-structure debate.
This is not the time to join the debate as to the direction and
nature of the relationship between these two variables. The essential
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organizational issues are raised an Alfred Chandler's well known book
and in Radnor's recent, insightful paper.* For present purposes, I
will merely state that the postal experience (to date) provides strong
empirical evidence to indicate that strategy dominates structure. How-
ever, this finding must be viewed in a very tentative way. Although
the implementation stage of postal reform lies beyond the scope of our
study, I have noted in the analysis that the policy actors paid rel-
atively little attention to implementation variables in general, and
to what we have termed organizational feasibility, in particular.
I offer as informed speculation the view that the relative in-
attention to organizational feasibility may have serious dysfunctional
consequences during the implementation phase.** Had more attention
been paid to organizational feasibility during the early phases of the
policy formation process, this variable may well have interacted with
other strategic considerations so as to produce a somewhat different
outcome--perhaps one in which strategic considerations would not have
dictated structural considerations so directly or so strongly. There-
fore, because of our presently truncated view of the total policy
formation process, this finding as to the relationship between strategy
*Michael Radnor, "Management Sciences and Policy Sciences"; Policy
Sciences, Vol. 2, 1971, pp. 447-456.
**Mr. Kappel, who is now serving as Chairman of the newly created Board
of Governors advised us during our interview with him that the Postal
Service has experienced considerable difficulty in regards to imple-
mentation actions.
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and structure is offered in a very tentative way, subject to further
empirical testing. However, I would conclude with the thought that
perhaps the most fruitful line of inquiry would be one aimed at better
understanding the real nature of the relationship between these two
variables, with less emphasis on "proving" which is the leading and
which is the following variable.
13I. System and Issue Delimitation
The unfixed, open, and undefined boundaries of complex policy
formation generally and the interrelatedness between the policy under
investigation and other related issues and systems is perhaps best
demonstrated in the pay issue. The analysis of Administration strategy
toward the pay issue points out the extreme difficulty of dealing with
the interconnection between variables endogenous to the postal policy
and variables exogenous to that policy but which influence it through
cross impact.
The analysis of the Case has demonstrated the near impossibility
of understanding the Nixon Administration's behavior in the postal
policy formation without treating the issue within the broader context
of the overall economic policy. The overall anti-inflationary policy
intended to be pursued at that time by the Administration demonstrates
a variable exogenous to postal policy, but which exercised strong
cross-impact influence on the policy under investigation. Contrary to
many other issues, the interrelatedness between the postal pay/reform
strategy pursued by the Post Office and the overall economic policy was
more visible and to some extent susceptible to control; but the exact
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issue delimitation and the reconciliation between those two strategic
decisions was extremely difficult--and until the postal-strike crisis
the issue remained unresolved. The threat of a Presidential veto of
the House version of HR 13000, the Administration posture in Congress,
and various negotiations with the unions were all greatly influenced
by spillover effects from other policies (i.e., the anti-inflationary
policy and federal pay in general).
It is beyond the intention and the scope of this study to pene-
trate deeper into the pay issue. All that can be done here is to high-
light the importance of the spillover effect from other policies on the
issue under investigation.
In the Postal Reform Case, we.did see a good example of a keen
awareness of-the implications of boundary and issue delimitation.
O'Brien (and later Kappel) brought to bear on the postal system a
"definition of the situation" which was an intuitive recognition of
the pattern of relationships between the Congress and the POD. Aware-
ness of the existence of this pattern lead to important strategic deci-
sions regarding the need to and the means of bringing about systemic
changes in long-established patterns of relationships.
Thus, the Case (and analysis of it) provide empirical support
for the suggestion in the framework development section concerning the
value of examining system and issue boundary delimitation.
1311. SpilloverEffects From Other Policies. Closely related to the
topic of boundary and issue delimitation is the matter of spillover
effects from other policies (cross-impact analysis). The Postal Reform
C-
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Case suggests that spillover effects from other policies constitute
a very important factor for analyzing and understanding behavior of
the policy system. The spillover effect from other policies on the
particular policy under investigation was demonstrated at least in
three separate decisions:
1) the impact of the Johnson Administration's desire to
remove the burden of the huge postal deficit form the fed-
eral budget on the treatment of O'Brien's reform proposal.
2) the impact of the Nixon Adminstration's overall anti-
inflationary policy on the important decisions regarding
pay and.ultimately the marrying together of pay and reform
considerations.
3) the impact of the policy of the federal government and
organized labor to improve labor-management relations in
the public sector. More specifically, the impact of the
desire on the part of some government officials and some
union leaders to initiate and institutionalize collective
bargaining in the public sector on the strike settlement
and the resultant Administration/Union coalition in support
of postal pay and reform.
The case analysis suggests a very mixed sensitivity to the impli-
cations of the above inter-connections. With the possible exception
of the first item, there was not conscious sensitivity to the possible
spillover effect of other policies on the postal reform strategy until
overt conflict began to emerge.
13J. Overall Strategy
13J1. Johnson Administration. Case analysis has shown that under the
Johnson Administration there was an absence of an overall strategy
regarding postal reform. O'Brien's policy initiatives can hardly be
characterized as an integral part of an overall strategy. Rather, it
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was much more of a personal initiative with tacit approval from Pres-
ident Johnson. The lack of an overall Administration strategy regard-
ing postal reform attribute mainly to the absence of a strategic
decision to make a policy decision.
President Johnson's management strategy was based on an expec-
tation that consensus would be reached among his advisors before he
was called upon to make a strategic decision. While some degree of
consensus was evident in regards to the decision to authorize O'Brien's
speech, this was not the case in regards to the broader strategic
question of endorsing postal reform... O'Brien's departure from the
postal scene and Watson's strong resistance to the corporate reform
idea advocated by the Kappel Commission made consensus on this issue
practically impossible. This lack of consensus finally dampened
Johnson's enthusiasm for the entire reform idea.
Thus, without a strong commitment from Johnson personally, and
in the absence of a consensus among his advisors, the decision to
make a policy decision was not made and, therefore, no overall strategy
was ever planned. Although a belated endorsement of postal reform was
made in the last moments of the Johnson Administration, this was so
late as to obviate the need for any overall strategy.
I see in the strategic milieu surrounding the Johnson Administra-
tion the critical impact of idiosyncratic personal and situational
variables and suggest that personalities may play a decisive role in
certain pivotal phases of the policy formation process. This further
suggests the high potential value of examining personal, motivational
variables in policy research and analysis.
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13J2. Nixon Administration. In contrast to the Johnson Administra-
tion, the Nixon Administration did develop and follow an overall
strategy towards postal reform. Although this strategy was informally
developed and at times only implicitly articulated (except in regards
to particular legislative proposals), it was consistently followed
and served as a guideline for secondary strategic and tactical deci-
sions. The development of an overall strategy by the Nixon Administra-
tion was closely linked to the early, strong, and explicit decision to
make a policy decision. This, as we have seen, is directly attributable
to Nixon's strong personal commitment to the reform idea, and to the
"availability" of the reform proposal as an actionable policy package.
This again underscores the important role of personal and situational
variables.
I would point out, however, the fallacy of the illusionary notion
that the existence of an overall Administration strategy resulted in the
absence of differing views within the Executive Branch regarding postal
reform. In fact, as we have already seen, the Executive Branch was far
from monolithic on this issue. Although not fully perceived by out-
sider, there was, within the Administration a continuous collision of
viewpoints and interests. These ranged from minor reservations to a
more basic questioning of the essence of the reform idea. However,
these diverse and diffuse interests and views were eventually over-
shadowed by the strong personal desire of the President to achieve the
postal reform goals he had originally committed himself to, even though
the cost of doing so had grown considerably.
Thus, the Nixon Administration did have and consistently (almost
rigidly) followed an overall strategy, but the formulation of this
strategy omitted any early and serious concern for the issue of reform
costs. Furthermore, the rather indlexible implementation of the stra-
tegy served to further increase the magnitude of the policy resources
necessary to achieve the strategic goal. This suggests a critical
(and in this instance overlooked) role for analysis in counter-balanc-
ing the likely impact of strong personal commitment by focusing explicit
attention on cost and other variables which tend to be de-emphasized
when strong ideological and instrumental beliefs are dominating the
formulation of policy strategies.
Even though the Nixon Administration did have an overall strategy
regarding postal reform, this strategy did not explicitly take into
account inter-connections with other policies and systems and spill-
over effects. Thus, in strategy implementation, postal reform goals,
and other goals (e.g., the desire to control inflation) came into con-
flict and no mechanism or structure (short of the crisis induced per-
sonal involvement of the President) existed for dealing with such high
level policy conflicts. This points out both the extreme difficulty
and the critical importance of achieving policy coordination at the
highest levels of government, and tends to show how analytical attention
to inter-connections and spillover effects might serve to improve the
policymaker's capability to achieve a higher degree of coordination.
13J3. Strategy Consistency. The postal reformiproposal, as presented
in various Administration bills, was directed at changing the interface
and the power distribution between Congress and the Post Office in the
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direction of strengthening the overall influence of the managers of
the postal system on the policy formation process and in allowing these
managers a high degree of autonomy and independence. The means to this
end was seen as a severing of the dependency of the postal system on the
Congress. From this perspective, the strategic goals and actions of
the Nixon Administration were consistent throughout both the Transition
Phase and the Realization Phase of the Postal Reform Case. Although, for
tactical reasons, the administration's postal reform proposals appeared
under different names and sometimes were sponsored by different Congress-
men, the main strategic patterns remained unchanged and were consistently
pursued.
Of course, as we have already seen, this consistency (bordering on
rigidity) was sometimes costly in terms of scarce policy resources. On
the other hand, there appears to be a high degree of consensus among
the key policymakers enterviewed during this study that this very con-
sistency and clarity in strategy (goals and actions) was a very impor-
tant factor in achieving ultimate success in the legislative arena.
Yet, as the Case and analysis have emphasized, even such an assessment
must be tempered by considering the impact of crisis (the postal strike)
on the policy formation process.
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13K. The Impact of Crisis on Policy Formation
Analysis of the Postal Reform Case has shown that the impact of cri-
sis (mainly the postal strike) on the policy formation process was signi-
ficant. It was manifested in regards to consensus-building, changing coa-
lition membership, changes in value sensitivity, and, changes in search
behavior.
1) Consensus-building and attitudinal change. This study showed
that crisis served to speed and otherwise facilitate consensus-building.
However, the crisis induced consensus did not really change existing
attitudes of the policy actors. When the danger of imminent crisis sub-
sided, previously existing attitudes (as manifested in patterns of be-
havior) quickly reasserted themselves. My interpretation of this pheno-
menon is that crisis created a shift in the goal priorities of the po-
licy actors, but did not produce basic attitudinal changes.
2) Coalition membership. Another impact of crisis well demonstrated
in the postal reform policy formation process is the change in coali-
tion membership. During the crisis stage, the patterns of relationships
among policy actors (both individual and institutional) were dynamically
changing. Bargaining positions and other elements of power were altered
by time pressures. Specifically, the historically strong coalition be-
tween the postal unions and the Congress (especially the House Post Of-
fice and Civil Service Committee) was drastically altered by an ad hoc
Postal Union/ Executive Branch coalition which emerged out of the crisis
and which ultimately resulted in passage of the postal reform legisla-
tion.
Thus, crisis tends to induce changes in coalition membership, with
old alignments being broken-up and temporarily replaced by emergent ad
hoc arrangements. This also tends to increase system uncertainty because,
while old patterns of relationships were broken up, new, more stable
relationships (ways of doing business) have not yet evolved out of the
drastically restructured system.
3) Value sensitivity. This study has suggested that a further im-
pact of crisis is the reduction of the value sensitivity of various
policy actors. Furthermore, crisis tends to provide an impetus for re-
consideration of values which are usually beyond the domain of deci-
sions.
4) Search Behavior. Crisis served to considerably reduce both the
scope and the duration of search activity. The crisis atmosphere reduced
the time available for search and also limited the kind of alternative
being searched for in the sense that only an already relatively "worked
out" policy alternative would be acceptable in search. Thus, it is clear
that the impact of crisis on policy formation may be quite significant,
and an understanding of policy actors' behavior should be heightened by
an examination of this dimension.
13L. Policy Instruments
In this particular study, the use of the concept of policy instru-
ments-has been restricted to structural dimension. The general use of
the concept implies no such' restriction and so in other situations, other
dimensions might be more appropriately focused upon.
This study has demonstrated that the strategic impact and importance
of decisions regarding policy instrument choices lay in molding the
structure of the policy formation system and in creating mechanisms for
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the management of policy analysis. Thus, we saw that the creation of the
Quadriad and of the Presidential Commission served to mold and shape
the overall mode of the policy formation process, including the nature
and direction of search, and to some extent the nature and scope of po-
licy alternatives dealt with.
In the Postal Reform Case, strategic decisions regarding policy
instruments were based more on rich, trained experience, political in-
tuition, and pragmatic considerations rather than on the results of any
systematic analysis. The internal Kappel Commission decisions relating
to policy instruments were a marked exception to this pattern.This points
out the anomoly which permeated the Crystallization Phase. The Commission-
ers (and Staff) perceived that the President would have different expec-
tations of them than they had of the Staff and contractors insofar as
the nature and degree of rigor in the conduct of systematic analysis and
the presentation for decision of the full range of the output of such
analysis.
13M. Time Considerations
This study has vividly shown that the policy formation process is
a time sensitive endeavor. As a strategic considerations, time was shown
to be important both in terms of time preferences with respect to de-
sired policy outcomes, and in terms of the timing of specific inputs to
the policy process. The time sensitive nature of policy formation was
demonstrated by crucial examples such as the timing of O'Brien's speech,
the timeliness of the creation of the Presidential Commission, and the
dysfunctional consequences of the delayed endorsement of the Kappel Re-
port by the Johnson Administration. Similarly, the strong and early
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decision of the Nixon Administration to endorse postal reform had a ma-
jor impact on the ensuing policy process.
In addition, a key, and often ignored, finding of this study was
the realtionship between time, systematic analysis, and strategy formu-
lation. Because systematic analysis can be very time consuming, an
unwillingness on the part of influential policymakers to allow(invest)
adequate time for analysis can severely impair the quality and role of
analytical inputs to the policy process. In the Postal Reform Case,
we saw an instance where policymakers systematically allowed time for
analysis and the outputs from that analysis significantly impacted on
the policy process. Furthermore we saw a close inter-connection between
the output from analysis (for which adequate time had been programmed)
and strategy formulation in the sense that the results of analysis partial-
ly shaped strategic time preferences with regard to policy outcomes.
13N. Policy Feasibility
Examination of the postal policy formation process from a policy
feasibility perspective clearly brought out the fact that policy feasi-
bility is a dynamic, time sensitive, and opportunistic concept. However,
the relationships between time and policy feasibility were shown to
be neither linear, nor fixed in direction, nor continuous. At certain
points the feasibility increased dramatically by "jumps" (for instance,
after O'Brien's speech, after the Colson-Rademacher agreement, and espe-
cially during the postal strike). At other points, the feasibility de-
creased, endangering opportunities for policy action, or nearly result-
ing in their loss (for instance, the absence of a strong, timely en-
dorsement of the Kappel Commission Recommendations by the Johnson
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Administration, and after the 13:13 tie vote in the House Post Office
Committee).
13N1. Variables Shaping Policy Feasibility. The central finding re-
garding policy feasibility is that it is variable, i.e., it can be mold-
ed by the policy actors. This was shown to be especially true in regard
to political feasibility. The findings from this study suggest two
main cluster variables which were important in shaping policy feasibili-
ty: 1) policy actors capacities and their policy leverage and intentions;
and, 2) the impact of crisis.
1) Actors' Capacities, Policy Leverage, and Intentions. Actors'
capacities and their policy leverage and intentions had an important
impact on the dynamics of shaping policy feasibility. This was demon-
strated by the role of several key policy actors (e.g., O'Brien, Kappel,
and Blount) in the postal policy formation process. For instance, O'Brien's
capacity to transform a potential policy concern into an actual policy
concern, Kappel's policy leverage vis-a-vis the incoming Administration,
and Blount's missionary commitment to the reform idea, are only a few
illustrative examples of this phenomenon.
It is important to recognize that actors' policy leverage differed
with respect to different policy target areas. The most striking example
of this phenomenon is the extremely low policy leverage of both the
Johnson and Nixon Administrations vis-a-vis the postal unions, (at
least until the strike crisis). It.is extremely difficult to document
this, but it is my informed impression that a significant increase in
the policy leverage of either (or both) political administrations would
probably have reduced some of the significant policy costs otherwise
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incurred by the White House.
Two conclusions emerge from the findings regarding the impact of
actors' capacities and their policy leverage and intentions. First,
although policy feasibility is partly dependent upon environmental and
situational variables (many of which are beyond the control of the policy-
makers) in some situations it can be at least partially molded by capable
policy actors. Secondly, the existence of a missionary commitment to
certain policy goals on the part of an aggressive leader can result in
the penetration of otherwise monolithic barriers. Under such conditions,
a capable and committed policy actor may achieve goals that previously
had been considered to be outside of the realm of feasibility. This
conclusion goes hand in hand with our observation that policy actors who
display such missionary leadership often prefer to deal with the more
dramatic, strategic aspects of policy formation and consider the imple-
mentation aspects of policy formation to be a more mundane, less attrac-
tive endeavor. This suggests that different kinds of leadership might
be more effective during different phases of the policy formation process.
2) The Impact of Crisis on Policy Feasibility. The impact of
crisis on the molding of policy feasibility has been demonstrated in the
case analysis, especially relative to the postal strike stage. Case
analysis suggested that the postal strike crisis was instrumental in en-
hancing the policy feasibility of the postal reform idea. During the
period between the Conception and Birth Phase and the occurrence of the
strike crisis, the policy system's readiness for change increased in a
step level function as a result of dissatisfacton and perceived crisis.
However, this increase was not enough to break the strong resistance to
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the Administration's reform proposal. The strike crisis can be viewed
as a critical event which upset the then existing equilibrium between
supporters and opponents of postal reform. The strike crisis may use-
fully be thought of as releasing a focused charge of energy sufficient
to upset a delicate, dynamic equilibrium and thus enabling a .change in
policy to materialize.
The strike situation created a condition in which there was: 1) an
imminent danger to the high priority goals of key policy actors; 2) a
perception of urgency; 3) a short decision time; and 4) a narrow range
of open options. The existence of these conditions facilitated con-
sensus regarding a radical departure from existing policies. Such a
consensus had been nearly impossible to achieve under a non-crisis
situation.
These findings also suggest that the crisis event mobilized the
application of policy energy and drive to postal problems to a degree
significantly higher than that existing at "normal" times. This energy
and drive was primarily manifested in the close involvement of the
President, The Secretary of Labor, Mr. George Meany, and other key policy
actors during the postal strike phase. This conclusion confirms the
broader observation that "in general crisis concentrates, non-crisis
disperses attention".
However, although the crisis event facilitated consensus and inten-
sified the application of policy energy to the postal reform issue, it
is doubtful whether it changed the existing attitudes, at least in the
short run. There is evidence that old patterns of behavior tended to
reassert themselves quickly as soon as the danger of imminent crisis was
over. This leads us to the conclusion that what really happened was a
shift in the priority of short-term goals, without the occurrence of
any basic attitudinal change on the part of the main policy actors. In
addition to the shift in the priority of goals, the crisis event reduced
the value sensitivity of various actors, thus allowing them to endorse
certain decisions which they otherwise may have opposed.
13N2. Degree of Attention to Policy Feasibility Dimensions. The concept
of policy feasibility suggested in Chapter Five is tri-partite in nature;
consisting of political, economic, and organizational dimensions. Pre-
sent findings indicate that these three main dimensions received unequal
attention in analysis and in various decisional processes. The Case
analysis has shown that an intense degree of attention was devoted to
the political feasibility dimension. The economic dimension also
received relatively extensive treatment. However, the organizational
feasibility dimension received relatively little explicit attention. To
the extent that organizational feasibility was considered, the main
focus was on the structural component, while the behavioral component
was nearly ignored.
It should be noted that although these three dimensions of policy
feasibility seem to be conceptually valid distinctions, in practice,
the policymakers tended to intermingle consideration of all three dimen-
sions in a somewhat ill-defined manner. Thus, while these conceptual
distinctions are useful for understanding policy formation behavior,
they should not be interpreted as behavioral descriptions. In some dases,
this amorphous intermingling made it difficult to assess which dimension
of policy feasibility was being given emphasis. However, within this
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reservation, it is clear that the degree of awareness and concern for
policy feasibility on the part of the policy actors may be ranked as
intense for political feasibility, moderate for economic feasibility,
and low for organizational feasibility.
Earlier detailed analysis of discrete decisions suggested two
main variables which help explain the above phenomenon. Those were:
1) the relative lack of attention to the implementation dimension, and
2) the tacit belief that organizational issues would be "ironed out"
during the implementation stage. We will briefly examine these two main
variables.
1) The relative Lack of Attention to the Implementation Dimension.
During the entire policy formation process the policy actors concentrat-
ed on the implementation dimension only to the extent that it was per-
ceived that this issue had some importance in terms of the probability
that the proposed alternative would receive sufficient support to be
approved. Except for some minor attention late in the process, there
was practically no concern with implementation in the broad sense;
namely, with the variables affecting the acceptance and successful imple-
mentation of the policy change by the focal organization. Given the
strategy that defined the first order issue as one of obtaining legisla-
tive approval for the policy change, it is not surprising that organi-
zational feasibility (in an implementation context) was quite neglected
during the postal policy formation process.
2) Tacit Belief that the Organizational Issues Would Be Ironed Out
During the Implementation Stage. A distinct but closely related variable
was the tendency to view organizational feasibility (and especially
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its behavioral aspects) as a secondary issue that vould hopefully be
"ironed out" during the implementation stage. This near total neglect
of organizational feasibility was manifested in a complete absence of
any early implementation planning. This behavior can be attributed to
the external, systemic orientation of the main policy actors, and to their
preference for dealing with the more dramatic (and presumably more impor-
tant in their perception) aspects of the policy formation process.
13N3. The Stigma Attached to a Concern For Political Feasibility. One
potentially important behavioral finding generally ignored in the lit-
erature is the observation that there existed an almost unanimous reluc-
tance on the part of the major policy actors to "admit" that they had
taken actions aimed at molding policy feasibility. As we noted earlier,
most policy actors did not clearly discriminate between political, econo-
mic, and organizational feasibility in their thinking and action. More
often than not, the term "feasibility" was used in an all inclusive
manner, but with a distinct emphasis on the political dimension. However,
while many of the policy actors we interviewed freely "accused" others
of engaging in "political maneuvering", nearly all of them took special
pains to assure us that they did not engage in such practices. This
is especially surprising in the case of those actors whose behavior is
portrayed in the Case as intentionally and very skillfully taking overt
action to mold the political feasibility of the corporate reform proposal.
Nonetheless, this behavior may be understood in terms of several
factors. First, the very word "political" seems to have a deeply ingrained
pejorative connotation which many policy actors prefer to avoid. This
was an especially sensitive issue in the Postal Reform Case, given that
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a major part of the rationale for advocating the reform of the postal
system was the implied "good government" objective of "removing the POD
from politics". Secondly, some actors (e.g., The Kappel Commission
and the POD) wanted to create a public image of balance and objectivity.
An admitted concern with "political feasibility" was probably perceived
as being inconsistent with that desired image. Finally, there may have
existed a perception that the value of such feasibility-molding action
as was undertaken might be undermined if exposed to public scrutiny.
Thus, the central conclusion from these findings is that the term
political feasibility is very imprecisely used and that it is burdened
with a persistent negative connotation (implying all manner of sub-rosa
activity) which tends to act as a barrier to effective understanding and
application of the phenomenon. Also, this study has indicated that
policy actors do not think and act in terms of the conceptual structure
used here to attempt to understand behavior. This emphasizes again that
the conceptual framework is not intended to be applied as a descriptive
model of actual behavior, but rather, as an heuristic aid to understand-
ing and research.
130. The Conceptual Framework In Retrospect
Section 13A indicated that the second and last part of this chapter
would include an assessment of the viability of the conceptual framework
as judged against the objectives set out for it early in this study.
With the full realization that the reader may or may not concur, a few
summary comments will be offered from the author's perspective. These com-
ments flow from an introspective and retrospective analysis of expecta-
tions and accomplishments insofar as this study is concerned.
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On balance, I feel that the conceptual framework for analysis was
a most useful heuristic aid insofar as focusing attention on certain
variables and suggesting what to look for when examining these varia-
bles. Given its flexibile and suggestive nature, the framework supplied
no "answers", but it was never intended to do so. To an even higher de-
gree than I had originally anticipated, the framework was very useful
in highlighting linkages and interdependencies between and among varia-
bles.
It seems quite clear that any policy analyst or policy researcher
would know infinitely more about the postal reform policy process after
having applied the conceptual framework than before such an attempt.
Furthermore, in the process of application, attention to one variable,
or to the relationship between certain variables, other relationships
are suggested as a result of the very process of guided analysis; the
framework being the guide and focusing mechanism.
It was recognized at the outset that this conceptual framework for
analysis was a very tentative one which required both refinement and
further elaboration through application and testing. At this stage,
often application of the framework to the Postal Reform Case, I do not
see the need for any major revisions in the structure or content of the
framework. I do see the need for investing a great deal of effort in
further operationalizing some of the concepts included in the framework,
so as to facilitate wide-spread application and replication.
In a broader sense, this "test" of the framework was inherently li-
mited because of application to only a single case study. However, even
that aspect must be tempered by recognition that the Postal Reform Case
was so complex and comprehensive, and because it consisted of several
major policy decisions and many subsidiary supporting decision, that
it in reality was several integrated cases. Nonetheless, there is an
urgent need to now apply the conceptual framework for analysis to many
other policy cases under varying circumstances.
Thus through further application and testing, this framework will
be refined, elaborated, and most certainly improved. I already have
specific plans to embark upon additional research which will entail
application of the framework to other, already documented, policy case
studies. This type of effort, along with the development of new, policy-
oriented, behavioral case studies is of great importance and represents
a difficult and costly endeavor. There is far more that needs to be
done and the reader is most earnestly invited to join me in this challeng-
ing future.
Appendix "A"
Key Personalities In the Postal Reform Case
ANDERSON, Martin, Dr. - Director of Research during President Nixon's
1968 Campaign; Chief of Staff of the Presiden-
tial Transition Task Force (1969); Special
Assistant to Presidential Councillor, Arthur
Burns.
BLOUNT, Winton M., Mr. - Postmaster General of the United States.
BURNS, Arthur F., Dr. - Personal Advisor to President-elect Nixon;
Councillor to President Richard Nixon (Jan-
uary 1969 - January, 1970).
BURRIS, Richard, Mr. - Special Assistant to Presidential Councillor,
Arthur Burns.
CALIFANO, Joseph A., Jr., Mr. - Special Assistant to President Lyndon
B. Johnson.
COHEN, Stanley R., Mr. - Washington Editor, Advertising Age.
COLSON, Charles W., Mr. - Special Counsel to President Nixon, White
House.
COMAROW, Murray, Mr. - Executive Director of the President's Commission
on Postal Organization.
DERWINSKI, Edward J., Rep. (R., Ill.) - Minority Member, House Post
Office and Civil Service Committee.
DULSKI, Thaddeus J., Rep., (D., N. Y.) - Chairman, House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee.
EHRLICHMAN, John D., Mr. - Special Assistant (Domestic Affairs) to
President Richard Nixon, White House.
HARLOW, Bryce, Mr.- Special Counsel to President Richard Nixon.
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KAPPEL, Frederick R., Mr. - Former board chairman of AT & T; Chairman
of the President's Commission on Postal Organi-
zation, New York City.
LEE, Ronald B., Mr. - Assistant Postmaster General for Planning and
Systems Analysis, Post Office Department;
Member of the "Quadriad".
LEWIN, Larry, Mr. - Special Assistant to FMG Lawrence O'Brien; Member
of the "Quadriad".
MAY, Timothy J., Mr. - Former General Counsel, Post Office Department;
Member of the "Quadriad".
MAYO, Robert P., Mr. - Former Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
Chicago.
MC GEE, Gale W., Senator (D., Wyo.) - Chairman, Senate Post Office and
Civil Service Committee.
O'BRIEN, Lawrence F., Mr. - Former Postmaster General of the United
States (November 1965 -April 1968); Co-chair-
man, Citizen's Committee for Postal Reform.
RADEMACHER, James
SCHULTZE, Charles
H., Mr. - President, National Association of Letter
Carriers (AFL/CIO).
L., Mr. - Former Director of the Bureau of the Budget
(June 1965 - June 1968).
SHULTZ, George P., Mr. - Former Secretary of Labor, U. S. Labor Department.
SIMON, Benson J.,
-UDALL, Morris K.,
Mr. - Budget Analyst for the Post Office in the Bureau
of the Budget; Professional Staff member of the
President's Commission on Postal Organization.
Rep. (D., Ariz.) : Member, House Post Office and Civil
Service Committee.
WATSON, Marvin, Mr. - Former Postmaster General of the United States
(April 1968 - January 1969).
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